[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"cve-CVE-2021-21293":3,"landing-trending":98,"landing-articles":124},{"id":4,"cve_id":5,"euvd_id":6,"summary":7,"published":8,"cvss_data":9,"is_remote":19,"cwes":20,"cpes":23,"technologies":25,"references":27,"score":32,"epss_score":33,"epss_percentile":34,"is_kev":35,"cisa_kev_date_added":36,"cisa_kev_due_date":36,"cisa_ssvc":37,"attack_mappings":43,"exploits":97},294241,"CVE-2021-21293","EUVD-2021-0580","Unbounded connection acceptance leads to file handle exhaustion\n\n### Impact\n\nAll servers running blaze-core \u003C= 0.14.14, including blaze-http and http4s-blaze-server users, are affected.\n\nBlaze, accepts connections unconditionally on a dedicated thread pool. This has the net effect of amplifying degradation in services that are unable to handle their current request load, since incoming connections are still accepted and added to an unbounded queue. Each connection allocates a socket handle, which drains a scarce OS resource. This can also confound higher level circuit breakers which work based on detecting failed connections.\n\nThe vast majority of affected users are using it as part of http4s-blaze-server \u003C= 0.21.16.  http4s provides a mechanism for limiting open connections, but is enforced inside the Blaze accept loop, after the connection is accepted and the socket opened. Thus, the limit only prevents the number of connections which can be simultaneously processed, not the number of connections which can be held open.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is fixed in version 0.14.15 for `NIO1SocketServerGroup`.  A `maxConnections` parameter is added, with a default value of 512.  Concurrent connections beyond this limit are rejected.  To run unbounded, which is not recommended, set a negative number.\n\nThe `NIO2SocketServerGroup`  has no such setting and is now deprecated.\n\n### Workarounds\n* An Nginx side-car acting as a reverse proxy for the local http4s-blaze-server instance would be able to apply a connection limiting semantic before the sockets reach blaze-core. Nginx’s connection bounding is both asynchronous and properly respects backpressure.\n* A similar sidecar strategy is viable for other non-HTTP services running on blaze-core.\n* http4s-ember-server is an alternative to http4s-blaze-server, but does not yet have HTTP\u002F2 or web socket support.  Its performance in terms of RPS is appreciably behind Blaze’s, and as the newest backend, has substantially less industrial uptake.\n* http4s-jetty is an alternative to http4s-blaze-server, but does not yet have web socket support.  Its performance in terms of requests per second is somewhat behind Blaze’s, and despite Jetty's industrial adoption, the http4s integration has substantially less industrial uptake.\n* http4s-tomcat is an alternative to http4s-blaze-server, but does not yet have HTTP\u002F2 web socket support.  Its performance in terms of requests per second is somewhat behind Blaze’s, and despite Jetty's industrial adoption, the http4s integration has substantially less industrial uptake.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [http4s\u002Fblaze](http:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhttp4s\u002Fblaze)\n* Contact us according to the [http4s security policy](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhttp4s\u002Fhttp4s\u002Fsecurity\u002Fpolicy)","2021-02-02T21:42:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":10},{"scope":11,"version":12,"baseScore":13,"attackVector":14,"baseSeverity":15,"vectorString":16,"integrityImpact":17,"userInteraction":17,"attackComplexity":18,"availabilityImpact":15,"privilegesRequired":17,"confidentialityImpact":17},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[21,22],"CWE-770","CWE-400",[24],"cpe:2.3:a:typelevel:blaze:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[26],"Typelevel Blaze",[28,29,30,31],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhttp4s\u002Fblaze\u002Fcommit\u002F4f786177f9fb71ab272f3a5f6c80bca3e5662aa1","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhttp4s\u002Fblaze\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-xmw9-q7x9-j5qc","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhttp4s\u002Fhttp4s\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-xhv5-w9c5-2r2w","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2021-21293",0.57,0.02117,0.81721,false,null,{"timestamp":36,"automatable":38,"tech_impact":39,"exploitation":40,"cisa_decision":41,"cisa_remediation_timeline":42},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[44,50,61,68,75,81,90],{"name":45,"source":46,"tactics":47,"technique_id":49},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[48],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":51,"source":52,"cwe_ids":53,"tactics":54,"capec_ids":56,"technique_id":60},"Direct Network Flood","capec",[21],[55],"impact",[57,58,59],"CAPEC-125","CAPEC-482","CAPEC-528","T1498.001",{"name":62,"source":52,"cwe_ids":63,"tactics":64,"capec_ids":65,"technique_id":67},"Reflection Amplification",[21],[55],[66],"CAPEC-490","T1498.002",{"name":69,"source":52,"cwe_ids":70,"tactics":71,"capec_ids":72,"technique_id":74},"Endpoint Denial of Service",[22,21],[55],[57,73],"CAPEC-227","T1499",{"name":76,"source":52,"cwe_ids":77,"tactics":78,"capec_ids":79,"technique_id":80},"OS Exhaustion Flood",[21],[55],[58],"T1499.001",{"name":82,"source":52,"cwe_ids":83,"tactics":84,"capec_ids":85,"technique_id":89},"Service Exhaustion Flood",[21],[55],[86,58,87,88,59],"CAPEC-469","CAPEC-488","CAPEC-489","T1499.002",{"name":91,"source":52,"cwe_ids":92,"tactics":93,"capec_ids":94,"technique_id":96},"Application Exhaustion Flood",[21],[55],[95],"CAPEC-130","T1499.003",[],{"count":99,"next":100,"previous":36,"results":101},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[102,111,114],{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"severity":107,"vendor":108,"products":109},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[110],"brotli",{"id":99,"title":104,"summary":112,"published_at":106,"severity":107,"vendor":108,"products":113},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[110],{"id":115,"title":116,"summary":117,"published_at":118,"severity":107,"vendor":119,"products":120},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[121,122,123],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"count":125,"next":126,"previous":36,"results":127},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[128,136,144],{"id":129,"title":130,"summary":131,"published_at":132,"type":133,"link":134,"image_url":135},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":137,"title":138,"summary":139,"published_at":140,"type":141,"link":142,"image_url":143},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":145,"title":146,"summary":147,"published_at":148,"type":149,"link":150,"image_url":151},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]