[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-39899":30,"landing-articles":82},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":50,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":60,"epss_score":61,"epss_percentile":62,"is_kev":63,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},49786,"CVE-2024-39899","EUVD-2024-2387","PrivateBin allows shortening of URLs for other domains\n\nIn [v1.5](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002FCHANGELOG.md#15-2022-12-11) we introduced the YOURLS server-side proxy. The idea was to allow using the YOURLs URL shortener without running the YOURLs instance without authentication and\u002For exposing the authentication token to the public, allowing anyone to shorten any URL. With the proxy mechanism, anyone can shorten any URL pointing to the configured PrivateBin instance. The vulnerability allowed other URLs to be shortened, as long as they contain the PrivateBin instance, defeating the limit imposed by the proxy.\n\nNeither the confidentially of existing pastes on the server nor the configuration options including the YOURLs token are affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis issue only affects non-standard configurations of PrivateBin. Instances are affected if all of the following conditions are met:\n1. The PrivateBin instance enables URL shortening.\n2. A YOURLs URL shortener is used and it is configured not to be public and require authentication to shorten URLs.\n3. A basepath, the YOURLs proxy mechanism and an authentication token is  configured in PrivateBin to use the non-public YOURLs instance.\n4. A crafted URL is sent to PrivateBins' YOURLs proxy endpoint with a URL that contains the PrivateBin instance URL as a GET-parameter or as part of the URL-fragment, but doesn't start with the instance URL (a third-party URL)\n\nThe root cause is, [that the guard clause checking whether the URL to be shortened belongs to your own PrivateBin domain only checks if the PrivateBin instance is contained in the URL](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fblob\u002F3cba170f3255de21bbebb77f6c565519ef33e8c1\u002Flib\u002FYourlsProxy.php#L50-L53) but not if it starts with it.\n\nThis is a kind of authentication bypass due to incomplete filtering. This [has a similar impact like an open redirect](https:\u002F\u002Fcwe.mitre.org\u002Fdata\u002Fdefinitions\u002F601.html) except it does not directly redirect, but allows a further hiding of the target URL as is common and known for URL shorteners. If the URL shortener domain used is trusted by it's users, this allows hiding a malicious URL. \n\nThe highest impact may be that this can be used for phishing campaigns, by routing users to some kind of fake site mimicking the trusted shortener or PrivateBin domain, which could then extract sensitive data from entered data or similar. That said, this is a general concern with URL shorteners and users are advised to follow general phishing prevention attempts like verifying the domain of the site they are using and [using a trusted PrivateBin instance](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin?tab=readme-ov-file#what-it-doesnt-provide).\n\n### Indicators of exploitation\n\nCheck your YOURLs proxy for shortened domains that do not start with your own PrivateBin instance. Also note, that for this to be a result of an exploitation of this vulnerability, somewhere in the URL the `base path + ?` e.g. `https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.example\u002F?` has to appear in the destination URL, as this is what the guard checked for.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 1.7.4 of PrivateBin. In addition to upgrading, users of the YOURLs proxy feature should check for the indicators of exploitation, as outlined above.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n* Disable URL shortening, if you have been using it.\n* Only the YOURLs proxy is affected. Other URL shortening options either require a public, un-authenticated shortener, or expose the token to the client, which by design allows shortening any URL.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSee [the unit test that got introduced](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fblob\u002F2c711e9d3ca21230fc68f5b4dba2a7a0592b963b\u002Ftst\u002FYourlsProxyTest.php#L57-L62) to prevent similar regressions for an example of a URL that would circumvent the configured basepath.\n\nHere is an example of how a manual exploitation would work:\n\nIn a PrivateBin instance hosted on `https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.example\u002F`, with a valid URL YOURLs shortening proxy configuration using a token to prevent un-authenticated short-URL creation, send a URL shortening request for the domain `https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example.com\u002F?q=https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.example\u002F?foo#bar`. `attacker.example.com` is any attacker controlled, arbitrary domain.\n\nYou can do this by sending a GET request to `https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.example\u002Fshortenviayourls?link=https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.example.com%2F%3Fq%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fprivatebin.example%2F%3Ffoo%23bar`, without URL encoding this looks as follows: `https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.example\u002Fshortenviayourls?link=https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example.com\u002F?q=https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.example\u002F?foo#bar`.\n\nOn an affected setup, you will get a valid short URL, which when accessed, leads to `https:\u002F\u002Fattacker.example.com\u002F?foo#bar`, the attackers domain. On a patched system your request will get rejected and only URLs starting with `https:\u002F\u002Fprivatebin.example\u002F?[...]` are allowed for shortening.\n\n### Post-mortem\n\nFrom our limited analysis, the issue [has been introduced in commit `0dc9ab7` while refactoring](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fcommit\u002F0dc9ab7576d5a1296debeb788afb2ae9c72d137c). The use of [`substr`](http:\u002F\u002Fphp.net\u002Fmanual\u002Ffunction.substr.php) got replaced by [`strpos`](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.php.net\u002Fmanual\u002Ffunction.strpos). The [initial contribution](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fcommit\u002Fb0f17f0a91cdebbfd6732781943f1e04ce3311f7) contained no tests, but an implementation without this flaw. All these changes got introduced [in a single pull request](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fpull\u002F997). This follows many best practices, as tests were added and the refactoring was done in close collaboration with the original author.\n\nIn the future, [we plan to switch to the more obvious, readable and understandable](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fissues\u002F1373) [`str_starts_with`](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.php.net\u002Fmanual\u002Ffunction.str-starts-with.php), which is available since PHP v8. Such a better function naming and insisting on using modern functions would not only result in a better code quality, but would possibly have prevented the issue, but for backwards-compatibility with PHP 7.3, we stay on the old function for now.\n\n### Final Thoughts\n\nThe project maintainers have always discouraged the use of URL shorteners and **users are always safer sharing the complete, long URL to a paste**, see [our FAQ](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fwiki\u002FFAQ#the-url-is-so-long-cant-i-just-use-an-url-shortener).\n\nIf you need or want to provide a URL shortener option as a PrivateBin instance administrator, YOURLs is the _best option_ available to use with PrivateBin, because it is the only shortener supported, through the proxy mechanism, preventing arbitrarily shortening any URLs. Running a public URL shortener instance and allowing anonymous users shortening arbitrary domains invites the shortener getting abused.\n\n### References\n\n* PR to fix the vulnerability: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fpull\u002F1370\n\n### Timeline\n\n- 2024-06-28 Issue report by @nbxiglk via email\n- 2024-06-29 Vulnerability reproduced by @elrido, mitigation created and shared with maintainers and issue reporter for review\n- 2024-07-06 Pull request with mitigation raised","2024-07-10T14:25:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.3,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","LOW","NONE",true,[48,49],"CWE-305","CWE-791",[51],"cpe:2.3:a:privatebin:privatebin:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Privatebin Privatebin",[55,56,57,58,59],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fcommit\u002F0c4e810e6728f67d678458838d8430dfba4fcca4","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fpull\u002F1370","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-mqqj-fx8h-437j","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-39899","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FPrivateBin\u002FPrivateBin",0.47,0.00627,0.49753,false,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2024-07-10T14:31:16.074596Z","yes","partial","none",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:45:01.559973\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[79],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":83,"next":84,"previous":6,"results":85},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[86,94,102],{"id":87,"title":88,"summary":89,"published_at":90,"type":91,"link":92,"image_url":93},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":95,"title":96,"summary":97,"published_at":98,"type":99,"link":100,"image_url":101},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]