[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-27933":30,"landing-articles":89},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":67,"epss_score":68,"epss_percentile":69,"is_kev":46,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":70,"attack_mappings":80,"exploits":87},58211,"CVE-2024-27933","EUVD-2024-0849","Deno arbitrary file descriptor close via `op_node_ipc_pipe()` leading to permission prompt bypass\n\n### Summary\n\nUse of raw file descriptors in `op_node_ipc_pipe()` leads to premature close of arbitrary file descriptors, allowing standard input to be re-opened as a different resource resulting in permission prompt bypass.\n\n\n### Details\n\nNode child_process IPC relies on the JS side to pass the raw IPC file descriptor to `op_node_ipc_pipe()`, which returns a `IpcJsonStreamResource` ID associated with the file descriptor. On closing the resource, the raw file descriptor is closed together.\n\nAlthough closing a file descriptor is seemingly a harmless task, this has been known to be exploitable:\n- With `--allow-read` and `--allow-write` permissions, one can open `\u002Fdev\u002Fptmx` as stdin. This device happily accepts TTY ioctls and pipes anything written into it back to the reader. \n  - This has been presented in a hacking competition (WACON 2023 Quals \"dino jail\").\n  - However, the precondition of this challenge was heavily contrived: fd 0 has manually been closed by FFI and `setuid()` was used to drop permissions and deny access to `\u002Fproc` since global write permissions are usually equivalent to arbitrary code execution (`\u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmem`).\n\nAs this vulnerability conveniently allows us to close stdin (fd 0) without any FFI, we can open any resource that when read returns `y`, `Y` or `A` as its first character ([runtimes\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L265)) to bypass the prompt.\n\nThere is a caveat however - all stdio\u002Fstdin\u002Fstderr streams are [locked](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L214), after which [`clear_stdin()`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L220) is called. This invokes [`libc::tcflush(0, libc::TCIFLUSH)`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L99) which fails on a non-TTY file descriptor.\n\nThis can be exploited by widening the race window between `clear_stdin()` and the next [`stdin_lock.read_line()`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L256). Notably, the prompt message contains the requested resource name (path) which is filtered by [`strip_ansi_codes_and_ascii_control()`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L225). This is also concatenated by [`write!()`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L241) to make a single buffer printed out to stderr. Thus, if we request a very long resource name, the window will widen allowing us to easily and stably race another Worker that closes fd 0 and opens a resource starting with an `A\\n` within the race window.\n\nNote that attacker does not need any permissions to exploit this bug to a full permission prompt bypass, as Cache API can be used to create and open files with controlled content without any permissions. Refer to the Impact section for more details.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nTesting environment is Docker image `denoland\u002Fdeno:alpine-1.39.0@sha256:95064390f2c115673762bfc4fe15b1a7f81c859038b8c02b277ede7cd8a2ccbf`.\n\nBelow PoC closes stdout (fd 1) and then prints two lines, one on stdout and one on stderr. Only the latter line is shown as stdout file descriptor is closed.\n\n```js\nconst ops = Deno[Deno.internal].core.ops;\n\n\u002F\u002F open fd 1 as ipc stream resource\nconst rid = ops.op_node_ipc_pipe(1);\n\n\u002F\u002F close resource & fd 1\nDeno.close(rid);\n\n\u002F\u002F this should not be seen (stdout)\nconsole.log('not seen');\n\n\u002F\u002F but this is seen (stderr)\nconsole.error('seen');\n```\n\nBelow is `\u002Fproc\u002F$(pgrep deno)\u002Ffd` right after executing the last line of the above PoC. We see that fd 1 is indeed missing.\n\n```text\ntotal 0\ndr-x------ 2 root root 30 Dec 18 07:07 .\u002F\ndr-xr-xr-x 9 root root  0 Dec 18 07:07 ..\u002F\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 0 -> \u002Fdev\u002Fpts\u002F0\nl-wx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 10 -> 'pipe:[159305]'\nlr-x------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 11 -> 'pipe:[159306]'\nl-wx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 12 -> 'pipe:[159306]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 13 -> \u002Fdeno-dir\u002Fdep_analysis_cache_v1\nl-wx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 14 -> 'pipe:[159305]'\nl-wx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 15 -> 'pipe:[159306]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 16 -> \u002Fdeno-dir\u002Fnode_analysis_cache_v1\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 17 -> \u002Fdev\u002Fpts\u002F0\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 18 -> \u002Fdev\u002Fpts\u002F0\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 19 -> \u002Fdev\u002Fpts\u002F0\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 2 -> \u002Fdev\u002Fpts\u002F0\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 20 -> 'anon_inode:[eventpoll]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 21 -> 'anon_inode:[eventfd]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 22 -> 'anon_inode:[eventpoll]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 23 -> 'socket:[159302]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 24 -> 'anon_inode:[eventpoll]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 25 -> 'anon_inode:[eventfd]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 26 -> 'anon_inode:[eventpoll]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 27 -> 'socket:[159302]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 28 -> 'socket:[159310]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 29 -> 'socket:[159308]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 3 -> 'anon_inode:[eventpoll]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 30 -> 'socket:[159309]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 4 -> 'anon_inode:[eventfd]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 5 -> 'anon_inode:[eventpoll]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 6 -> 'socket:[159302]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 7 -> 'socket:[159303]'\nlrwx------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 8 -> 'socket:[159302]'\nlr-x------ 1 root root 64 Dec 18 07:07 9 -> 'pipe:[159305]'\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\nUse of raw file descriptors in `op_node_ipc_pipe()` leads to premature close of arbitrary file descriptors. This allow standard input (fd 0) to be closed and re-opened for a different resource, which allows a silent permission prompt bypass. This is exploitable by an attacker controlling the code executed inside a Deno runtime to obtain arbitrary code execution on the host machine regardless of permissions.\n\nThis bug is **known to be exploitable** - there is a working exploit that achieves arbitrary code execution by bypassing prompts from zero permissions, additionally abusing the fact that Cache API lacks filesystem permission checks. The attack can be conducted silently as stderr can also be closed, suppressing all prompt outputs.\n\n> Note that Deno's security model is currently described as follows:\n> - All runtime I\u002FO is considered to be privileged and must always be guarded by a runtime permission. This includes filesystem access, network access, etc.\n>   - The only exception to this is runtime storage explosion attacks that are isolated to a part of the file system, caused by evaluated code (for example, caching big dependencies or no limits on runtime caches such as the Web Cache API).\n>\n> Although it is ambiguous if the fundamental lack of file system permission checks on Web Cache API is a vulnerability or not, the reporter have not reported this as a vulnerability assuming that this is a known risk (or a feature).\n\nAffected version of Deno is 1.39.0.\n\n- Introduced with commit 5a91a06\n- Fixed with commit 55fac9f\n","2024-03-06T17:04:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":42},"CHANGED","3.1",8.2,"LOCAL","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:H\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",false,[48],"CWE-863",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:a:deno:deno:1.39.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:deno:deno:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Deno Deno",[55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65,66],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L214","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L220","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L225","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L241","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L256","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L265","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fblob\u002Fv1.39.0\u002Fruntime\u002Fpermissions\u002Fprompter.rs#L99","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fcommit\u002F55fac9f5ead6d30996400e8597c969b675c5a22b","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fcommit\u002F5a91a065b882215dde209baf626247e54c21a392","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-6q4w-9x56-rmwq","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-27933","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdenoland\u002Fdeno",0.56,0.02276,0.82973,{"timestamp":71,"automatable":72,"tech_impact":73,"exploitation":74,"cisa_decision":75,"cisa_remediation_timeline":79},"2024-08-02T19:54:07.494367Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":76,"decision":77,"priority":78},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:10:17.679286\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[81],{"name":82,"source":83,"tactics":84,"technique_id":86},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[85],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[88],{"link":64},{"count":90,"next":91,"previous":6,"results":92},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[93,101,109],{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":110,"title":111,"summary":112,"published_at":113,"type":114,"link":115,"image_url":116},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]