[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-41945":30,"landing-articles":80},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":51,"references":53,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":61,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":72,"exploits":79},50600,"CVE-2024-41945","EUVD-2024-2237","The fuels-ts typescript SDK has no awareness of to-be-spent transactions\n\n# Brief\u002FIntro\n\nThe typescript SDK has no awareness of to-be-spent transactions causing some transactions to fail or silently get pruned as they are funded with already used UTXOs.\n\nThe `Typescript SDK` provides the `fund` function which retrieves `UTXOs`, which belong to the owner and can be used to fund the request in question, from fuel's graphql api. These then get added to the request making it possible to send it to the network as it now has inputs which can be spent by its outputs. Now this works when a user only wants to fund one transaction per block as in the next block, the spent UTXO will not exist anymore. However if a user wants to fund multiple transactions within one block, the following can happen:\n\nIt is important to note, that the graphql API will return a random UTXO which has enough value to fund the transaction in question.\n\n- user has 2 spendable `UTXOs` in their wallet which can cover all expenses\n- user funds transaction `tA` with an input gotten from the API `iA`\n- user submits `tA` to fuel\n- `iA` is still in possession of the user as no new block has been produced\n- user funds a transaction `tB` and gets the same input `iA` from the API\n- user tries to submit transaction `tB` to fuel but now one of the following can happen:\n  - if the recipient and all other parameters are the same as in `tA`, submission will fail as `tB` will have the same `txHash` as `tA`\n  - if the parameters are different, there will be a collision in the `txpool` and `tA` will be removed from the `txpool`\n\n# Vulnerability Details\n\nThe problem occurs, because the `fund` function in `fuels-ts\u002Fpackages\u002Faccount\u002Fsrc\u002Faccount.ts` gets the needed ressources statelessly with the function `getResourcesToSpend` without taking into consideration already used UTXOs:\n\n```ts\n async fund\u003CT extends TransactionRequest>(request: T, params: EstimatedTxParams): Promise\u003CT> {\n\n    \u002F\u002F [...]\n\n    let missingQuantities: CoinQuantity[] = [];\n    Object.entries(quantitiesDict).forEach(([assetId, { owned, required }]) => {\n      if (owned.lt(required)) {\n        missingQuantities.push({\n          assetId,\n          amount: required.sub(owned),\n        });\n      }\n    });\n\n    let needsToBeFunded = missingQuantities.length > 0;\n    let fundingAttempts = 0;\n    while (needsToBeFunded && fundingAttempts \u003C MAX_FUNDING_ATTEMPTS) {\n      const resources = await this.getResourcesToSpend(\n        missingQuantities,\n        cacheRequestInputsResourcesFromOwner(request.inputs, this.address)\n      ); \u002F\u002F @audit-issue here we do not exclude ids we already got and used for another transaction in the current block\n\n      request.addResources(resources);\n\n      \u002F\u002F [...]\n    }\n\n    \u002F\u002F [...]\n\n    return request;\n  }\n```\n\n# Impact Details\n\nThis issue will lead to unexpected SDK behaviour. Looking at the scenario in `Brief\u002FIntro`, it could have the following impacts for users:\n\n1. A transaction does not get included in the `txpool` \u002F in a block\n1. A previous transaction silently gets removed from the `txpool` and replaced with a new one\n\n# Recommendation\n\nI would recommend adding a buffer to the `Account` class, in which retrieved `resources` are saved. These can then be provided to `getResourcesToSpend` to be excluded from future queries but need to be removed from the buffer if their respective transaction fails to be included, in order to be able to use those `resources` again in such cases.\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\nThe following PoC transfers 100 coins from `wallet2` to `wallet` after which `wallet2` has two `UTXOs` one with value `100` and one with a very high value (this is printed to the console). Afterwards, `wallet` will attempt transfering `80` coins back to `wallet2` twice in one block, each in a separate transaction. This should work perfectly fine as `wallet` has two `UTXOs` where each can cover the cost of each respective transaction. Now when running this one of the following will happen:\n\n1. both transfers from `wallet` to `wallet2` get a different `UTXO`. This is the case if execution is successful and `wallet2` has `80` coins more than `wallet` in the end.\n1. both transfers get the same `UTXO`. In this case the script will fail and throw an error as then both transactions will have the same hash\n\nIn order to execute this PoC, please deploy a local node with a blocktime of `5secs` as I wrote my PoC for that blocktime. Note that with a small change it will also work with other blocktimes. Then add the PoC to a file `poc_resources.ts` and compile it with `tsc poc_resources.ts`. Finally execute it with `node poc_resources.js`.\n\nSince the choice which `UTXO` is taken as input is random, it might take a few tries to trigger the bug!\n\n```ts\nimport { JsonAbi, Script, Provider, WalletUnlocked, Account, Predicate, Wallet, CoinQuantityLike, coinQuantityfy, EstimatedTxParams, BN, Coin, AbstractAddress, Address, Contract, ScriptTransactionRequest } from 'fuels';\n\nconst abi: JsonAbi = {\n  'encoding': '1',\n  'types': [\n    {\n      'typeId': 0,\n      'type': '()',\n      'components': [],\n      'typeParameters': null\n    }\n  ],\n  'functions': [\n    {\n      'inputs': [],\n      'name': 'main',\n      'output': {\n        'name': '',\n        'type': 0,\n        'typeArguments': null\n      },\n      'attributes': null\n    }\n  ],\n  'loggedTypes': [],\n  'messagesTypes': [],\n  'configurables': []\n};\n\nconst FUEL_NETWORK_URL = 'http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:4000\u002Fv1\u002Fgraphql';\n\nasync function executeTransaction() {\n\n  const provider = await Provider.create(FUEL_NETWORK_URL);\n  \n  const wallet: WalletUnlocked = Wallet.fromPrivateKey('0x37fa81c84ccd547c30c176b118d5cb892bdb113e8e80141f266519422ef9eefd', provider);\n  const wallet2: WalletUnlocked = Wallet.fromPrivateKey('0xde97d8624a438121b86a1956544bd72ed68cd69f2c99555b08b1e8c51ffd511c', provider);\n  const sleep = (ms: number) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));\n\n\n  console.log(\"Balance wallet before: \", await wallet.getBalance());\n  console.log(\"Balance wallet2 before: \", await wallet2.getBalance());\n\n  wallet2.transfer(wallet.address, 100);\n\n  await sleep(5500);\n\n\n  await wallet.transfer(wallet2.address, 80);\n  console.log('wallet -> wallet2');\n\n  await wallet.transfer(wallet2.address, 80);\n  console.log('wallet -> wallet2');\n\n  console.log(\"Balance wallet after: \", await wallet.getBalance());\n  console.log(\"Balance wallet2 after: \", await wallet2.getBalance());\n};\n\nexecuteTransaction().catch(console.error);\n```","2024-07-30T21:13:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",3.1,"NETWORK","LOW","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:L\u002FA:N","NONE","HIGH",true,[48],"CWE-20",[50],"cpe:2.3:a:fuel-ts:account:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52],"Fuel-Ts Account",[54,55,56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FFuelLabs\u002Ffuels-ts\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-3jcg-vx7f-j6qf","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-41945","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FFuelLabs\u002Ffuels-ts\u002Fcommit\u002F16ee1bfe66733551d00f0a76c21e8a09ea33006f","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FFuelLabs\u002Ffuels-ts",0.35,0.00309,0.23516,false,{"timestamp":63,"automatable":64,"tech_impact":65,"exploitation":66,"cisa_decision":67,"cisa_remediation_timeline":71},"2024-07-31T13:27:12.497228Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":68,"decision":69,"priority":70},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T08:09:16.290051\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[73],{"name":74,"source":75,"tactics":76,"technique_id":78},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[77],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":81,"next":82,"previous":6,"results":83},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[84,92,100],{"id":85,"title":86,"summary":87,"published_at":88,"type":89,"link":90,"image_url":91},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":101,"title":102,"summary":103,"published_at":104,"type":105,"link":106,"image_url":107},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]