[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"cve-CVE-2021-47072":3,"landing-trending":53,"landing-articles":79},{"id":4,"cve_id":5,"euvd_id":6,"summary":7,"published":8,"cvss_data":9,"is_remote":20,"cwes":21,"cpes":22,"technologies":26,"references":28,"score":31,"epss_score":32,"epss_percentile":33,"is_kev":20,"cisa_kev_date_added":34,"cisa_kev_due_date":34,"cisa_ssvc":35,"attack_mappings":45,"exploits":52},277312,"CVE-2021-47072","EUVD-2021-33720","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: fix removed dentries still existing after log is synced\n\nWhen we move one inode from one directory to another and both the inode\nand its previous parent directory were logged before, we are not supposed\nto have the dentry for the old parent if we have a power failure after the\nlog is synced. Only the new dentry is supposed to exist.\n\nGenerally this works correctly, however there is a scenario where this is\nnot currently working, because the old parent of the file\u002Fdirectory that\nwas moved is not authoritative for a range that includes the dir index and\ndir item keys of the old dentry. This case is better explained with the\nfollowing example and reproducer:\n\n  # The test requires a very specific layout of keys and items in the\n  # fs\u002Fsubvolume btree to trigger the bug. So we want to make sure that\n  # on whatever platform we are, we have the same leaf\u002Fnode size.\n  #\n  # Currently in btrfs the node\u002Fleaf size can not be smaller than the page\n  # size (but it can be greater than the page size). So use the largest\n  # supported node\u002Fleaf size (64K).\n\n  $ mkfs.btrfs -f -n 65536 \u002Fdev\u002Fsdc\n  $ mount \u002Fdev\u002Fsdc \u002Fmnt\n\n  # \"testdir\" is inode 257.\n  $ mkdir \u002Fmnt\u002Ftestdir\n  $ chmod 755 \u002Fmnt\u002Ftestdir\n\n  # Create several empty files to have the directory \"testdir\" with its\n  # items spread over several leaves (7 in this case).\n  $ for ((i = 1; i \u003C= 1200; i++)); do\n       echo -n > \u002Fmnt\u002Ftestdir\u002Ffile$i\n    done\n\n  # Create our test directory \"dira\", inode number 1458, which gets all\n  # its items in leaf 7.\n  #\n  # The BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY item for inode 257 (\"testdir\") that points to\n  # the entry named \"dira\" is in leaf 2, while the BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY\n  # item that points to that entry is in leaf 3.\n  #\n  # For this particular filesystem node size (64K), file count and file\n  # names, we endup with the directory entry items from inode 257 in\n  # leaves 2 and 3, as previously mentioned - what matters for triggering\n  # the bug exercised by this test case is that those items are not placed\n  # in leaf 1, they must be placed in a leaf different from the one\n  # containing the inode item for inode 257.\n  #\n  # The corresponding BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY and BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY items for\n  # the parent inode (257) are the following:\n  #\n  #    item 460 key (257 DIR_ITEM 3724298081) itemoff 48344 itemsize 34\n  #         location key (1458 INODE_ITEM 0) type DIR\n  #         transid 6 data_len 0 name_len 4\n  #         name: dira\n  #\n  # and:\n  #\n  #    item 771 key (257 DIR_INDEX 1202) itemoff 36673 itemsize 34\n  #         location key (1458 INODE_ITEM 0) type DIR\n  #         transid 6 data_len 0 name_len 4\n  #         name: dira\n\n  $ mkdir \u002Fmnt\u002Ftestdir\u002Fdira\n\n  # Make sure everything done so far is durably persisted.\n  $ sync\n\n  # Now do a change to inode 257 (\"testdir\") that does not result in\n  # COWing leaves 2 and 3 - the leaves that contain the directory items\n  # pointing to inode 1458 (directory \"dira\").\n  #\n  # Changing permissions, the owner\u002Fgroup, updating or adding a xattr,\n  # etc, will not change (COW) leaves 2 and 3. So for the sake of\n  # simplicity change the permissions of inode 257, which results in\n  # updating its inode item and therefore change (COW) only leaf 1.\n\n  $ chmod 700 \u002Fmnt\u002Ftestdir\n\n  # Now fsync directory inode 257.\n  #\n  # Since only the first leaf was changed\u002FCOWed, we log the inode item of\n  # inode 257 and only the dentries found in the first leaf, all have a\n  # key type of BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY, and no keys of type\n  # BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY, because they sort after the former type and none\n  # exist in the first leaf.\n  #\n  # We also log 3 items that represent ranges for dir items and dir\n  # indexes for which the log is authoritative:\n  #\n  # 1) a key of type BTRFS_DIR_LOG_ITEM_KEY, which indicates the log is\n  #    authoritative for all BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY keys that have an offset\n  #    in the range [0, 2285968570] (the offset here is th\n---truncated---","2024-03-01T22:15:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":10},{"scope":11,"version":12,"baseScore":13,"attackVector":14,"baseSeverity":15,"vectorString":16,"integrityImpact":17,"userInteraction":17,"attackComplexity":18,"availabilityImpact":19,"privilegesRequired":18,"confidentialityImpact":17},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.5,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW","HIGH",false,[],[23,24,25],"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.13:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.13:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*",[27],"Linux Linux Kernel",[29,30],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F54a40fc3a1da21b52dbf19f72fdc27a2ec740760","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F6d0924c5b742036b4f20a0ffdf2b6cf3f963f5f6",0.28,0.00193,0.08939,null,{"timestamp":36,"automatable":37,"tech_impact":38,"exploitation":39,"cisa_decision":40,"cisa_remediation_timeline":44},"2024-03-11T16:49:49.252452Z","no","partial","none",{"vector":41,"decision":42,"priority":43},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T04:16:20.208551\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[46],{"name":47,"source":48,"tactics":49,"technique_id":51},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[50],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":54,"next":55,"previous":34,"results":56},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[57,66,69],{"id":58,"title":59,"summary":60,"published_at":61,"severity":62,"vendor":63,"products":64},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[65],"brotli",{"id":54,"title":59,"summary":67,"published_at":61,"severity":62,"vendor":63,"products":68},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[65],{"id":70,"title":71,"summary":72,"published_at":73,"severity":62,"vendor":74,"products":75},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[76,77,78],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"count":80,"next":81,"previous":34,"results":82},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[83,91,99],{"id":84,"title":85,"summary":86,"published_at":87,"type":88,"link":89,"image_url":90},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":92,"title":93,"summary":94,"published_at":95,"type":96,"link":97,"image_url":98},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":100,"title":101,"summary":102,"published_at":103,"type":104,"link":105,"image_url":106},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]