[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2022-43759":30,"landing-articles":247},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":50,"technologies":206,"references":209,"score":214,"epss_score":215,"epss_percentile":216,"is_kev":217,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":218,"attack_mappings":228,"exploits":245},299554,"CVE-2022-43759","EUVD-2023-0388","Privilege escalation in project role template binding (PRTB) and -promoted roles\n\n### Impact\n\nAn issue was discovered in Rancher versions from 2.5.0 up to and including 2.5.16 and from 2.6.0 up to and including 2.6.9, where an authorization logic flaw allows privilege escalation via project role template binding (PRTB) and `-promoted` roles. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.\n\nNote: Consult Rancher [documentation](https:\u002F\u002Franchermanager.docs.rancher.com\u002Fhow-to-guides\u002Fnew-user-guides\u002Fauthentication-permissions-and-global-configuration\u002Fmanage-role-based-access-control-rbac\u002Fcluster-and-project-roles) for more information about cluster and project roles and [KB 000020097](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.suse.com\u002Fsupport\u002Fkb\u002Fdoc\u002F?id=000020097) for information about `-promoted` roles.\n\nThis privilege escalation is possible for users with access to the `escalate` verb on PRTBs (`projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io`), including users with `*` verbs on PRTBs (see notes below for more information). These users can escalate permissions for any `-promoted` resource (see the table below for a full enumeration) in any cluster where they have a PRTB granting such permissions in at least one project in the cluster.\n\nOn a default Rancher setup, only the following roles have such permissions:\n\n1. Project Owner\n2. Manage Project Members\n\nThese roles have permissions to affect the following resources:\n\n| Resource | API Group | Affected Rancher version |\n| - | - | - |\n| navlinks | ui.cattle.io | 2.6 |\n| nodes | \"\" | 2.6 |\n| persistentvolumes | \"\" | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| persistentvolumes | core | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| storageclasses | storage.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| apiservices | apiregistration.k8s.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| clusterrepos | catalog.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n| clusters (`local` only) | management.cattle.io | 2.5, 2.6 |\n\nNotes:\n\n1. During the calculation of the CVSS score, `privileges required` was considered  as `high` because, by default, `standard user` and `user-base` users in Rancher do not have  `create`, `patch` and `update` permissions on `roletemplates`.\n2. If a role template with access to those objects was already created by another user in the cluster, then this issue can be exploited by users without the mentioned permissions from point 1.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf updating Rancher to a patched version is not possible, then the following workarounds must be observed to mitigate this issue:\n\n1. Only grant Project Owner and Manage Project Members roles to trusted users.\n5. Minimize the creation of custom roles that contain the `escalate`, `*` or write verbs (`create`, `delete`, `patch`, `update`) on `projectroletemplatebindings` resource, and only grant such custom roles to trusted users.\n6. Minimize the number of users that have permissions to `create`, `patch` and `update` `roletemplates`.\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions include releases 2.5.17 and 2.6.10 and later versions. This issue is not present in Rancher 2.7 releases.\n\n### Detection\n\nThe following script was developed to list role template bindings that give written access to the affected resources listed above. It is highly recommended to run the script in your environment and review the list of identified roles and role template bindings for possible signs of exploitation of this issue. The script requires `jq` installed and a `kubeconfig` with access to Rancher local cluster; it can also be executed in Rancher's kubectl shell.\n\n```shell\n#!\u002Fbin\u002Fbash\n\nhelp=\"\nUsage: bash find_promoted_resource.sh \\n \\n\n\nRequires: \\n\n- jq installed and on path \\n\n- A kubeconfig pointing at rancher's local cluster (can also run from rancher's kubectl shell) \\n \\n\n\nOutputs a list of roletemplates and roletemplate bindings which give write access to promoted resources.\n\"\n\nif [[ $1 == \"-h\" || $1 == \"--help\" ]]\nthen\n\techo -e $help\n\texit 0\nfi\n\n# first, get the current roletemplates so that we only issue a get once\nkubectl get roletemplates.management.cattle.io -o json >> script_templates.json\n\n# find roles which have write access to a promoted resource. Filter on roleTemplates which fulfill all requirements:\n# Have a project context\n# Have some rules\n# Have one\u002Fmore of the target api groups, or a * in the api groups\n# Have one\u002Fmore of the target resources, or a * in the resources\n# Have a verb that is not read access (i.e. a verb that is not get\u002Flist\u002Fwatch)\nroles=$(jq --argjson apiGroups '[\"\", \"ui.cattle.io\", \"core\", \"storage.k8s.io\", \"apiregistration.k8s.io\", \"catalog.cattle.io\", \"management.cattle.io\"]' --argjson resources '[\"navlinks\", \"persistentvolumes\", \"nodes\", \"storageclasses\", \"apiservices\", \"clusterrepos\", \"clusters\"]' --argjson verbs '[\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\"]' '.items[] | select(.context==\"project\" and (.rules | length >= 1)) | select( .rules[] | select( (($apiGroups - .apiGroups | length \u003C 7) or (.apiGroups | index(\"*\"))) and (($resources - .resources | length \u003C 7) or (.resources | index(\"*\"))) and (.verbs - $verbs  | length > 0)) | length >= 1 ) | .metadata.name' script_templates.json | jq -s )\n\n# log promoted roles which give direct write access so they can be easily fixed\necho \"The following role templates give direct write access to a promoted resource:\"\necho $roles\necho -e \"\"\n\n# find any roles which inherit first-level roles. Mostly a BFS which radiates outward from the known bad roles \nold_roles=\"[]\"\nnew_roles=\"$roles\"\nold_length=$(echo $old_roles | jq 'length')\nnew_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq 'length')\n# if our last loop found nothing new, it's safe to stop\nwhile [[ $old_length != $new_length ]];\ndo\n\t# set old values to what we currently know about\n\told_roles=$new_roles\n\told_length=$new_length\n\t# update new values with anything that inherits a \"bad\" role we know about\n\tnew_roles=$(jq --argjson roles \"$old_roles\" --argjson roleLen \"$old_length\" '.items[] | .metadata.name as $NAME | select (( $roles | index($NAME)) or ((.roleTemplateNames | length > 0 ) and ($roles - .roleTemplateNames | length \u003C $roleLen))) | .metadata.name ' script_templates.json | jq -s)\n\tnew_length=$(echo $new_roles | jq 'length')\ndone\n\nroles=$new_roles\n\n# log all roles which can give write access, even if it's not first level\necho -e \"The following role templates give write access to a promoted resource directly or through inheritance:\"\necho $roles\necho -e \"\"\n\nkubectl get projectroletemplatebindings.management.cattle.io -A -o json >> script_bindings.json\nrole_template_bindings=$(jq --argjson roleTemplates \"$roles\" '.items[] | .roleTemplateName as $TemplateName | select($roleTemplates | index($TemplateName)) | .metadata.name' script_bindings.json | jq -s)\n\n# since these bindings could be for users or groups, we need to include all fields which could help identify the subject. But they won't all be present, which makes the list look less pretty\necho -e \"The following is a list of bindings which give access to promoted resource, with the format of: bindingName, projectName, userName, userPrincipalName, groupName, groupPrincipalName: \"\necho $(jq --argjson bindings \"$role_template_bindings\" '.items[] | .metadata.name as $BindingName | select ( $bindings | index($BindingName)) | .metadata.name, .projectName, .userName?, .userPrincipalName?, .groupName?, .groupPrincipalName?' script_bindings.json | jq -s)\n\nunset old_roles\nunset new_roles\nunset roles\nunset role_template_bindings\nrm script_templates.json\nrm script_bindings.json\n```\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n* Reach out to [SUSE Rancher Security team](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Francher\u002Francher\u002Fsecurity\u002Fpolicy) for security related inquiries.\n* Open an issue in [Rancher](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Francher\u002Francher\u002Fissues\u002Fnew\u002Fchoose) repository.\n* Verify our [support matrix](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.suse.com\u002Fsuse-rancher\u002Fsupport-matrix\u002Fall-supported-versions\u002F) and [product support lifecycle](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.suse.com\u002Flifecycle\u002F)","2023-01-25T19:35:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.2,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49],"CWE-269","CWE-284",[51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,205],"cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.9:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.13:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.0:rc9:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.13:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc13:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:patch3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:patch2-rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.9:rc12:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.11:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc12:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.9:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc15:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc15:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc17:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.9:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc18:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.12:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.12:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.1:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc14:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.1:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.13:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.1:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc19:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.12:debug1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.13:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc10:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc9:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:patch1-rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.11:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc9:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.9:rc9:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.12:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.9:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.10:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc20:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.10:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.11:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc13:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.1:rc11:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc16:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.9:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:patch1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.1:rc13:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:patch3-rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:alpha1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:rc10:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.12:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:patch3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc8:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.10:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:patch2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.4:rc16:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.1:rc10:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.1:rc9:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.8:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.2:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.6.3:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.12:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:suse:rancher:2.5.9:rc16:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2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Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":260,"title":261,"summary":262,"published_at":263,"type":264,"link":265,"image_url":266},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":268,"title":269,"summary":270,"published_at":271,"type":272,"link":273,"image_url":274},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]