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CVE-2023-35042

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2023-1696 · Published Jun 12, 2023

GeoServer RCE due to improper control of generation of code in jai-ext`Jiffle` map algebra language GeoServer 2, in some configurations, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via `java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec` in `wps:LiteralData` within a `wps:Execute` request, as exploited in the wild in June 2023. ## RCE in Jiffle The Jiffle map algebra language, provided by jai-ext, allows efficiently execute map algebra over large images. A vulnerability [CVE-2022-24816](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24816) has been recently found in Jiffle, that allows a Code Injection to be performed by properly crafting a Jiffle invocation. In the case of GeoServer, the injection can be performed from a remote request. ## Assessment GeoTools includes the Jiffle language as part of the `gt-process-raster-<version>` module, applications using it should check whether it’s possible to provide a Jiffle script from remote, and if so, upgrade or remove the functionality (see also the GeoServer mitigation, below). The issue is of particular interest for GeoServer users, as GeoServer embeds Jiffle in the base WAR package. Jiffle is available as a OGC function, for usage in SLD rendering transformations. This allows for a Remote Code Execution in properly crafted OGC requests, as well as from the administration console, when editing SLD files. ## Mitigations In case you cannot upgrade at once, then the following mitigation is strongly recommended: 1. Stop GeoServer 2. Open the war file, get into `WEB-INF/lib` and remove the `janino-<version>.jar` 3. Restart GeoServer. This effectively removes the Jiffle ability to compile scripts in Java code, from any of the potential attack vectors (Janino is the library used to turn the Java code generated from the Jiffle script, into executable bytecode). GeoServer should still work properly after the removal, but any attempt to use Jiffle will result in an exception.

Technologies

Geoserver Geoserver

CVSS scores

  • v3.19.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

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Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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