[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-25108":30,"landing-articles":98},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":52,"technologies":66,"references":68,"score":75,"epss_score":76,"epss_percentile":77,"is_kev":78,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":79,"attack_mappings":89,"exploits":96},57974,"CVE-2024-25108","EUVD-2024-0638","Pixelfed doesn't check OAuth Scopes in API routes, giving elevated permissions\n\n### Summary\n\nWhen processing requests authorization was improperly and insufficiently checked, allowing attackers to access far more functionality than users intended, including to the administrative and moderator functionality of the Pixelfed server.\n\nThis vulnerability affects every version of Pixelfed between `v0.10.4` and `v0.11.9`, inclusive. A proof of concept of this vulnerability exists.\n\n### Details\n\nIn vulnerable versions of Pixelfed (versions before 0.11.11), when the API checked the request for permissions to perform a certain behavior, it did not check that the OAuth Application\u002FClient had granted access to those API endpoints, it only checked if the user was authenticated via an access token, and if the user was the owner of the resource or an admin on the instance.\n\nThis meant that an attacker could request an access token for \"read\" permissions to authenticate you with their application, but the access token that they obtained actually could be used for \"write\" or even administrative actions, and the user who granted access to their account had zero knowledge of this elevated access.\n\n#### Proof of Concept\n\n1. Create an access token either via [2-legged OAuth flow](https:\u002F\u002Foauth.net\u002F2\u002Fgrant-types\u002Fauthorization-code\u002F) for the `read` scope, or create a Personal Access Tokens with the `read` scope.\n2. Using that Access Token, perform a request that would need a particular higher-privilege scope, for instance, following a user or performing an administrative request. (respectively requiring `follow` or `admin:read` and `admin:write` scopes in the patched versions)\n3. Observe that despite your access token having `read` permissions, the follow or administrative request was successful.\n\ne.g., Maybe an attacker collects an access token (which expires in 1 year) wants to do something really nasty to an admin, such as disabling federation on their target's pixelfed server. As long as that server has `instance.enable_cc` configured (defaults to `true`), then the attacker can use the `read` scoped access token and perform the following request:\n\n```\nPOST \u002Fapi\u002Fadmin\u002Fconfig\u002Fupdate\nContent-Type: application\u002Fjson\nAccept: application\u002Fjson\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003Caccess token with read scope>\n\n{ \"key\": \"federation.activitypub.enabled\": \"value\": false }\n```\n\nAnd federation of that pixelfed server would be subsequently disabled, as if the administrator had disabled it.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability affects every local user of a Pixelfed server, and can potentially affect the servers' ability to federate.\n\nSome user interaction is required to setup the conditions to be able to exercise the vulnerability, but the attacker could conduct this attack time-delayed manner, where user interaction is not actively required, since access tokens in Pixelfed have a 1-year lifetime before they expire, and users' often forget to revoke access tokens for applications that they are no longer using.\n\nThis also means that Access Tokens that may have been leaked from third-party OAuth Application's databases would be usable for a significant amount of time by potential attackers.\n\n### Prior versions\n\nWhilst this vulnerability is listed as `>= 0.10.4`, there is potential that versions before `0.10.4` are also vulnerable to this sort of security bypass, however, given that the code changed significantly between `0.10.3` and `0.10.4` we've been unable to easily assess if these heavily outdated versions are vulnerable or not to this exploit.\n\n### Sponsorship\n\nThe work involved in investigating and remediation of this security vulnerability was provided by [Nivenly Foundation](https:\u002F\u002Fnivenly.org\u002F), for whom we are grateful for their support of the Fediverse and Pixelfed.","2024-02-12T15:17:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":46},"CHANGED","3.1",9.9,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:L\u002FA:L","LOW","NONE","HIGH",true,[49,50,51],"CWE-863","CWE-280","CWE-285",[53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65],"cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.10.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.11.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.10.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.10.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.10.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.11.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.11.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.10.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.11.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.10.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.11.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:pixelfed:pixelfed:0.10.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[67],"Pixelfed Pixelfed",[69,70,71,72,73,74],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fcommit\u002F7e47d6dccb0393a2e95c42813c562c854882b037","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-gccq-h3xj-jgvf","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-25108","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fcommit\u002Ffd7f5dbb","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fcommit\u002Ffd7f5dbba13818f60d1c2b3ab110b499e996aa81","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fpixelfed\u002Fpixelfed",0.85,0.00678,0.52038,false,{"timestamp":80,"automatable":81,"tech_impact":82,"exploitation":83,"cisa_decision":84,"cisa_remediation_timeline":88},"2024-09-16T19:34:39.742590Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":85,"decision":86,"priority":87},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:10:16.394536\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[90],{"name":91,"source":92,"tactics":93,"technique_id":95},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[94],"initial-access","T1190",[97],{"link":70},{"count":99,"next":100,"previous":6,"results":101},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[102,110,118],{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":111,"title":112,"summary":113,"published_at":114,"type":115,"link":116,"image_url":117},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":119,"title":120,"summary":121,"published_at":122,"type":123,"link":124,"image_url":125},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]