[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-43414":30,"landing-articles":98},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":50,"technologies":59,"references":68,"score":75,"epss_score":76,"epss_percentile":77,"is_kev":78,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":79,"attack_mappings":89,"exploits":96},22987,"CVE-2024-43414","EUVD-2024-2576","Apollo Query Planner and Apollo Gateway may infinitely loop on sufficiently complex queries\n\n### Impact\nInstances of @apollo\u002Fquery-planner >=2.0.0 and \u003C2.8.5 are impacted by a denial-of-service vulnerability. @apollo\u002Fgateway versions >=2.0.0 and \u003C 2.8.5 and Apollo Router \u003C1.52.1 are also impacted through their use of @apollo\u002Fquery-planner. \n\nIf @apollo\u002Fquery-planner is asked to plan a sufficiently complex query, it may loop infinitely and never complete. This results in unbounded memory consumption and either a crash or out-of-memory (OOM) termination.\n\nThis issue can be triggered if you have at least one non-`@key` field that can be resolved by multiple subgraphs. To identify these shared fields, the schema for each subgraph must be reviewed. The mechanism to identify shared fields varies based on the version of Federation your subgraphs are using.\n\nYou can check if your subgraphs are using Federation 1 or Federation 2 by reviewing their schemas. Federation 2 subgraph schemas will contain a `@link` directive referencing the version of Federation being used while Federation 1 subgraphs will not. For example, in a Federation 2 subgraph, you will find a line like `@link(url: \"https:\u002F\u002Fspecs.apollo.dev\u002Ffederation\u002Fv2.0\")`. If a similar `@link` directive is not present in your subgraph schema, it is using Federation 1. Note that a supergraph can contain a mix of Federation 1 and Federation 2 subgraphs.\n\n**To review Federation 1 subgraphs for impact:**\n\nIn Federation 1 subgraphs, fields are implicitly shareable across subgraphs. To review for impact, you will need to review for cases where multiple subgraphs can resolve the same field. For example: \n\n```graphql\n# Subgraph 1\ntype Query {\n  field: Int\n}\n\n# Subgraph 2\ntype Query {\n  field: Int\n}\n```\n\n\n**To review Federation 2 subgraphs for impact:**\n\nIn Federation 2 subgraphs, fields must be explicitly defined as shareable across subgraphs. This is done via the `@shareable` directive. For example:\n\n```graphql\n# Subgraph 1\n@link(url: \"https:\u002F\u002Fspecs.apollo.dev\u002Ffederation\u002Fv2.0\")\ntype Query {\n  field: Int @shareable\n}\n\n# Subgraph 2\n@link(url: \"https:\u002F\u002Fspecs.apollo.dev\u002Ffederation\u002Fv2.0\")\ntype Query {\n  field: Int @shareable\n}\n```\n\n### Impact Detail\n\nThis issue results from the Apollo query planner attempting to use a `Number` exceeding Javascript’s `Number.MAX_VALUE` in some cases. In Javascript, `Number.MAX_VALUE` is (2^1024 - 2^971).\n\nWhen the query planner receives an inbound graphql request, it breaks the query into pieces and for each piece, generates a list of potential execution steps to solve the piece. These candidates represent the steps that the query planner will take to satisfy the pieces of the larger query. As part of normal operations, the query planner requires and calculates the number of possible query plans for the total query. That is, it needs the product of the number of query plan candidates for each piece of the query. Under normal circumstances, after generating all query plan candidates and calculating the number of all permutations, the query planner moves on to stack rank candidates and prune less-than-optimal options. \n\nIn particularly complex queries, especially those where fields can be solved through multiple subgraphs, this can cause the number of all query plan permutations to balloon. In worst-case scenarios, this can end up being a number larger than `Number.MAX_VALUE`. In Javascript, if `Number.MAX_VALUE` is exceeded, Javascript represents the value as “infinity”. If the count of candidates is evaluated as infinity, the component of the query planner responsible for pruning less-than-optimal query plans does not actually prune candidates, causing the query planner to evaluate many orders of magnitude more query plan candidates than necessary.\n\nA given graph’s exposure to this issue varies based on its complexity. Consider the following Federation 2 subgraphs: \n\n```graphql\n# Subgraph 1\ntype Query {\n  field: Int @shareable\n}\n\n# Subgraph 2\ntype Query {\n  field: Int @shareable\n}\n```\n\nThe query planner can solve requests for `Query.field` in one of two ways - either by querying subgraph 1 or subgraph 2. \n\nThe following query with 1024 aliased fields would trigger this issue because 2^1024 > `Number.MAX_VALUE`:  \n\n```graphql\nquery {\n  field_1: field\n  field_2: field\n  # ...\n  field_1023: field\n  field_1024: field\n}\n```\n\n\nHowever, in a graph that provided 5 options to solve a given field, the bug could be encountered in a query that aliased the field approximately 440 times.\n\n\n### Patches\n@apollo\u002Fquery-planner 2.8.5\n@apollo\u002Fgateway 2.8.5\nApollo Router 1.52.1\n\n### Workarounds\nThis issue can be avoided by ensuring there are no fields resolvable from multiple subgraphs. If all subgraphs are using Federation 2, you can confirm that you are not impacted by ensuring that none of your subgraph schemas use the `@shareable` directive. If you are using Federation 1 subgraphs, you will need to validate that there are no fields resolvable by multiple subgraphs. \n\nNote that a supergraph can contain a mix of Federation 1 and Federation 2 subgraphs. \n\nIf you do have fields resolvable by multiple subgraphs, changing this behavior in response to this issue may be risky to the operation of your supergraph. We recommend that you update to a patched version of either Apollo Router or Apollo Gateway.\n\nApollo customers with an enterprise entitlement using the Apollo Router can also mitigate much of the risk from this issue by implementing [Apollo’s Persisted Queries (PQ) feature](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.apollographql.com\u002Fdocs\u002Frouter\u002Fconfiguration\u002Fpersisted-queries). With PQ enabled, the Apollo Router will only execute safelisted queries. While customers would need to ensure that queries that induce this issue are not added to the safelist, PQs would mitigate the risk of clients submitting ad hoc queries that exploit this issue.\n\n### References\n\n[Additional information on Query Plans](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.apollographql.com\u002Fdocs\u002Ffederation\u002Fquery-plans\u002F)\n","2024-08-27T18:14:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49],"CWE-674","CWE-673",[51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58],"cpe:2.3:a:apollographql:apollo_query-planner:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:apollographql:apollo_gateway:*:*:*:*:*:node.js:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:apollographql:apollo-router:*:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:apollographql:apollo_helms-charts_router:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:apollographql:apollo_router:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:apollo:gateway:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:apollo-router:apollo-router:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:apollo:query-planner:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[60,61,62,63,64,65,66,67],"Apollographql Apollo Router","Apollographql Apollo-Router","Apollographql Apollo Helms-Charts Router","Apollographql Apollo Gateway","Apollographql Apollo Query-Planner","Apollo-Router Apollo-Router","Apollo Query-Planner","Apollo Gateway",[69,70,71,72,73,74],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapollographql\u002Ffederation\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-fmj9-77q8-g6c4","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.apollographql.com\u002Fdocs\u002Ffederation\u002Fquery-plans","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.apollographql.com\u002Fdocs\u002Frouter\u002Fconfiguration\u002Fpersisted-queries","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-43414","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapollographql\u002Frouter\u002Fcommit\u002Fe309c9bb5a48c1304ff69c88b7eabdd08c26bf45","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fapollographql\u002Ffederation",0.73,0.00988,0.62222,false,{"timestamp":80,"automatable":81,"tech_impact":82,"exploitation":83,"cisa_decision":84,"cisa_remediation_timeline":88},"2024-08-27T17:55:12.961543Z","yes","partial","none",{"vector":85,"decision":86,"priority":87},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T03:08:02.852076\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[90],{"name":91,"source":92,"tactics":93,"technique_id":95},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[94],"initial-access","T1190",[97],{"link":69},{"count":99,"next":100,"previous":6,"results":101},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[102,110,118],{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":111,"title":112,"summary":113,"published_at":114,"type":115,"link":116,"image_url":117},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":119,"title":120,"summary":121,"published_at":122,"type":123,"link":124,"image_url":125},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]