[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-45039":30,"landing-articles":84},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":54,"references":57,"score":63,"epss_score":64,"epss_percentile":65,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":66,"attack_mappings":76,"exploits":83},25562,"CVE-2024-45039","EUVD-2024-2851","gnark's Groth16 commitment extension unsound for more than one commitment\n\n### Description\n\nThe summary is that the proof of knowledge associated to a commitment is crucial to bind the commitment to the actual circuit variables that were supposed to be committed. However, the same σ is used for all proofs of knowledge for the commitments, which allows mixing between them, making it possible to fix the value of all but one commitment before choosing the circuit variable assignments.\n\nIn more detail:\nTo simplify notation, let us consider the case of two commitments, each to only a single variable. Let's say the basis elements for those commitments are `K_0` and `K_1`. Then the proving key will contain `K_0` and `K_1`, and also `σ*K_0` and `σ*K_1` for the proof of knowledge. The honest prover assigning a to the first circuit variable and b to the second will then produce commitments\n`D_0 = a*K_0`\n`D_1 = b*K_1`\nOut of the two D's, a challenge r for the commitment folding will be generated. The folded commitment will then be\n`D_folded = D_0 + r*D_1 = a*K_0 + r*b*K_1`\nThe honest prover will supply a fitting proof of knowledge\n`P = a*(σ*K_0) + r*b*(σ*K_1)`\n\nNow the verifier will only use all of this in two ways:\n1. In the check of the Groth16 proof itself, where only the sum `D_0 + D_1` is used.\n2. In the proof of knowledge check, where it will be verified that P is indeed `σ*(D_0 + r*D_1)`, with r calculated from `D_0` and `D_1` as before.\n\nThis has the following implications. In the following, a malicious prover's points will have an apostrophe appended, and we keep `D_0` etc. for the legitimate values:\n1. A malicious prover is only forced to provide `D'_0` and `D'_1` such that the sum is correct. So they can use arbitrary `D'_0` as long as they set `D'_1 = D_0 + D_1 - D'_0`.\n2. After choosing `D'_0` and `D'_1`, the prover can always calculate r. Evaluating `σ*(D'_0 + r*D'_1)` is then possible as long as both `D'_0` and `D'_1` are linear combinations of basis elements for which σ times that basis element is known. In particular, this works as long as `D'_0` and `D'_1` are linear combinations of `K_0` and `K_1`.\n\nThe upshot is that a malicious prover can choose arbitrary a' and b', and then set\n`D'_0 = a'*K_0 + b'*K_1`\n`D'_1 = (a - a')*K_0 + (b - b')*K_1`\nThen they calculate r for this, and set\n`P = (a' + r*(a-a'))*(σ*K_0) + (b' + r*(b-b'))*(σ*K_1)`\nThis will then be accepted as a valid proof. Yet the first commitment point can be chosen completely independently of a and b, so in particular the malicious prover can use a constant for this, so that they will know the in-circuit challenge that will be added to the public inputs before they have to choose the witness assignments. For most use cases of such challenges (for proving things with Fiat-Shamir, random linear combinations etc.) this causes a critical soundness problem.\n\nThe problem generalizes to more than two commitments and commitments to more than one circuit variable each; one can freely choose all but one commitment as arbitrary linear combinations of the basis elements for all commitments, and then must choose the one remaining commitment in such a way that the sum is correct.\n\nThe root cause of the issue is that the σ used for the proofs of knowledge is the same, allowing to mix between the basis elements, as one has σ times them available for all of them.\nSo the fix is to have a separate σ for each commitment. So in our example above, the proving key would have the basis elements `K_0` and `K_1`, and for the proofs of knowledge now `σ_0*K_0` and `σ_1*K_1`. Folding the commitments would not be possible in the same way now, so the verifier will have to do more pairings. The prover could still provide a folded proof of knowledge however. With\n`D_0 = a*K_0`\n`D_1 = b*K_1`\nthe proof of knowledge would be\n`P = a*(σ_0*K_0) + r*b*(σ_1*K_1)`\nFor later, let us use notation for the unfolded proofs of knowledge\n`P_0 = a*(σ_0*K_0)`\n`P_1 = b*(σ_1*K_1)`\nso that\n`P = P_0 + r*P_1`\n\nThe verifying key would need `G` and `σ_0*G` and `σ_1*G`. To check the two unfolded proofs of knowledge would be the checks\n`e(P_0, G) = e(D_0, σ_0*G)`\n`e(P_1, G) = e(D_1, σ_1*G)`\nAs r is a challenge derived from D_0 and D_1, we may instead check\n`e(P_0, G) + r*e(P_1, G) = e(D_0, σ_0*G) + r*e(D_1, σ_1*G)`\nThe left hand side is\n`e(P_0, G) + r*e(P_1, G) = e(P_0 + r*P_1, G) = e(P, G)`\nSo the prover can just provide P and then the verifier checks\n`e(P, G) = e(D_0, σ_0*G) + r*e(D_1, σ_1*G)`\nUnfortunately, the right hand side can't be folded as before, as there isn't a side of the pairing that is kept constant between the pairings as before. So the verifier will need to have a pairing for each commitment on the right hand side.\n\n### Impact\n\nIt is a soundness issue - in case of multiple commitments used inside the circuit the prover is able to choose all but the last commitment. As we use the commitments for optimized non-native multiplication, lookup checks etc. as random challenges, then it could impact the soundness of the whole circuit.\n\nHowever, using multiple commitments has been discouraged due to the additional cost to the verifier and it has not been supported in the recursive in-circuit Groth16 verifier and Solidity verifier. So we expect the impact of the issue be very small - only for the users who have implemented the native Groth16 verifier or are using it with multiple commitments. We do not have information of such users.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue has been patched in e7c66b000454f4d2a4ae48c005c34154d4cfc2a2\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe recommendation has been to use only a single commitment and then derive in-circuit commitments as needed using [std\u002Fmulticommit](https:\u002F\u002Fpkg.go.dev\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fconsensys\u002Fgnark\u002Fstd\u002Fmulticommit) package.\n\n### References\n\nSee the correspondence above.\n","2024-09-06T19:53:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",6.2,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","HIGH","NONE","LOW",false,[49],"CWE-200",[51,52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:consensys:gnark-crypto:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:consensys:gnark:0.10.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:consensys:gnark:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55,56],"Consensys Gnark-Crypto","Consensys Gnark",[58,59,60,61,62],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark\u002Fcommit\u002Fe7c66b000454f4d2a4ae48c005c34154d4cfc2a2","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-q3hw-3gm4-w5cr","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-45039","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark","https:\u002F\u002Fpkg.go.dev\u002Fvuln\u002FGO-2024-3122",0.31,0.0019,0.08564,{"timestamp":67,"automatable":68,"tech_impact":69,"exploitation":70,"cisa_decision":71,"cisa_remediation_timeline":75},"2024-09-06T13:58:43.116066Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":72,"decision":73,"priority":74},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T11:35:49.057077\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[77],{"name":78,"source":79,"tactics":80,"technique_id":82},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[81],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":85,"next":86,"previous":6,"results":87},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[88,96,104],{"id":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"published_at":92,"type":93,"link":94,"image_url":95},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":97,"title":98,"summary":99,"published_at":100,"type":101,"link":102,"image_url":103},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":105,"title":106,"summary":107,"published_at":108,"type":109,"link":110,"image_url":111},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]