[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-26135":30,"landing-articles":158},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":128,"references":130,"score":135,"epss_score":136,"epss_percentile":137,"is_kev":138,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":139,"attack_mappings":149,"exploits":156},39656,"CVE-2024-26135","EUVD-2024-0618","MeshCentral cross-site websocket hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability\n\nWe have identified a cross-site websocket hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability within the control.ashx endpoint of MeshCentral. This component is the primary mechanism used within MeshCentral to perform administrative actions on the server. To demonstrate the impact of the vulnerability we developed a proof-of-concept which leveraged the cross-site websocket hijacking vulnerability to read the server configuration file to leak the sessionKey variable, generating login tokens, and generating an authentication cookie.\n\nThe vulnerability is exploitable when an attacker is able to convince a victim end-user to click on a malicious link to a page hosting an attacker-controlled site. The attacker can then originate a cross-site websocket connection using client-side JavaScript code to connect to “control.ashx” as the victim user within MeshCentral. There are some caveats to exploiting this issue however as MeshCentral configures `SameSite=Lax` security setting on cookies which introduces some additional preconditions for exploitation which we cover in a subsequent section.\n\n### MeshCentral Version Tested\nWe performed testing against MeshCentral version 1.1.20 which appears to be the latest supported version of the application. This appears to have been the latest version of MeshCentral available at the time we performed testing of the application in January and February 2024 (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002F4a24fce2-5047-47a1-ac91-ae84c44ef3f1)\nFigure 1: We determined that MeshCentral version 1.1.20 was the latest version available at the time we performed testing of the application.\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002F4e347e91-6296-4b1a-a1d0-bb3587a82ea3)\nFigure 2: We configured our test environment on an Ubuntu server running version 1.1.20 of the MeshCentral application server.\n\n### What about SameSite=Lax Cookie Settings?\nOne may make the counterpoint that the `SameSite=Lax` security setting (see Figure 4) effectively prevents cross-site websocket hijacking (CSWSH) issues as an attacker origin of attacker.com would not be within the same-site as the victim meshcentral server at say meshcentral.example.com. This means an attacker that is able to convince a user to click on a malicious link wouldn’t be able to successfully perform this attacker to the Lax setting with differing origins.\n\nUnfortunately, this isn’t entirely correct as there is a core difference between same-site and same-origin policies within all modern browsers. In this case, while it’s valid to say that the attack wouldn’t work in the case of attacker.com targeting meshcentral.example.com when the SameSite setting is configured to Lax for session cookies, there are several other scenarios where an attacker could perform the attack successfully (see Figure 3).\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002Fb108232d-7f85-4815-9439-431db0eeed85)\nFigure 3: A table from PortSwigger’s article on Bypassing SameSite Cookie Restrictions (source).\n\nFrom our perspective, the most relevant scenario is when an attacker is able to compromise an adjacent subdomain either through a vector such as a system compromise, exploiting a subdomain takeover vulnerability, or through exploitation of a cross-site scripting vulnerability within an adjacent application running under the same domain. For example, if an attacker found a cross-site scripting issue on example.com or vulnerable.example.com they would then be able to leverage the cross-site scripting issues on those domains to target meshcentral.example.com. There are other factors which could also allow an attacker to bypass the SameSite=Lax setting to perform cross-site websocket hijacking. For a more comprehensive list please see Bypassing SameSite Cookie Restrictions from PortSwigger.\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002F8310a307-273f-44e5-948a-f1a2b49cf960)\nFigure 4: We observed that upon logging into MeshCentral the “xid” and “xid.sig” tokens were configured with the SameSite=Lax security settings.\n\n### Developing an Initial Proof-of-Concept Exploit\nAt this point we had a testing deployment of MeshCentral configured at meshcentral.example.com and simulated an attacker-compromised adjacent subdomain at evil.example.com. In this scenario, we assume the attacker exploited a subdomain takeover vulnerability to host malicious content on evil.example.com. Next, we developed a simple proof-of-concept payload which originated a cross-site websocket connection from the evil.example.com origin to meshcentral.example.com (see Figure 5).\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002F725820ef-5e93-48f5-aa47-9e21b299f255)\nFigure 5: An initial proof-of-concept exploit we developed which simply sent a ping-message over the websocket connection from evil.example.com targeting meshcentral.example.com. We then triggered the exploit payload as a user that was logged into the MeshCentral application as an administrator by browsing to evil.example.com with a valid session on meshcentral.example.com. We\nobserved a cross-site websocket connection to meshcentral.example.com with an origin header set to evil.example.com as it originated from the attacker domain (see Figure 6). The response indicated the connection was successful and we received the expected pong response to our ping message sent to the server.\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002F9bcec329-4206-4ce6-bbba-a02a47c306d8)\nFigure 6: We observed that when originating a websocket connection across origins the origin header was sent by the browser to the MeshCentral server indicating the origin which originated the cross-site websocket connection.\n\n### Demonstrating Impact\nAfter confirming the vulnerability we then developed a more comprehensive exploit payload to demonstrate the impact of the vulnerability (see Figure 7). Our new payload sent the serverconfig, authcookie, and createLoginToken actions to the administrative component. The ability to issue a new login token then provided us with persistent access to the users account. The ability to read the serverconfig file allowed us to exfiltrate the session key used to sign sessions allowing the attacker to forge valid session tokens as arbitrary users on the system. Our payload then read the response from the server and exfiltrated the sensitive data exported from the system to an attacker-controlled system for storage purposes (see Figure 8).\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002Fd42f8372-24c9-4786-bfaa-ed1f91915749)\nFigure 7: A proof-of-concept exploit we developed for the cross-site websocket hijacking vulnerability resulting in complete compromise of the user’s account and persistent access to the MeshCentral application as the victim user.\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002F3e3977e1-a8c8-4856-9d27-f0307855049c)\nFigure 8: We performed the attack using the exploit code shown in Figure AA to invoked the authcookie, serverconfig, and createLoginToken endpoints on the victim MeshCentral system leveraging the cross-site websocket hijacking vulnerability from evil.example.com.\n\nAfter performing the attack successfully we used the issued login token to authenticate to MeshCental and access the console as the NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM user for a windows agent which connected to the victim MeshCentral instance. This provided compromise of all the nodes within the impacted MeshCentral instance (see Figure 9 and Figure 10).\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002F95405b59-8073-483e-9527-e1d03b546f5a)\nFigure 9: An attacker could leverage the login token created by the attacker to authenticate to MeshCentral and then leverage this access to compromise nodes managed by the impacted MeshCentral instance.\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fassets\u002F1319013\u002F605b909e-54eb-4ad0-b397-84fa3fb9455d)\nFigure 10: An attacker could leverage the cross-site websocket hijacking vulnerability to read the server configuration file of the MeshCentral system as an administrator to obtain the key used to encrypt sessions (sessionKey).\n\n### Remediation\nTo remediate this vulnerability we recommend inspecting the origin header when websocket connections are established to control.ashx and other websocket endpoints. Verify that the origin header sent to the server matches an allowlisted origin. This would prevent an attacker from originating a cross-site websocket connection from an untrusted site.","2024-02-21T00:10:00Z",{"cvss_v3.0":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":42},"CHANGED","3.0",8.3,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.0\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","REQUIRED","NONE",true,[48],"CWE-346",[50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,101,102,103,104,105,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124,125,126,127],"cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.69:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.52:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.20:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.54:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.85:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.47:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.75:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.55:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.83:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.63:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.86:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.88:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.65:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.59:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.91:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.94:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.56:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.78:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.60:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.77:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.71:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.61:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.68:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.73:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.74:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.93:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.67:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.97:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.66:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.46:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.57:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.96:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.58:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.50:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.92:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.84:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.81:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.49:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.51:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.87:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.64:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.80:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.48:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.45:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.44:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.82:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.53:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.95:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.76:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.79:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.90:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.72:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.98:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.99:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.89:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.62:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.1.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:meshcentral:meshcentral:1.0.70:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[129],"Meshcentral Meshcentral",[131,132,133,134],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fcommit\u002Ff2e43cc6da9f5447dbff0948e6c6024c8a315af3","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-cp68-qrhr-g9h8","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-26135","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FYlianst\u002FMeshCentral",0.77,0.0046,0.39593,false,{"timestamp":140,"automatable":141,"tech_impact":142,"exploitation":143,"cisa_decision":144,"cisa_remediation_timeline":148},"2024-02-21T15:46:41.513861Z","no","total","none",{"vector":145,"decision":146,"priority":147},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:09:01.961878\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[150],{"name":151,"source":152,"tactics":153,"technique_id":155},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[154],"initial-access","T1190",[157],{"link":132},{"count":159,"next":160,"previous":6,"results":161},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[162,170,178],{"id":163,"title":164,"summary":165,"published_at":166,"type":167,"link":168,"image_url":169},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":171,"title":172,"summary":173,"published_at":174,"type":175,"link":176,"image_url":177},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":179,"title":180,"summary":181,"published_at":182,"type":183,"link":184,"image_url":185},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]