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CVE-2022-50471

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-32377 · Published Oct 4, 2025

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/gntdev: Accommodate VMA splitting Prior to this commit, the gntdev driver code did not handle the following scenario correctly with paravirtualized (PV) Xen domains: * User process sets up a gntdev mapping composed of two grant mappings (i.e., two pages shared by another Xen domain). * User process munmap()s one of the pages. * User process munmap()s the remaining page. * User process exits. In the scenario above, the user process would cause the kernel to log the following messages in dmesg for the first munmap(), and the second munmap() call would result in similar log messages: BUG: Bad page map in process doublemap.test pte:... pmd:... page:0000000057c97bff refcount:1 mapcount:-1 \ mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:... ... page dumped because: bad pte ... file:gntdev fault:0x0 mmap:gntdev_mmap [xen_gntdev] readpage:0x0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x5e print_bad_pte.cold+0x66/0xb6 unmap_page_range+0x7e5/0xdc0 unmap_vmas+0x78/0xf0 unmap_region+0xa8/0x110 __do_munmap+0x1ea/0x4e0 __vm_munmap+0x75/0x120 __x64_sys_munmap+0x28/0x40 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb ... For each munmap() call, the Xen hypervisor (if built with CONFIG_DEBUG) would print out the following and trigger a general protection fault in the affected Xen PV domain: (XEN) d0v... Attempt to implicitly unmap d0's grant PTE ... (XEN) d0v... Attempt to implicitly unmap d0's grant PTE ... As of this writing, gntdev_grant_map structure's vma field (referred to as map->vma below) is mainly used for checking the start and end addresses of mappings. However, with split VMAs, these may change, and there could be more than one VMA associated with a gntdev mapping. Hence, remove the use of map->vma and rely on map->pages_vm_start for the original start address and on (map->count << PAGE_SHIFT) for the original mapping size. Let the invalidate() and find_special_page() hooks use these. Also, given that there can be multiple VMAs associated with a gntdev mapping, move the "mmu_interval_notifier_remove(&map->notifier)" call to the end of gntdev_put_map, so that the MMU notifier is only removed after the closing of the last remaining VMA. Finally, use an atomic to prevent inadvertent gntdev mapping re-use, instead of using the map->live_grants atomic counter and/or the map->vma pointer (the latter of which is now removed). This prevents the userspace from mmap()'ing (with MAP_FIXED) a gntdev mapping over the same address range as a previously set up gntdev mapping. This scenario can be summarized with the following call-trace, which was valid prior to this commit: mmap gntdev_mmap mmap (repeat mmap with MAP_FIXED over the same address range) gntdev_invalidate unmap_grant_pages (sets 'being_removed' entries to true) gnttab_unmap_refs_async unmap_single_vma gntdev_mmap (maps the shared pages again) munmap gntdev_invalidate unmap_grant_pages (no-op because 'being_removed' entries are true) unmap_single_vma (For PV domains, Xen reports that a granted page is being unmapped and triggers a general protection fault in the affected domain, if Xen was built with CONFIG_DEBUG) The fix for this last scenario could be worth its own commit, but we opted for a single commit, because removing the gntdev_grant_map structure's vma field requires guarding the entry to gntdev_mmap(), and the live_grants atomic counter is not sufficient on its own to prevent the mmap() over a pre-existing mapping.

Technologies

Linux Linux Kernel

CVSS scores

  • v3.15.5CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

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Privilege Escalation

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Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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