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CVE-2023-25572

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2023-0631 · Published Feb 14, 2023

Cross-Site-Scripting attack on <RichTextField>

Impact

All React applications built with react-admin and using the <RichTextField> are affected.

<RichTextField> outputs the field value using dangerouslySetInnerHTML without client-side sanitization. If the data isn't sanitized server-side, this opens a possible Cross-Site-Scripting (XSS) attack.

Proof of concept:

import { RichTextField } from 'react-admin';

const record = {
    id: 1,
    body: `
<p>
<strong>War and Peace</strong> is a novel by the Russian author
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leo_Tolstoy" onclick="document.getElementById('stolendata').value='credentials';">Leo Tolstoy</a>,
published serially, then in its entirety in 1869.
</p>
<p onmouseover="document.getElementById('stolendata').value='credentials';">
It is regarded as one of Tolstoy's finest literary achievements and remains a classic of world literature.
</p>
<img src="x" onerror="document.getElementById('stolendata').value='credentials';" />
`,
};

const VulnerableRichTextField = () => (
    <>
        <RichTextField record={record} source="body" />
        <hr />
        <h4>Stolen data:</h4>
        <input id="stolendata" defaultValue="none" />
    </>
);
Patches

Versions 3.19.12 and 4.7.6 now use DOMPurify to escape the HTML before outputting it with React and dangerouslySetInnerHTML

Workarounds

You don't need to upgrade if you already sanitize HTML data server-side.

Otherwise, you'll have to replace the <RichTextField> by a custom field doing sanitization by hand:

// react-admin v4
import * as React from 'react';
import { memo } from 'react';
import PropTypes from 'prop-types';
import get from 'lodash/get';
import Typography from '@material-ui/core/Typography';
import { useRecordContext, sanitizeFieldRestProps, fieldPropTypes } from 'react-admin';
import purify from 'dompurify';

export const removeTags = (input) =>
    input ? input.replace(/<[^>]+>/gm, '') : '';

const RichTextField = memo(
    props => {
        const { className, emptyText, source, stripTags, ...rest } = props;
        const record = useRecordContext(props);
        const value = get(record, source);

        return (
            <Typography
                className={className}
                variant="body2"
                component="span"
                {...sanitizeFieldRestProps(rest)}
            >
                {value == null && emptyText ? (
                    emptyText
                ) : stripTags ? (
                    removeTags(value)
                ) : (
                    <span
                        dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{
                            __html: purify.sanitize(value),
                        }}
                    />
                )}
            </Typography>
        );
    }
);

RichTextField.defaultProps = {
    addLabel: true,
    stripTags: false,
};

RichTextField.propTypes = {
    // @ts-ignore
    ...Typography.propTypes,
    ...fieldPropTypes,
    stripTags: PropTypes.bool,
};

RichTextField.displayName = 'RichTextField';

export default RichTextField;
References

https://github.com/marmelab/react-admin/pull/8644, https://github.com/marmelab/react-admin/pull/8645

Technologies

Marmelab React-AdminMarmelab Ra-Ui-MaterialuiRa-Ui-Materialui Ra-Ui-MaterialuiReact-Admin React-Admin

Weaknesses

CWE-79

CVSS scores

  • v3.15.4CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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