[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2023-46132":30,"landing-articles":86},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":51,"references":53,"score":63,"epss_score":64,"epss_percentile":65,"is_kev":66,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":67,"attack_mappings":77,"exploits":84},345080,"CVE-2023-46132","EUVD-2023-3042","Fabric vulnerable to crosslinking transaction attack\n\n# Short summary\n\nCombining two molecules to one another, called \"cross-linking\" results in a molecule with a chemical formula that is composed of all atoms of the original two molecules. \n\nIn Fabric, one can take a block of transactions and cross-link the transactions in a way that alters the way the peers parse the transactions. If a first peer receives a block `B` and a second peer receives a block identical to `B` but with the transactions being cross-linked, the second peer will parse transactions in a different way and thus its world state will deviate from the first peer. \n\nOrderers or peers cannot detect that a block has its transactions cross-linked, because there is a vulnerability in the way Fabric hashes the transactions of blocks. It simply and naively concatenates them, which is insecure and lets an adversary craft a \"cross-linked block\" (block with cross-linked transactions) which alters the way peers process transactions. \nFor example, it is possible to select a transaction and manipulate a peer to completely avoid processing it, without changing the computed hash of the block.\n\nAdditional validations have been added in v2.2.14 and v2.5.5 to detect potential cross-linking issues before processing blocks.\n\n## Impact\nIn V1 and V2, we only have a crash fault tolerant orderer and as such, the security model Fabric operates in is that the orderer is honest,\nbut peers may be malicious. As such, a peer that replicates a block from a malicious peer can have a state fork.\n\nIn V3 which we did not a release a GA yet (only a preview), we have a byzantine fault tolerant orderering service, so the security model that Fabric operates in such a case includes malicious orderers. If the orderer is malicious, it can cause state forks for peers, and can infect non-malicious orderers with cross-linked blocks.\n\n# Long summary\n\nIn order to create a signature on a big chunk of data  such as a block, the data needs to be \"compressed\" first to the input size of the signature algorithm.\n\nIn Fabric's case, we use a hash function which compressed a Fabric block from arbitrary size to a 32 byte string.\n\nIn order to understand the problem we need to be more specific: The block structure has three parts to it: (1) Header, (2) Transactions, and (3) Metadata.\n\nWhen hashing the block, the header and metadata are stitched together and then hashed, and this hash of the header and the metadata is what signed (it's a simplification but let's not get into details)\n\nHowever, the transactions of the block are not part of the above hash. Instead, the header contains a hash, called the \"Data hash\" and despite the fact that in the comments it is said: \"\u002F\u002F The hash of the BlockData, by MerkleTree\", actually it is far from being the case, and that is where our problem lies.\n\nThe problem is that the way the transactions are hashed gives an attacker some freedom in manipulating the data. \n\nTo create the Data Hash, the transactions in the block are concatenated to one another, creating a big long byte array and then this big long byte array is hashed, and this is essentially the Data Hash.\n\nThe transactions in the block are a list of raw byte arrays, and when they are concatenated they look like this:\n\n`|$$$$$$$$$$$$|*************|@@@@@@@@@@@@|%%%%%%%%%|`  (The vertical lines \" | \" represent how transactions are separated in a block.)\n\nWhen the transactions are concatenated in order to be hashed, the payload that is hashed is: \n`$$$$$$$$$$$$*************@@@@@@@@@@@@%%%%%%%%%`\n\nAn adversary can't change the bytes of the concatenation, however what it can do, is to modify how transactions are encoded in the block:\n\nFor example, consider an adversary wants to manipulate a peer to skip the second transaction (******).\n\nIt can then create a block with the transactions as follows:\n\n`|$$$$$$$$$$$$*************|@@@@@@@@@@@@|%%%%%%%%%| `\n\nNotice that a block with the above transactions has the same concatenation of bytes as the original block, but the block has one less transaction - the first transaction is a concatenation of the first and second transactions in the original block.\n\nWhen the peer receives this block, it looks at the first transaction and when it parses it, it completely ignores the ***** bytes, (we will see why soon), and so, an adversary can create a block with the same hash but different transactions and this would create a fork in the network.\n \nI made a small PoC where I created a block with 2 transactions (by invoking two chaincodes at the same time) with a Raft orderer:\n\n```\n    [e][OrdererOrg.orderer] 2023-10-14 23:07:34.076 CEST 0079 INFO [orderer.consensus.etcdraft] propose -> Created block [10] with 2 transactions, there are 0 blocks in flight channel=testchannel node=1\n```\n\nBut right after creating the block, I just modified only its transaction content (without modifying the block hash) and then the peers only detect a single transaction inside that block:\n \n```\n    [e][Org2.peer0] 2023-10-14 23:07:34.079 CEST 0099 INFO [kvledger] commit -> [testchannel] Committed block [10] with 1 transaction(s) in 0ms (state_validation=0ms block_and_pvtdata_commit=0ms state_commit=0ms) commitHash=[c5ecca818da9319af2f276dd01cd1337938f20c3535dd23f95a33933a114fe84]\n```\n\nThe important takeaway from this experiment is that the peer does not detect any tempering was done to the block. If an attacker performs this attack, the network can be forked silently and no one will notice the network was forked until it's too late.\n\n \n\n# Patches\nHere is the patch I propose (the explanation is further below): \n\n```\ndiff --git a\u002Finternal\u002Fpeer\u002Fgossip\u002Fmcs.go b\u002Finternal\u002Fpeer\u002Fgossip\u002Fmcs.go\nindex b46df8b6a..9c3b5c8fd 100644\n--- a\u002Finternal\u002Fpeer\u002Fgossip\u002Fmcs.go\n+++ b\u002Finternal\u002Fpeer\u002Fgossip\u002Fmcs.go\n@@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ func (s *MSPMessageCryptoService) VerifyBlock(chainID common.ChannelID, seqNum u\n \t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"Block with id [%d] on channel [%s] does not have metadata. Block not valid.\", block.Header.Number, chainID)\n \t}\n \n+\tif err := protoutil.VerifyTransactionsAreWellFormed(block); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\n \t\u002F\u002F - Verify that Header.DataHash is equal to the hash of block.Data\n \t\u002F\u002F This is to ensure that the header is consistent with the data carried by this block\n \tif !bytes.Equal(protoutil.BlockDataHash(block.Data), block.Header.DataHash) {\ndiff --git a\u002Forderer\u002Fcommon\u002Fcluster\u002Futil.go b\u002Forderer\u002Fcommon\u002Fcluster\u002Futil.go\nindex e229bebfc..05b1bfaa9 100644\n--- a\u002Forderer\u002Fcommon\u002Fcluster\u002Futil.go\n+++ b\u002Forderer\u002Fcommon\u002Fcluster\u002Futil.go\n@@ -260,6 +260,9 @@ func VerifyBlockHash(indexInBuffer int, blockBuff []*common.Block) error {\n \tif block.Header == nil {\n \t\treturn errors.New(\"missing block header\")\n \t}\n+\tif err := protoutil.VerifyTransactionsAreWellFormed(block); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n \tseq := block.Header.Number\n \tdataHash := protoutil.BlockDataHash(block.Data)\n \t\u002F\u002F Verify data hash matches the hash in the header\ndiff --git a\u002Forderer\u002Fconsensus\u002Fsmartbft\u002Fverifier.go b\u002Forderer\u002Fconsensus\u002Fsmartbft\u002Fverifier.go\nindex 2b9fdfc4c..f232a1eae 100644\n--- a\u002Forderer\u002Fconsensus\u002Fsmartbft\u002Fverifier.go\n+++ b\u002Forderer\u002Fconsensus\u002Fsmartbft\u002Fverifier.go\n@@ -237,6 +237,10 @@ func verifyHashChain(block *cb.Block, prevHeaderHash string) error {\n \t\treturn errors.Errorf(\"previous header hash is %s but expected %s\", thisHdrHashOfPrevHdr, prevHeaderHash)\n \t}\n \n+\tif err := protoutil.VerifyTransactionsAreWellFormed(block); err != nil {\n+\t\treturn err\n+\t}\n+\n \tdataHash := hex.EncodeToString(block.Header.DataHash)\n \tactualHashOfData := hex.EncodeToString(protoutil.BlockDataHash(block.Data))\n \tif dataHash != actualHashOfData {\ndiff --git a\u002Fprotoutil\u002Fblockutils.go b\u002Fprotoutil\u002Fblockutils.go\nindex 8527869e4..fca3c386f 100644\n--- a\u002Fprotoutil\u002Fblockutils.go\n+++ b\u002Fprotoutil\u002Fblockutils.go\n@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ import (\n \t\"bytes\"\n \t\"crypto\u002Fsha256\"\n \t\"encoding\u002Fasn1\"\n+\t\"encoding\u002Fbase64\"\n \t\"fmt\"\n \t\"math\u002Fbig\"\n \n@@ -298,3 +299,35 @@ func searchConsenterIdentityByID(consenters []*cb.Consenter, identifier uint32)\n \t}\n \treturn nil\n }\n+\n+func VerifyTransactionsAreWellFormed(block *cb.Block) error {\n+\tif block == nil || block.Data == nil || len(block.Data.Data) == 0 {\n+\t\treturn nil\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfor i, rawTx := range block.Data.Data {\n+\t\tenv := &cb.Envelope{}\n+\t\tif err := proto.Unmarshal(rawTx, env); err != nil {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"transaction %d is invalid: %v\", i, err)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif len(env.Payload) == 0 {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"transaction %d has no payload\", i)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif len(env.Signature) == 0 {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"transaction %d has no signature\", i)\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\texpected := MarshalOrPanic(env)\n+\t\tif len(expected) \u003C len(rawTx) {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"transaction %d has %d trailing bytes\", i, len(rawTx)-len(expected))\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif !bytes.Equal(expected, rawTx) {\n+\t\t\treturn fmt.Errorf(\"transaction %d (%s) does not match its raw form (%s)\", i,\n+\t\t\t\tbase64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(expected), base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(rawTx))\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn nil\n+}\ndiff --git a\u002Fprotoutil\u002Fblockutils_test.go b\u002Fprotoutil\u002Fblockutils_test.go\nindex b2159da9f..2871483f1 100644\n--- a\u002Fprotoutil\u002Fblockutils_test.go\n+++ b\u002Fprotoutil\u002Fblockutils_test.go\n@@ -489,3 +489,109 @@ func TestBlockSignatureVerifierByCreator(t *testing.T) {\n \trequire.Len(t, signatureSet, 1)\n \trequire.Equal(t, []byte(\"creator1\"), signatureSet[0].Identity)\n }\n+\n+func TestVerifyTransactionsAreWellFormed(t *testing.T) {\n+\toriginalBlock := &cb.Block{\n+\t\tData: &cb.BlockData{\n+\t\t\tData: [][]byte{\n+\t\t\t\tmarshalOrPanic(&cb.Envelope{\n+\t\t\t\t\tPayload:   []byte{1, 2, 3},\n+\t\t\t\t\tSignature: []byte{4, 5, 6},\n+\t\t\t\t}),\n+\t\t\t\tmarshalOrPanic(&cb.Envelope{\n+\t\t\t\t\tPayload:   []byte{7, 8, 9},\n+\t\t\t\t\tSignature: []byte{10, 11, 12},\n+\t\t\t\t}),\n+\t\t\t},\n+\t\t},\n+\t}\n+\n+\tforgedBlock := proto.Clone(originalBlock).(*cb.Block)\n+\ttmp := make([]byte, len(forgedBlock.Data.Data[0])+len(forgedBlock.Data.Data[1]))\n+\tcopy(tmp, forgedBlock.Data.Data[0])\n+\tcopy(tmp[len(forgedBlock.Data.Data[0]):], forgedBlock.Data.Data[1])\n+\tforgedBlock.Data.Data = [][]byte{tmp} \u002F\u002F Replace transactions {0,1} with transaction {0 || 1}\n+\n+\tfor _, tst := range []struct {\n+\t\tname          string\n+\t\texpectedError string\n+\t\tblock         *cb.Block\n+\t}{\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname: \"empty block\",\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname:  \"no block data\",\n+\t\t\tblock: &cb.Block{},\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname:  \"no transactions\",\n+\t\t\tblock: &cb.Block{Data: &cb.BlockData{}},\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname: \"single transaction\",\n+\t\t\tblock: &cb.Block{Data: &cb.BlockData{Data: [][]byte{marshalOrPanic(&cb.Envelope{\n+\t\t\t\tPayload:   []byte{1, 2, 3},\n+\t\t\t\tSignature: []byte{4, 5, 6},\n+\t\t\t})}}},\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname:  \"good block\",\n+\t\t\tblock: originalBlock,\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname:          \"forged block\",\n+\t\t\tblock:         forgedBlock,\n+\t\t\texpectedError: \"transaction 0 has 10 trailing bytes\",\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname:          \"no signature\",\n+\t\t\texpectedError: \"transaction 0 has no signature\",\n+\t\t\tblock: &cb.Block{\n+\t\t\t\tData: &cb.BlockData{\n+\t\t\t\t\tData: [][]byte{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tmarshalOrPanic(&cb.Envelope{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tPayload: []byte{1, 2, 3},\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n+\t\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t},\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname:          \"no payload\",\n+\t\t\texpectedError: \"transaction 0 has no payload\",\n+\t\t\tblock: &cb.Block{\n+\t\t\t\tData: &cb.BlockData{\n+\t\t\t\t\tData: [][]byte{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tmarshalOrPanic(&cb.Envelope{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSignature: []byte{4, 5, 6},\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t}),\n+\t\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t},\n+\t\t},\n+\t\t{\n+\t\t\tname:          \"transaction invalid\",\n+\t\t\texpectedError: \"transaction 0 is invalid: proto: cannot parse invalid wire-format data\",\n+\t\t\tblock: &cb.Block{\n+\t\t\t\tData: &cb.BlockData{\n+\t\t\t\t\tData: [][]byte{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\tmarshalOrPanic(&cb.Envelope{\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tPayload:   []byte{1, 2, 3},\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSignature: []byte{4, 5, 6},\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t})[9:],\n+\t\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t\t},\n+\t\t\t},\n+\t\t},\n+\t} {\n+\t\tt.Run(tst.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n+\t\t\terr := protoutil.VerifyTransactionsAreWellFormed(tst.block)\n+\t\t\tif tst.expectedError == \"\" {\n+\t\t\t\trequire.NoError(t, err)\n+\t\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\t\trequire.EqualError(t, err, tst.expectedError)\n+\t\t\t}\n+\t\t})\n+\t}\n+}\n\n```\n\nThe idea is as follows:\n\nWhen we validate that the block's transactions match the hash in the header, we not only hash the transactions are earlier, \n\nbut also ensure that if the transactions in the block are encoded into bytes, they re-create the exact split in the original block: `|$$$$$$$$$$$$|***********|@@@@@@@@@|%%%%%%%%%%%|`\n\nMore specifically, each transaction in the block is parsed and then re-encoded to bytes, and we check that the original encoding of a transaction is as the second encoding after parsing the original bytes of the transaction.\n\nThis fix keeps the legacy way of hashing transactions to create the block data hash, but also aims to check if some manipulation was done.\n\n \nTo understand why the fix works, we need to understand how protobuf, the wire protocol that Fabric uses to encode transactions (and almost anything it sends over the wire or writes to disk) encodes a transaction.\n\nA transaction is a protobuf message with two fields of bytes: (1) Payload and (2) Signature.\n\nWhen encoding a field of bytes, protobuf first writes a tag for the field (a byte) and then writes the length of the field in variable-length encoding, and then the bytes themselves.\n\nFor example, to encode a transaction, protobuf writes 10 (the tag for payload), then two bytes for the length of the payload, then the payload, and then 18, the tag for the signature, and then a single byte for the length of the signature, and finally the signature.\n\nNow, we can understand a proof sketch of why my solution works:\n\nAssume in contradiction that an adversary takes a block of transactions and changes the split of the concatenation in a way that changes the transactions for a peer:\n\nFrom `|$$$$$$$$$$$$|************|@@@@@@@@@@@|...|%%%%%%%|` to (for example): From `|$$$$$$$$$$$$************|@@@@@@@@@@@|...|%%%%%%%|` \n\nSince this split is not identical to the original split, there exists at least one transaction index of different size between the two splits. Let's look at the first transaction that is of different size.\n\nFor example, for the split:\n\n`|$$$$$$$$$$$$|************|@@@@@@@@@@@|...|%%%%%%%|`  we have two options:\n\n1.  The first transaction of different size is smaller in the new split:  `|$$$$$$$$$$$$|*****|*******|@@@@@@@@@@@|...|%%%%%%%|`  In such a case, it must contain both a payload and a signature, so it needs two fields (we can say we will return an error if one of the two is missing). If the protobuf parser detects it lacks bytes to parse a payload, it will fail with an error. Else, it has enough bytes to parse the payload, and then the signature is parsed. If the signature field is too short then we also error similarly.\n\n2. The first transaction of different size is bigger in the new split: `|$$$$$$$$$$$$|************@@@@|@@@@@@@|...|%%%%%%%|` \nIn that case, once this transaction is parsed, the extra bytes are skipped, so encoding the transaction to bytes yields a shorter byte array, and we detect a tempering.\n\n","2023-11-14T20:28:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.1,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:L","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-362",[50],"cpe:2.3:a:hyperledger:fabric:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52],"Hyperledger Fabric",[54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhyperledger\u002Ffabric\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-v9w2-543f-h69m","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2023-46132","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhyperledger\u002Ffabric\u002Fpull\u002F4503","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhyperledger\u002Ffabric\u002Fpull\u002F4504","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhyperledger\u002Ffabric\u002Fcommit\u002F389b2e66de9a6fbc6043216d554c97bbbdf0e008","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhyperledger\u002Ffabric\u002Fcommit\u002F93bef10bd3ce3c54d7f3b064f765dbde61da7def","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhyperledger\u002Ffabric","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhyperledger\u002Ffabric\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.2.14","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fhyperledger\u002Ffabric\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.5.5",0.71,0.00519,0.4385,false,{"timestamp":68,"automatable":69,"tech_impact":70,"exploitation":71,"cisa_decision":72,"cisa_remediation_timeline":76},"2024-08-29T20:19:34.464828Z","no","partial","none",{"vector":73,"decision":74,"priority":75},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:12:11.564209\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[78],{"name":79,"source":80,"tactics":81,"technique_id":83},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[82],"initial-access","T1190",[85],{"link":54},{"count":87,"next":88,"previous":6,"results":89},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[90,98,106],{"id":91,"title":92,"summary":93,"published_at":94,"type":95,"link":96,"image_url":97},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":99,"title":100,"summary":101,"published_at":102,"type":103,"link":104,"image_url":105},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":107,"title":108,"summary":109,"published_at":110,"type":111,"link":112,"image_url":113},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]