[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2019-13177":30,"landing-articles":83},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":64,"epss_score":65,"epss_percentile":66,"is_kev":67,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":68,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},240870,"CVE-2019-13177","EUVD-2019-0033","Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in django-rest-registration\n\n## Misusing the Django Signer API leads to predictable signatures used in verification emails\n\n### Impact\nThe vulnerability is a high severity one. Anyone using Django REST Registration library versions `0.2.*` - `0.4.*` with e-mail verification option (which is recommended, but needs [additional configuration](https:\u002F\u002Fdjango-rest-registration.readthedocs.io\u002Fen\u002Flatest\u002Fquickstart.html#preferred-configuration)) is affected.\nIn the worst case, the attacker can take over any Django user by resetting his\u002Fher password without even receiving the reset password verification link, just by guessing the signature from publicly available data (more detailed description below).\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in version `0.5.0`. All library users should upgrade to version `0.5.0` or higher.\nThe fix will invalidate all previously generated signatures , and in consequence, all verification links in previously sent verification e-mails. Therefore semi-major version `0.5.0` was released instead of version `0.4.6` to mark that incompatibility.\n\n### Workarounds\nThe easiest way way is to disable the verification options by using something like the minimal configuration described [here](https:\u002F\u002Fdjango-rest-registration.readthedocs.io\u002Fen\u002Flatest\u002Fquickstart.html#minimal-configuration). This will unfortunately disable checking whether the given e-mail is valid and make unable to users who registered an account but didn't verify it before config change.\n\nLess harsh way is to temporarily disable just the the reset password functionality:\n\n```python\nREST_REGISTRATION = {\n    # ...\n    'RESET_PASSWORD_VERIFICATION_ENABLED': False,\n    # ...\n}\n```\nWhich should disallow the worst case, which is account takeover by an attacker. The attacker can still use the register-email endpoint to change the email to its own (but it is less critical than resetting the password in this case).\n\nIf one already set `'RESET_PASSWORD_VERIFICATION_ONE_TIME_USE'` setting key to `True` in `REST_REGISTRATION` Django setting (which is not the default setting) then it should mitigate the security issue in case of password reset (in this case, the signature is much harder to guess by the attacker). But even in this case upgrade to newest version is highly recommended.\n\n### Technical description\nAfter the code [was refactored](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapragacz\u002Fdjango-rest-registration\u002Fcommit\u002Fb6d921e9decc9bb36a4c6d58bc607471aa824a2e) to use the [official Signer class](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.djangoproject.com\u002Fen\u002Fdev\u002Ftopics\u002Fsigning\u002F) the salt\nwas passed wrongly as secret key, replacing the `SECRET_KEY` set in\nDjango settings file. This leads to the Django `SECRET_KEY` not being used by the signer object. The secret key of the signer ends to be the salt which in most cases is a static string which is publicly available.\n\nIn consequence this allows, with verification enabled, to guess\nthe signature contained in the verification link (which is sent in a verification e-mail) by a potential attacker very easily.\n\nThe bug went unnoticed for very long time so multiple versions are affected:\nthis bug affects versions `0.2.*`, `0.3.*`, `0.4.*`; version `0.1.*` is not affected.\n\nRecently released version `0.5.0` contains the [fix](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapragacz\u002Fdjango-rest-registration\u002Fcommit\u002F26d094fab65ea8c2694fdfb6a3ab95a7808b62d5) which correctly passes the salt to the Signer constructor as keyword argument instead as a positonal argument. It also contains additonal test so this problem should not reappear in the future.\n\n### Thanks\nI'd like to thank @peterthomassen from https:\u002F\u002Fdesec.io DNS security project for finding the bug. I'd like also to thank his employer, SSE (https:\u002F\u002Fwww.securesystems.de) for funding his work.\n\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [GitHub issues project page](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapragacz\u002Fdjango-rest-registration\u002Fissues)\n* Email @apragacz, author of the library ","2019-07-02T15:43:00Z",{"cvss_v3.0":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.0",9.8,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49],"CWE-347",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:django-rest-registration_project:django-rest-registration:*:*:*:*:*:django:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:django-rest-registration:django-rest-registration:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Django-Rest-Registration_Project Django-Rest-Registration","Django-Rest-Registration Django-Rest-Registration",[57,58,59,60,61,62,63],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapragacz\u002Fdjango-rest-registration\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F0.5.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapragacz\u002Fdjango-rest-registration\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-p3w6-jcg4-52xh","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2019-13177","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapragacz\u002Fdjango-rest-registration\u002Fcommit\u002F26d094fab65ea8c2694fdfb6a3ab95a7808b62d5","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-p3w6-jcg4-52xh","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapragacz\u002Fdjango-rest-registration","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpypa\u002Fadvisory-database\u002Ftree\u002Fmain\u002Fvulns\u002Fdjango-rest-registration\u002FPYSEC-2019-20.yaml",0.84,0.01635,0.76128,false,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":69,"tech_impact":70,"exploitation":71,"cisa_decision":72,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[79],"initial-access","T1190",[82],{"link":58},{"count":84,"next":85,"previous":6,"results":86},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[87,95,103],{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]