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CVE-2022-21702

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2024-1857 · Published May 14, 2024

Grafana proxy Cross-site Scripting

Today we are releasing Grafana 8.3.5 and 7.5.15. This patch release includes MEDIUM severity security fix for XSS for Grafana.

Release v.8.3.5, only containing security fixes:

Release v.7.5.15, only containing security fixes:

XSS (CVE-2022-21702)

Summary

On Jan. 16, an external security researcher, Jasu Viding contacted Grafana to disclose an XSS vulnerability in the way that Grafana handles data sources.

An attacker could serve HTML content through the Grafana datasource or plugin proxy and trick a user to visit this HTML page using a specially crafted link and execute a Cross-site Scripting (XSS) attack. The attacker could either compromise an existing datasource for a specific Grafana instance or either set up its own public service and instruct anyone to set it up in their Grafana instance.

We believe that this vulnerability is rated at CVSS 6.8 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N).

Impact

Should an existing data source connected to Grafana be compromised, it could be used to inappropriately gain access to other data sources connected to the same Grafana org.

Affected versions with MEDIUM severity

To be impacted, all of the following must be applicable:

For data source proxy:

  • A Grafana instance running version v2.0.0-beta1 up to v8.3.4.
  • A Grafana HTTP-based datasource configured with Server as Access Mode and a URL set.
  • Attacker to be in control of the HTTP server serving the URL of above data source.
  • A specially crafted link pointing at http://host/api/datasources/proxy/"data source id" and attacker somehow tricks a user of the above Grafana instance to click/visit the link.
  • A user that’s already authenticated to above Grafana instance clicks on/visits the specially crafted link sent/provided by the attacker.

For plugin proxy:

  • A Grafana instance running version v2.0.0-beta1 up to v8.3.4.
  • A Grafana HTTP-based app plugin configured and enabled with a URL set.
  • Attacker to be in control of the HTTP server serving the URL of above app.
  • A specially crafted link pointing at http://host/api/plugin-proxy/"plugin id" and attacker somehow tricks a user of the above Grafana instance to click/visit the link.
  • A user that’s already authenticated to above Grafana instance clicks on/visits the specially crafted link sent/provided by the attacker.

Backend plugin resource:

  • A Grafana instance running version v7.0.0-beta1 up to v8.3.4.
  • Attacker potentially needs to craft a custom plugin to be able to pull this off, but if an attacker can compromise/control the backend service that a backend plugin connects to, it might be possible to serve HTML content via the /api/plugins/"plugin Id"/resources* or /api/datasources/"id"/resources* routes.
  • A specially crafted link pointing at /api/plugins/"plugin Id">/resources* or /api/datasources/"id"/resources* and attacker somehow tricks a user of the above Grafana instance to click/visit the link.
  • A user that’s already authenticated to above Grafana instance clicks on/visits the specially crafted link sent/provided by the attacker.

Root Causes

Trigger

Reproduced and confirmed via this Golang app:

package main

import (
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"net/http"
)

func main() {
	http.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
		fmt.Fprintf(w, "<html><body><script>alert('XSS');</script></body></html>")
	})

	log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(":3011", nil))
}

A Prometheus datasource is configured in Grafana with URL http://localhost:3011.

When visitining http://localhost:3000/api/datasources/proxy/170 the scripts declared in the HTML page executes. Confirmed in both Chrome and Firefox.

Solutions and mitigations

All installations between Grafana v2.0.0-beta1 up to v8.3.4 should be upgraded as soon as possible.

Workarounds

Using a proxy, set a response header Content Security Policy: sandbox for the following routes:

/api/datasources/proxy*
/api/plugin-proxy*
/api/plugins/<pluginId>/resources*
/api/datasources/<id>/resources*

Another possible mitigation is setting the response header Content-Disposition: attachment; “proxy.txt”. Confirmed in both Chrome and Firefox.

Timeline and postmortem

Here is a detailed timeline starting from when we originally learned of the issue. All times in UTC.

  • 2022-01-16 16:19 Issue submitted by Jasu Viding
  • 2022-01-17 14:40 CVSS score confirmed 6.8 at maximum and MEDIUM impact
  • 2022-01-17 15:15 Vulnerability confirmed reproducible
  • 2022-01-17 16:01 Begin mitigation for Grafana Cloud
  • 2022-01-18 15:12 Similar report received
  • 2022-01-19 09:57 CVE requested
  • 2022-01-19 13:21 PR with fix opened
  • 2022-01-19 19:53 GitHub issues CVE-2022-21702
  • 2022-01-20 12:43 Second similar report received
  • 2022-01-21 14:30 Private release planned for 2022-01-25, and public release planned for 2022-02-01
  • 2022-01-25 12:00 Private release with patches
  • 2022-02-01 12:00 During the public release process, we realized that private 7.x release was incomplete. Abort public release, send second private release to customers using 7.x
  • 2022-02-08 13:00 Public release

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Jasu Viding for responsibly disclosing the vulnerability.

Reporting security issues

If you think you have found a security vulnerability, please send a report to security@grafana.com. This address can be used for all of Grafana Labs' open source and commercial products (including, but not limited to Grafana, Grafana Cloud, Grafana Enterprise, and grafana.com). We can accept only vulnerability reports at this address. We would prefer that you encrypt your message to us by using our PGP key. The key fingerprint is

F988 7BEA 027A 049F AE8E 5CAA D125 8932 BE24 C5CA

The key is available from keyserver.ubuntu.com.

Security announcements

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Technologies

Grafana GrafanaFedoraproject FedoraNetapp E-Series Performance Analyzer

Weaknesses

CWE-79

CVSS scores

  • v3.16.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticaltoday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Two situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy or WAF. When the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag "paas: platform.sh" or "cdn: fastly" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Contact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly / Plateform.sh) Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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