New MCP server — Bring vulnerability intelligence into your AI
Back to feed

CVE-2023-41045

ExploitedNVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2023-2058 · Published Jul 6, 2023

Graylog vulnerable to insecure source port usage for DNS queries

Summary

Graylog utilises only one single source port for DNS queries.

Details

Graylog seems to bind a single socket for outgoing DNS queries. That socket is bound to a random port number which is not changed again. This goes against recommended practice since 2008, when Dan Kaminsky discovered how easy is to carry out DNS cache poisoning attacks. In order to prevent cache poisoning with spoofed DNS responses, it is necessary to maximise the uncertainty in the choice of a source port for a DNS query.

PoC

The attached figure shows the source ports distribution difference between Graylog configured to use a data adapter based on DNS queries and ISC Bind. The source port distribution of the DNS queries sent from Graylog to a recursive DNS name server running Bind (CLIENT_QUERY) are depicted in purple, while the queries sent from the recursive DNS server to the authoritatives (RESOLVER_QUERY) are plotted in green color. As it can be observed, in contrast to ISC Bind which presents a heterogeneous usage of source port, Graylog utilises a single source port.

image

Impact

Although unlikely in many setups, an external attacker could inject forged DNS responses into a Graylog's lookup table cache. In order to prevent this, it is at least recommendable to distribute the DNS queries through a pool of distinct sockets, each of them with a random source port and renew them periodically.

(Credit to Iratxe Niño from Fundación Sarenet and Borja Marcos from Sarenet)

Technologies

Graylog Graylog

Weaknesses

CWE-345

CVSS scores

  • v3.13.7CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Resource Development Initial Access Persistence Stealth Defense Impairment Credential Access Collection Impact

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

Take 15 minutes to discover our platform with our experts

Patrowl Intel platform screenshot