[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2023-32679":30,"landing-articles":183},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":122,"references":125,"score":130,"epss_score":131,"epss_percentile":132,"is_kev":133,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":134,"attack_mappings":144,"exploits":181},343446,"CVE-2023-32679","EUVD-2023-1632","Craft CMS vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via unrestricted file extension \n\n### Summary\nUnrestricted file extension lead to a potential Remote Code Execution\n(Authenticated, ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES=true)\n\n### Details\n#### Vulnerability Cause : \nIf the name parameter value is not empty string('') in the View.php's doesTemplateExist() -> resolveTemplate() -> _resolveTemplateInternal() -> _resolveTemplate() function, it returns directly without extension verification, so that arbitrary extension files are rendered as twig templates (even if they are not extensions set in defaultTemplateExtensions = ['html', 'twig'])\n```php\n    \u002F**\n     * Searches for a template files, and returns the first match if there is one.\n     *\n     * @param string $basePath The base path to be looking in.\n     * @param string $name The name of the template to be looking for.\n     * @param bool $publicOnly Whether to only look for public templates (template paths that don’t start with the private template trigger).\n     * @return string|null The matching file path, or `null`.\n     *\u002F\n    private function _resolveTemplate(string $basePath, string $name, bool $publicOnly): ?string\n    {\n        \u002F\u002F Normalize the path and name\n        $basePath = FileHelper::normalizePath($basePath);\n        $name = trim(FileHelper::normalizePath($name), '\u002F');\n\n        \u002F\u002F $name could be an empty string (e.g. to load the homepage template)\n        if ($name !== '') {\n            if ($publicOnly && preg_match(sprintf('\u002F(^|\\\u002F)%s\u002F', preg_quote($this->_privateTemplateTrigger, '\u002F')), $name)) {\n                return null;\n            }\n\n            \u002F\u002F Maybe $name is already the full file path\n            $testPath = $basePath . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $name;\n\n            if (is_file($testPath)) {\n                return $testPath;\n            }\n\n            foreach ($this->_defaultTemplateExtensions as $extension) {\n                $testPath = $basePath . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $name . '.' . $extension;\n\n                if (is_file($testPath)) {\n                    return $testPath;\n                }\n            }\n        }\n\n        foreach ($this->_indexTemplateFilenames as $filename) {\n            foreach ($this->_defaultTemplateExtensions as $extension) {\n                $testPath = $basePath . ($name !== '' ? DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $name : '') . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $filename . '.' . $extension;\n\n                if (is_file($testPath)) {\n                    return $testPath;\n                }\n            }\n        }\n\n        return null;\n    }\n```\n\nWhen attacker with admin privileges on the DEV or Misconfigured STG, PROD, they can exploit this vulnerability to remote code execution **(ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES=true)**\n\n\n### PoC\n**Step 1)** Create a new filesystem. **Base Path: \u002Fvar\u002Fwww\u002Fhtml\u002Ftemplates**\n![1](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228049254-6c3a9897-c26a-46a5-96ad-41c7b769116a.png)\n\n**Step 2)** Create a new asset volume. **Asset Filesystem: template**\n![2](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228049839-d2d42245-fa6e-4245-9fd2-967f1b9f4a74.png)\n\n**Step 3)** Upload poc file( .txt , .js , .json , etc ) with twig template rce payload\n```twig\n{{'\u003Cpre>'}}\n{{1337*1337}}\n{{['cat \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd']|map('passthru')|join}}\n{{['id;pwd;ls -altr \u002F']|map('passthru')|join}}\n```\n![7](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228051307-623b78d0-4792-44ae-af0f-aff6b16f8d87.png)\n![5](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228051064-cfaad338-3aff-4c4f-a177-9b42e473142b.png)\n\n**Step 4)** Create a new global set with template layout. The template filename is poc.js\n![8](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228051430-365457eb-2a10-47a8-aed9-fb400e80c6d5.png)\n\n**Step 5)** When access global menu or \u002Fadmin\u002Fglobal\u002Ftest, poc.js is rendered as a template file and RCE confirmed\n![9](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228053142-62a0f1ad-bbfa-4b8d-b6bd-28ed26c1cc18.png)\n\n**Step 6)** RCE can be confirmed on other menus(Entries, Categories) where the template file is loaded.\n![10](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228054216-5dcd0c30-85bd-4603-84e5-944cfe9ad93c.png)\n![11](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228054146-d5a3ceea-e13d-461a-bcd6-abf260761d62.png)\n\n\n**Poc Environment)** ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES=true, defaultTemplateExtensions=['html','twig']\n![0](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228054764-37d78cf5-5eca-442f-873a-99e6676b8173.png)\n![13](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228054803-1a2c40b0-e515-46b3-a653-bb5ef1a287a2.png)\n![14](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228054821-c7b0cfd6-126a-4722-846c-26d725af1a6a.png)\n\n### Impact\nTake control of vulnerable systems, Data exfiltrations, Malware execution, Pivoting, etc.\n\nAdditionally, there are 371 domains using CraftCMS exposed on Shodan, and among them, 33 servers have \"stage\" or \"dev\" included in their hostnames. \n\nalthough the vulnerability is exploitable only in the authenticated users, configuration with ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES=true, there is still a potential security threat (Remote Code Execution)\n\n![2023-03-31 10 29 53](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F229001176-4c235b2f-e1a3-4b96-965a-78f227546a12.png)\n\n### Remediation\nRecommend taking measures by referring to https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcraftcms\u002Fcms-ghsa-9f84-5wpf-3vcf\u002Fpull\u002F1\n```php\n            \u002F\u002F Maybe $name is already the full file path\n            $testPath = $basePath . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $name;\n\n            if (is_file($testPath)) {\n                \u002F\u002F Remedation: Verify template file extension, before return\n                $fileExt = pathinfo($testPath, PATHINFO_EXTENSION);\n                $isDisallowed = false;\n\n                if (isset($fileExt)) {\n                    $isDisallowed = !in_array($fileExt, $this->_defaultTemplateExtensions);\n\n                    if($isDisallowed) {\n                        return null;\n                    } else {\n                        return $testPath;\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n```\n\n![remediation](https:\u002F\u002Fuser-images.githubusercontent.com\u002F30969523\u002F228841202-43079754-0d9d-47fa-8ae3-ce5dd509796b.png)","2023-05-22T20:36:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.2,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-74",[50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121],"cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:alpha1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.0:beta7:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.0:beta6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.1.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.0:beta5:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.0:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.1.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.0:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.8.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.0:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.0:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.1.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.2.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.0.0:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:craft_cms:4.3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:craftcms:cms:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[123,124],"Craftcms 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reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":196,"title":197,"summary":198,"published_at":199,"type":200,"link":201,"image_url":202},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":204,"title":205,"summary":206,"published_at":207,"type":208,"link":209,"image_url":210},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]