[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2021-30465":30,"landing-articles":102},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":51,"technologies":72,"references":76,"score":91,"epss_score":92,"epss_percentile":93,"is_kev":46,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":94,"attack_mappings":100,"exploits":101},290925,"CVE-2021-30465","EUVD-2021-1034","mount destinations can be swapped via symlink-exchange to cause mounts outside the rootfs\n\n### Summary\n\nrunc 1.0.0-rc94 and earlier are vulnerable to a symlink exchange attack whereby\nan attacker can request a seemingly-innocuous container configuration that\nactually results in the host filesystem being bind-mounted into the container\n(allowing for a container escape). CVE-2021-30465 has been assigned for this\nissue.\n\nAn attacker must have the ability to start containers using some kind of custom\nvolume configuration, and while recommended container hardening mechanisms such\nas LSMs (AppArmor\u002FSELinux) and user namespaces will restrict the amount of\ndamage an attacker could do, they do not block this attack outright. We have a\nreproducer using Kubernetes (and the below description mentions\nKubernetes-specific paths), but this is not a Kubernetes-specific issue.\n\nThe now-released [runc v1.0.0-rc95][release] contains a fix for this issue, we\nrecommend users update as soon as possible.\n\n[release]: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopencontainers\u002Frunc\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv1.0.0-rc95\n\n### Details\n\nIn circumstances where a container is being started, and runc is mounting\ninside a volume shared with another container (which is conducting a\nsymlink-exchange attack), runc can be tricked into mounting outside of the\ncontainer rootfs by swapping the target of a mount with a symlink due to a\ntime-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) flaw. This is fairly similar in style to\nprevious TOCTTOU attacks (and is a problem we are working on solving with\nlibpathrs).\n\nHowever, this alone is not useful because this happens inside a mount namespace\nwith `MS_SLAVE` propagation applied to `\u002F` (meaning that the mount doesn't\nappear on the host -- it's only a \"host-side mount\" inside the container's\nnamespace). To exploit this, you must have additional mount entries in the\nconfiguration that use some subpath of the mounted-over host path as a source\nfor a subsequent mount.\n\nHowever, it turns out with some container orchestrators (such as Kubernetes --\nthough it is very likely that other downstream users of runc could have similar\nbehaviour be accessible to untrusted users), the existence of additional volume\nmanagement infrastructure allows this attack to be applied to gain access to\nthe host filesystem without requiring the attacker to have completely arbitrary\ncontrol over container configuration.\n\nIn the case of Kubernetes, this is exploitable by creating a symlink in a\nvolume to the top-level (well-known) directory where volumes are sourced from\n(for instance,\n`\u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fkubelet\u002Fpods\u002F$MY_POD_UID\u002Fvolumes\u002Fkubernetes.io~empty-dir`), and then\nusing that symlink as the target of a mount. The source of the mount is an\nattacker controlled directory, and thus the source directory from which\nsubsequent mounts will occur is an attacker-controlled directory. Thus the\nattacker can first place a symlink to `\u002F` in their malicious source directory\nwith the name of a volume, and a subsequent mount in the container will\nbind-mount `\u002F` into the container.\n\nApplying this attack requires the attacker to start containers with a slightly\npeculiar volume configuration (though not explicitly malicious-looking such as\nbind-mounting `\u002F` into the container explicitly), and be able to run malicious\ncode in a container that shares volumes with said volume configuration. It\nhelps the attacker if the host paths used for volume management are well known,\nthough this is not a hard requirement.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been patched in runc 1.0.0-rc95, and users should upgrade as soon as\npossible. The patch itself can be found [here](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopencontainers\u002Frunc\u002Fcommit\u002F0ca91f44f1664da834bc61115a849b56d22f595f).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere are no known workarounds for this issue.\n\nHowever, users who enforce running containers with more confined security\nprofiles (such as reduced capabilities, not running code as root in the\ncontainer, user namespaces, AppArmor\u002FSELinux, and seccomp) will restrict what\nan attacker can do in the case of a container breakout -- we recommend users\nmake use of strict security profiles if possible (most notably user namespaces\n-- which can massively restrict the impact a container breakout can have on the\nhost system).\n\n### References\n* [commit](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopencontainers\u002Frunc\u002Fcommit\u002F0ca91f44f1664da834bc61115a849b56d22f595f)\n* [seclists public disclosure](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openwall.com\u002Flists\u002Foss-security\u002F2021\u002F05\u002F19\u002F2)\n\n### Credit\n\nThanks to Etienne Champetier for discovering and disclosing this vulnerability,\nto Noah Meyerhans for writing the first draft of this patch, and to Samuel Karp\nfor testing it.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [our issue tracker](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopencontainers\u002Frunc\u002Fissues).\n* Email us at \u003Csecurity@opencontainers.org>.","2021-05-25T18:44:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"CHANGED","3.1",7.6,"ADJACENT_NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:A\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","LOW","NONE",false,[48,49,50],"CWE-362","CWE-367","CWE-22",[52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71],"cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc93:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc10:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:33:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc91:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc90:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc92:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:fedoraproject:fedora:34:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc9:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:linuxfoundation:runc:1.0.0:rc94:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:opencontainers:runc:1.0.0-rc94:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:opencontainers:runc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[73,74,75],"Fedoraproject Fedora","Linuxfoundation Runc","Opencontainers Runc",[77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90],"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.openwall.com\u002Flists\u002Foss-security\u002F2021\u002F05\u002F19\u002F2","https:\u002F\u002Fbugzilla.opensuse.org\u002Fshow_bug.cgi?id=1185405","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopencontainers\u002Frunc\u002Fcommit\u002F0ca91f44f1664da834bc61115a849b56d22f595f","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopencontainers\u002Frunc\u002Freleases","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopencontainers\u002Frunc\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-c3xm-pvg7-gh7r","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2023\u002F03\u002Fmsg00023.html","https:\u002F\u002Flists.fedoraproject.org\u002Farchives\u002Flist\u002Fpackage-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org\u002Fmessage\u002F35ZW6NBZSBH5PWIT7JU4HXOXGFVDCOHH\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Flists.fedoraproject.org\u002Farchives\u002Flist\u002Fpackage-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org\u002Fmessage\u002F4HOARVIT47RULTTFWAU7XBG4WY6TDDHV\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fsecurity.gentoo.org\u002Fglsa\u002F202107-26","https:\u002F\u002Fsecurity.netapp.com\u002Fadvisory\u002Fntap-20210708-0003\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2021-30465","https:\u002F\u002Flists.fedoraproject.org\u002Farchives\u002Flist\u002Fpackage-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org\u002Fmessage\u002F35ZW6NBZSBH5PWIT7JU4HXOXGFVDCOHH","https:\u002F\u002Flists.fedoraproject.org\u002Farchives\u002Flist\u002Fpackage-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org\u002Fmessage\u002F4HOARVIT47RULTTFWAU7XBG4WY6TDDHV","https:\u002F\u002Fsecurity.netapp.com\u002Fadvisory\u002Fntap-20210708-0003",0.38,0.10245,0.9565,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":95,"tech_impact":96,"exploitation":97,"cisa_decision":98,"cisa_remediation_timeline":99},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[],[],{"count":103,"next":104,"previous":6,"results":105},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[106,114,122],{"id":107,"title":108,"summary":109,"published_at":110,"type":111,"link":112,"image_url":113},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":115,"title":116,"summary":117,"published_at":118,"type":119,"link":120,"image_url":121},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":123,"title":124,"summary":125,"published_at":126,"type":127,"link":128,"image_url":129},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]