[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2022-50014":30,"landing-articles":75},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":53,"references":55,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":46,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":61,"attack_mappings":67,"exploits":74},295647,"CVE-2022-50014","EUVD-2022-55291","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm\u002Fgup: fix FOLL_FORCE COW security issue and remove FOLL_COW\n\nEver since the Dirty COW (CVE-2016-5195) security issue happened, we know\nthat FOLL_FORCE can be possibly dangerous, especially if there are races\nthat can be exploited by user space.\n\nRight now, it would be sufficient to have some code that sets a PTE of a\nR\u002FO-mapped shared page dirty, in order for it to erroneously become\nwritable by FOLL_FORCE.  The implications of setting a write-protected PTE\ndirty might not be immediately obvious to everyone.\n\nAnd in fact ever since commit 9ae0f87d009c (\"mm\u002Fshmem: unconditionally set\npte dirty in mfill_atomic_install_pte\"), we can use UFFDIO_CONTINUE to map\na shmem page R\u002FO while marking the pte dirty.  This can be used by\nunprivileged user space to modify tmpfs\u002Fshmem file content even if the\nuser does not have write permissions to the file, and to bypass memfd\nwrite sealing -- Dirty COW restricted to tmpfs\u002Fshmem (CVE-2022-2590).\n\nTo fix such security issues for good, the insight is that we really only\nneed that fancy retry logic (FOLL_COW) for COW mappings that are not\nwritable (!VM_WRITE).  And in a COW mapping, we really only broke COW if\nwe have an exclusive anonymous page mapped.  If we have something else\nmapped, or the mapped anonymous page might be shared (!PageAnonExclusive),\nwe have to trigger a write fault to break COW.  If we don't find an\nexclusive anonymous page when we retry, we have to trigger COW breaking\nonce again because something intervened.\n\nLet's move away from this mandatory-retry + dirty handling and rely on our\nPageAnonExclusive() flag for making a similar decision, to use the same\nCOW logic as in other kernel parts here as well.  In case we stumble over\na PTE in a COW mapping that does not map an exclusive anonymous page, COW\nwas not properly broken and we have to trigger a fake write-fault to break\nCOW.\n\nJust like we do in can_change_pte_writable() added via commit 64fe24a3e05e\n(\"mm\u002Fmprotect: try avoiding write faults for exclusive anonymous pages\nwhen changing protection\") and commit 76aefad628aa (\"mm\u002Fmprotect: fix\nsoft-dirty check in can_change_pte_writable()\"), take care of softdirty\nand uffd-wp manually.\n\nFor example, a write() via \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmem to a uffd-wp-protected range has\nto fail instead of silently granting write access and bypassing the\nuserspace fault handler.  Note that FOLL_FORCE is not only used for debug\naccess, but also triggered by applications without debug intentions, for\nexample, when pinning pages via RDMA.\n\nThis fixes CVE-2022-2590. Note that only x86_64 and aarch64 are\naffected, because only those support CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR.\n\nFortunately, FOLL_COW is no longer required to handle FOLL_FORCE. So\nlet's just get rid of it.\n\nThanks to Nadav Amit for pointing out that the pte_dirty() check in\nFOLL_FORCE code is problematic and might be exploitable.\n\nNote 1: We don't check for the PTE being dirty because it doesn't matter\n\tfor making a \"was COWed\" decision anymore, and whoever modifies the\n\tpage has to set the page dirty either way.\n\nNote 2: Kernels before extended uffd-wp support and before\n\tPageAnonExclusive (\u003C 5.19) can simply revert the problematic\n\tcommit instead and be safe regarding UFFDIO_CONTINUE. A backport to\n\tv5.19 requires minor adjustments due to lack of\n\tvma_soft_dirty_enabled().","2025-06-18T11:15:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7,"LOCAL","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",false,[48],"CWE-362",[50,51,52],"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54],"Linux Linux Kernel",[56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F5535be3099717646781ce1540cf725965d680e7b","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F9def52eb10baab3b700858003d462fcf17d62873",0.35,0.00179,0.07395,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":62,"tech_impact":63,"exploitation":64,"cisa_decision":65,"cisa_remediation_timeline":66},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[68],{"name":69,"source":70,"tactics":71,"technique_id":73},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[72],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":76,"next":77,"previous":6,"results":78},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[79,87,95],{"id":80,"title":81,"summary":82,"published_at":83,"type":84,"link":85,"image_url":86},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]