[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2021-47303":30,"landing-articles":79},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":46,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":61,"attack_mappings":71,"exploits":78},288870,"CVE-2021-47303","EUVD-2021-34308","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: Track subprog poke descriptors correctly and fix use-after-free\n\nSubprograms are calling map_poke_track(), but on program release there is no\nhook to call map_poke_untrack(). However, on program release, the aux memory\n(and poke descriptor table) is freed even though we still have a reference to\nit in the element list of the map aux data. When we run map_poke_run(), we then\nend up accessing free'd memory, triggering KASAN in prog_array_map_poke_run():\n\n  [...]\n  [  402.824689] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2\u002F0x34e\n  [  402.824698] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881905a7940 by task hubble-fgs\u002F4337\n  [  402.824705] CPU: 1 PID: 4337 Comm: hubble-fgs Tainted: G          I       5.12.0+ #399\n  [  402.824715] Call Trace:\n  [  402.824719]  dump_stack+0x93\u002F0xc2\n  [  402.824727]  print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1a\u002F0x140\n  [  402.824736]  ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2\u002F0x34e\n  [  402.824740]  ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2\u002F0x34e\n  [  402.824744]  kasan_report.cold+0x7c\u002F0xd8\n  [  402.824752]  ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2\u002F0x34e\n  [  402.824757]  prog_array_map_poke_run+0xc2\u002F0x34e\n  [  402.824765]  bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem+0x124\u002F0x1a0\n  [...]\n\nThe elements concerned are walked as follows:\n\n    for (i = 0; i \u003C elem->aux->size_poke_tab; i++) {\n           poke = &elem->aux->poke_tab[i];\n    [...]\n\nThe access to size_poke_tab is a 4 byte read, verified by checking offsets\nin the KASAN dump:\n\n  [  402.825004] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881905a7800\n                 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024\n  [  402.825008] The buggy address is located 320 bytes inside of\n                 1024-byte region [ffff8881905a7800, ffff8881905a7c00)\n\nThe pahole output of bpf_prog_aux:\n\n  struct bpf_prog_aux {\n    [...]\n    \u002F* --- cacheline 5 boundary (320 bytes) --- *\u002F\n    u32                        size_poke_tab;        \u002F*   320     4 *\u002F\n    [...]\n\nIn general, subprograms do not necessarily manage their own data structures.\nFor example, BTF func_info and linfo are just pointers to the main program\nstructure. This allows reference counting and cleanup to be done on the latter\nwhich simplifies their management a bit. The aux->poke_tab struct, however,\ndid not follow this logic. The initial proposed fix for this use-after-free\nbug further embedded poke data tracking into the subprogram with proper\nreference counting. However, Daniel and Alexei questioned why we were treating\nthese objects special; I agree, its unnecessary. The fix here removes the per\nsubprogram poke table allocation and map tracking and instead simply points\nthe aux->poke_tab pointer at the main programs poke table. This way, map\ntracking is simplified to the main program and we do not need to manage them\nper subprogram.\n\nThis also means, bpf_prog_free_deferred(), which unwinds the program reference\ncounting and kfrees objects, needs to ensure that we don't try to double free\nthe poke_tab when free'ing the subprog structures. This is easily solved by\nNULL'ing the poke_tab pointer. The second detail is to ensure that per\nsubprogram JIT logic only does fixups on poke_tab[] entries it owns. To do\nthis, we add a pointer in the poke structure to point at the subprogram value\nso JITs can easily check while walking the poke_tab structure if the current\nentry belongs to the current program. The aux pointer is stable and therefore\nsuitable for such comparison. On the jit_subprogs() error path, we omit\ncleaning up the poke->aux field because these are only ever referenced from\nthe JIT side, but on error we will never make it to the JIT, so its fine to\nleave them dangling. Removing these pointers would complicate the error path\nfor no reason. However, we do need to untrack all poke descriptors from the\nmain program as otherwise they could race with the freeing of JIT memory from\nthe subprograms. Lastly, a748c6975dea3 (\"bpf: propagate poke des\n---truncated---","2024-05-21T15:15:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.8,"LOCAL","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",false,[48],"CWE-416",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:5.14:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Linux Linux Kernel",[55,56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F599148d40366bd5d1d504a3a8fcd65e21107e500","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fa9f36bf3613c65cb587c70fac655c775d911409b","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Ff263a81451c12da5a342d90572e317e611846f2c",0.39,0.00237,0.14541,{"timestamp":62,"automatable":63,"tech_impact":64,"exploitation":65,"cisa_decision":66,"cisa_remediation_timeline":70},"2024-05-29T18:50:53.751322Z","no","total","none",{"vector":67,"decision":68,"priority":69},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:16:58.040312\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[72],{"name":73,"source":74,"tactics":75,"technique_id":77},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[76],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":80,"next":81,"previous":6,"results":82},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[83,91,99],{"id":84,"title":85,"summary":86,"published_at":87,"type":88,"link":89,"image_url":90},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":92,"title":93,"summary":94,"published_at":95,"type":96,"link":97,"image_url":98},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":100,"title":101,"summary":102,"published_at":103,"type":104,"link":105,"image_url":106},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]