[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"cve-CVE-2023-30626":3,"landing-trending":62,"landing-articles":88},{"id":4,"cve_id":5,"euvd_id":6,"summary":7,"published":8,"cvss_data":9,"is_remote":19,"cwes":20,"cpes":22,"technologies":25,"references":28,"score":37,"epss_score":38,"epss_percentile":39,"is_kev":40,"cisa_kev_date_added":41,"cisa_kev_due_date":41,"cisa_ssvc":42,"attack_mappings":52,"exploits":59},329251,"CVE-2023-30626","EUVD-2023-1255","Directory traversal + file write causing arbitrary code execution\n\n### Impact\nFrederic Linn (@FredericLinn) has reported a series of vulnerabilities that can result in directory traversal, file write, and potential remote code execution on Jellyfin instances. The general process involves chaining several exploits including a stored XSS vulnerability and can be used by an unprivileged user.\n\nThe general process is (using the example of setting an intro video as the payload):\n\n* Create a session as a low-priviledged user with a crafted authorization header\n* Upload an executable that contains a malicious plugin inline via \u002FClientLog\u002FDocument\n* (Admin hovers over our device in dashboard -> XSS payload gets triggered)\n* XSS Payload tries to set encoder path to our uploaded \"log\" file via \u002FSystem\u002FMediaEncoder\u002FPath\n* The request fails, but in the process our executable actually runs (I guess for verifying if the path points to a valid ffmpeg version)\n* The executable will create a plugin folder and place the inlined plugin DLL inside it\n* The XSS payload shuts down the server via \u002FSystem\u002FShutdown (separate CVE in `jellyfin-web`)\n* After (manually) starting the server, the plugin gets loaded and will:\n    * write a new video into the Jellyfin temp folder and register it\n    * register this video as the new intro\n    * and finally provide a malicious endpoint that simply executes system commands and sends back the results\n\nThe ability to write arbitrary content to log files was added in #5918 to allow flexibility to client logging.\n\nThe following two sections detail Frederic's exact determinations regarding the two vulnerabilities.\n\n#### Directory traversal and file write\n\nI've been reading the codebase here and there for a couple of days and found a directory traversal inside the ClientLogController, specifically \u002FClientLog\u002FDocument.\n\nThe GetRequestInformation method retrieves the name and version of the client from the HttpContext.User object.\n\nThose values are attacker controlled when authenticating against the API. Both values are interpolated into a string, which ultimately ends up as an argument to Path.Combine().\n\nSetting a client name to the relative path \"\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\test\" will write a file with completely attacker controlled content to the executing user's autostart directory.\n\nHowever, because the attacker only partially controls the filename, exploitation proves to be tricky. That's because the resulting file will always end in \".log\", which means putting something in the autostart directory is only going to open notepad on startup. I mean, we can at least insult the user :^).\n\nAnyway, the next logical step would be to write into Jellyfin's plugins directory, but the sub-directories there (of which the already existing configurations directory conveniently counts as one!) are only getting scanned for \".dll\" files.\n\nThis stops an attacker from providing malicious DLLs that implement the correct interfaces in order to be recognized as legitimate plugins.\n\nOn Linux, there might be more options. Running as the standard root user inside a container, an attacker could of course write anywhere. There's the very interesting \"\u002Fetc\u002Fcron.d\" directory, where an attacker can place cron jobs that get picked up automatically. Those files, however, can't contain a dot. Moreover, inside the container the cronjobs are probably not being executed, as the Jellyfin process should be only one running.\n\nFor the stored XSS component, see https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fjellyfin-web\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-89hp-h43h-r5pq\n\n### Patches\n10.8.10\n\n### Workarounds\nN\u002FA\n\n### References\n\nA complete write-up is available here: https:\u002F\u002Fgebir.ge\u002Fblog\u002Fpeanut-butter-jellyfin-time\u002F","2023-04-24T22:39:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":10},{"scope":11,"version":12,"baseScore":13,"attackVector":14,"baseSeverity":15,"vectorString":16,"integrityImpact":15,"userInteraction":17,"attackComplexity":18,"availabilityImpact":15,"privilegesRequired":18,"confidentialityImpact":15},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.8,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[21],"CWE-22",[23,24],"cpe:2.3:a:jellyfin:jellyfin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:jellyfin.controller:jellyfin.controller:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[26,27],"Jellyfin Jellyfin","Jellyfin.Controller Jellyfin.Controller",[29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fjellyfin-web\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-89hp-h43h-r5pq","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fblob\u002F22d880662283980dec994cd7d35fe269613bfce3\u002FJellyfin.Api\u002FControllers\u002FClientLogController.cs#L44","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fcommit\u002F82ad2633fdfb1c37a158057c7935f83e1129eda7","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fpull\u002F5918","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fjellyfin\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv10.8.10","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-9p5f-5x8v-x65m","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2023-30626","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjellyfin\u002Fjellyfin",0.79,0.01972,0.80296,false,null,{"timestamp":43,"automatable":44,"tech_impact":45,"exploitation":46,"cisa_decision":47,"cisa_remediation_timeline":51},"2025-02-03T21:00:37.114609Z","no","total","none",{"vector":48,"decision":49,"priority":50},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T10:42:00.615735\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[53],{"name":54,"source":55,"tactics":56,"technique_id":58},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[57],"initial-access","T1190",[60,61],{"link":34},{"link":30},{"count":63,"next":64,"previous":41,"results":65},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[66,75,78],{"id":67,"title":68,"summary":69,"published_at":70,"severity":71,"vendor":72,"products":73},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[74],"brotli",{"id":63,"title":68,"summary":76,"published_at":70,"severity":71,"vendor":72,"products":77},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[74],{"id":79,"title":80,"summary":81,"published_at":82,"severity":71,"vendor":83,"products":84},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[85,86,87],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"count":89,"next":90,"previous":41,"results":91},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[92,100,108],{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":101,"title":102,"summary":103,"published_at":104,"type":105,"link":106,"image_url":107},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":109,"title":110,"summary":111,"published_at":112,"type":113,"link":114,"image_url":115},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]