New MCP server — Bring vulnerability intelligence into your AI
Back to feed

CVE-2024-39687

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2024-2391 · Published Jul 5, 2024

Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack in Fedify

Summary

At present, when Fedify needs to retrieve an object or activity from a remote activitypub server, it makes a HTTP request to the @id or other resources present within the activity it has received from the web. This activity could reference an @id that points to an internal IP address, allowing an attacker to send request to resources internal to the fedify server's network.

This applies to not just resolution of documents containing activities or objects, but also to media URLs as well.

Specifically this is a Server Side Request Forgery attack. You can learn more about SSRF attacks via CWE-918

Details

When Fedify makes a request at runtime via the DocLoader [1] [2], the fetch API does not first check the URI's to assert that it resolve to a public IP address. Additionally, any downstream software of Fedify that may fetch data from URIs contained within Activities or Objects maybe be at risk of requesting non-public resources, and storing those, exposing non-public information to the public.

Additionally, in many cases the URIs are not asserted to be either strictly HTTPS or HTTP protocols, which could lead to further attacks, and there is no check that the URI contains a hostname part. Whilst the fetch() specification may provide some safety here, along with underlying fetch implementations, there is still potential for attacks through using data: URIs, or just attacking some other protocol entirely, e.g., FTP or CalDav.

[1] https://github.com/dahlia/fedify/blob/main/runtime/docloader.ts#L141
[2] https://github.com/dahlia/fedify/blob/main/runtime/docloader.ts#L175

Deno-specific Attack Vectors

In Deno specifically, the fetch() API allows accessing local filesystem, I'm not sure how Deno's Permissions model may prevent attacks utilising file: URIs.

Fetch also supports fetching from file URLs to retrieve static files. For more info on static files, see the filesystem API documentation.

ActivityPub Security Considerations

This is also noted in the ActivityPub spec in Section B.3 Security Considerations, however, there it is more limited in scope.

Other Implementations

It may be acceptable to allow a server operator to allow access to given non-public IP addresses, for instance in Mastodon they allow requests to non-public IP addresses, i.e., localhost in development and those in the ALLOWED_PRIVATE_ADDRESSES environment variable.

PoC

I'm not sure a PoC is necessary given this is a reasonably well known vulnerability vector.

Impact

This impacts server operates, as resources that are internal to their network may find themselves being improperly accessed or potentially even attacked or exposed to the public.

Notes for resolution:

When implementing public IP address validation, be careful of CWE-1389 and CWE-1286 both of which recently caused a CVE to be filed against the popular node.js ip package, although this package was not originally intended for security purposes.

Technologies

Fedify Fedify

Weaknesses

CWE-918

CVSS scores

  • v3.17.2CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

Take 15 minutes to discover our platform with our experts

Patrowl Intel platform screenshot