CVE-2020-26250

EUVD-2020-0118 · Published Dec 1, 2020

Base class whitelist configuration ignored in OAuthenticator

Impact

What goes wrong?

The deprecated (in jupyterhub 1.2) configuration Authenticator.whitelist, which should be transparently mapped to Authenticator.allowed_users with a warning, is instead ignored by OAuthenticator classes, resulting in the same behavior as if this configuration has not been set. If this is the only mechanism of authorization restriction (i.e. no group or team restrictions in configuration) then all authenticated users will be allowed. Provider-based restrictions, including deprecated values such as GitHubOAuthenticator.org_whitelist are not affected.

Who is impacted?

All users of OAuthenticator 0.12.0 and 0.12.1 with JupyterHub 1.2 (JupyterHub Helm chart 0.10.0-0.10.5) who use the admin.whitelist.users configuration in the jupyterhub helm chart or the c.Authenticator.whitelist configuration directly. Users of other deprecated configuration, e.g. c.GitHubOAuthenticator.team_whitelist are not affected.

If you see a log line like this and expect a specific list of allowed usernames:

[I 2020-11-27 16:51:54.528 JupyterHub app:1717] Not using allowed_users. Any authenticated user will be allowed.

you are likely affected.

Patches

Replacing deprecated c.Authenticator.whitelist = ... with c.Authenticator.allowed_users = ... avoids the issue.
Update oauthenticator to 0.12.2
Update jupyterhub helm chart to 0.10.6

If any users have been authorized during this time who should not have been, they must be deleted via the API or admin interface, per the documentation.

Workarounds

Replacing c.Authenticator.whitelist = ... with c.Authenticator.allowed_users = ... avoids the issue.

In the jupyterhub helm chart prior to 0.10.6, this can be done via hub.extraConfig:

auth:
  allowedUsers:
  - user1
  - user2

hub:
  extraConfig:
    allowedUsers: |
        # set new field not exposed in helm chart < 0.10.6
        set_config_if_not_none(c.Authenticator, "allowed_users", "auth.allowedUsers")

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open a thread on the Jupyter forum
Email us at security@ipython.org

Technologies

Jupyter OauthenticatorOauthenticator Oauthenticator

Weaknesses

CWE-863

CVSS scores

v3.16.3CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

ReconImpact

Initial Access

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.