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CVE-2021-20319

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2021-2149 · Published Oct 12, 2021

coreos-installer improperly verifies GPG signature when decompressing gzipped artifact

Impact

coreos-installer fails to correctly verify GPG signatures when decompressing gzip-compressed artifacts. This allows bypass of signature verification in cases where coreos-installer decompresses a downloaded OS image, allowing an attacker who can modify the OS image to compromise a newly-installed system.

Default installations from ISO or PXE media in Fedora CoreOS, RHEL CoreOS, and RHEL for Edge are not affected, as coreos-installer installs from an OS image shipped as part of the install media.

These flows are affected:

  1. Installing with --image-file, --image-url, or coreos.inst.image_url. For example, if a user has a local mirror of installation images, an attacker could replace an image with a gzip-compressed alternative (even if the file extension is .xz). The result:

    $ coreos-installer install --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz /dev/loop0
    Downloading image from http://localhost:8080/image.xz
    Downloading signature from http://localhost:8080/image.xz.sig
    > Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%)
    gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT
    gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39
    gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) <fedora-34-primary@fedoraproject.org>" [ultimate]
    Install complete.
    

    Notice that GPG reports a bad signature, but coreos-installer continues anyway. Automation that relies on coreos-installer's exit status will not notice either.

  2. coreos-installer download --decompress --image-url:

    $ coreos-installer download --decompress --image-url http://localhost:8080/image.xz
    > Read disk 749.9 MiB/749.9 MiB (100%)
    gpg: Signature made Mon 20 Sep 2021 02:41:50 PM EDT
    gpg: using RSA key 8C5BA6990BDB26E19F2A1A801161AE6945719A39
    gpg: BAD signature from "Fedora (34) <fedora-34-primary@fedoraproject.org>" [ultimate]
    ./image
    

    Again, coreos-installer reports success.

  3. Installing with default parameters, when not installing from the image built into live ISO or PXE media, if the hosting service is compromised or if an active attacker gains control of the HTTPS response.

  4. coreos-installer download --decompress if the hosting service is compromised or if an active attacker gains control of the HTTPS response.

Patches

The vulnerability is fixed in coreos-installer 0.10.1.

Workarounds

For coreos-installer download, do not use the -d or --decompress options.

For coreos-installer install, manually inspect the stderr output. If BAD signature appears, do not boot from the target disk. Note, however, that some OS services may have already accessed data on the compromised disk.

References

For more information, see PR 655.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, open an issue in coreos-installer or email the CoreOS development mailing list.

Technologies

Redhat Coreos-InstallerCoreos-Installer Coreos-Installer

Weaknesses

CWE-347

CVSS scores

  • v3.17.8CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Privilege Escalation

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Two situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy or WAF. When the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag "paas: platform.sh" or "cdn: fastly" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Contact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly / Plateform.sh) Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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