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CVE-2022-35936

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2022-6548 · Published Aug 18, 2022

Ethermint vulnerable to DoS through unintended Contract Selfdestruct

Vulnerability Report

Impact

Smart contract applications that make use of the selfdestruct functionality and their end-users.

Classification

The vulnerability has been classified as high with a CVSS score of 8.2. It has the potential to create a denial-of-service to all contracts that can invoke the selfdestruct function to destroy a smart contract.

Users Impacted

Due to the successfully coordinated security vulnerability disclosure, no smart contracts were impacted through the use of this vulnerability. Smart contract states and storage values are not affected by this vulnerability. User funds and balances are safe.

Disclosure

In Ethermint running versions before v0.17.2, the contract selfdestruct invocation permanently removes the corresponding bytecode from the internal database storage. However, due to a bug in the DeleteAccount function, all contracts that used the identical bytecode (i.e shared the same CodeHash) will also stop working once one contract invokes selfdestruct, even though the other contracts did not invoke the selfdestruct OPCODE.

Additional Details

The same contract bytecode can be deployed multiple times to create multiple contract instances. In the internal database, the bytecode is stored as a key-value entry bytecode hash --> bytecode which is shared by those contracts. Unfortunately, when one of the contracts invokes selfdestruct, it will remove the corresponding bytecode hash -> bytecode entry, and thus it disables all the contracts that share the same bytecode.

The attack scenario is as follows:

  1. The malicious attacker identifies a vulnerable contract that can invoke selfdestruct
  2. The attacker deploys a copy of the contract with identical bytecode
  3. Finally, the attacker triggers the selfdestruct operation on their redeployed contract, actively causing a DoS on the original and vulnerable contract. All transactions will fail until a workaround is used (see below).

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

This vulnerability has been patched in Ethermint versions ≥v0.18.0. The patch has state machine-breaking changes for applications using Ethermint so a coordinated upgrade procedure is required.

Details

The patch removes the bytecode deletion logic, i.e. contract bytecodes are never deleted from the internal database after the patch.
At the moment, Ethermint does not track how many times each bytecode is used, and thus it cannot determine if it is safe to delete a particular bytecode on selfdestruct invocations. This behavior is the same with go-ethereum.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

If a contract is subject to DoS due to this issue, the user can redeploy the same contract, i.e with identical bytecode, so that the original contract's code is recovered.

The new contract deployment restores the bytecode hash -> bytecode entry in the internal state.

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

  • Reach out to the Core Team in Discord

Credits

Thanks to the

  • Cronos Team: @yihuang and @tomtau for discovering the issue, @gakuzen-crypto, @polycryptics, @FinnZhangCrypto, @wilson-ang, @brianatcrypto for the impact analysis.
  • Evmos Team: @facs95 for patching the issue and @fedekunze for managing the release and coordinating between teams.

Technologies

Crypto CronosKava KavaEvmos EvmosEvmos EthermintKava-Labs KavaCrypto-Org-Chain Cronos

Weaknesses

CWE-668

CVSS scores

  • v3.18.2CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticaltoday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Two situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy or WAF. When the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag "paas: platform.sh" or "cdn: fastly" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Contact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly / Plateform.sh) Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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