[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-45040":30,"landing-articles":84},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":55,"score":62,"epss_score":63,"epss_percentile":64,"is_kev":65,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":66,"attack_mappings":76,"exploits":83},31091,"CVE-2024-45040","EUVD-2024-2765","gnark commitments to private witnesses in Groth16 as implemented break zero-knowledge property\n\n\nThis report concerns the Groth16 prover when used with commitments (as in `frontend.Committer`). To simplify exposition of the issue, I will focus on the case of a single commitment, to only private witnesses. But the issue should be present whenever commitments are used that include private witnesses.\n>\nThe commitment to private witnesses `w_i` is computed as\n```\nc = sum_i w_i * b_i\n```\nwhere `b_i` would be `ProvingKey.CommitmentKeys[0].Basis[i]` in the code.\n\nWhile this is a binding commitment, it is not hiding. In practice, an adversary will know the points `b_i`, as they are part of the proving key, and can verify correctness of a guess for the values of `w_i` by computing `c'` as the right hand side of the above formula, and checking whether `c'` is equal to `c`. I attach a proof of concept that demonstrates this.\n\nThis breaks the perfect zero-knowledge property of Groth16, so the Groth16 scheme using commitments to private witnesses as implemented by gnark fails to be a zk-SNARK.\n\nThe code indicates that the extension to Groth16 given by the commitments follows the paper \"Recursion over Public-Coin Interactive Proof Systems; Faster Hash Verification\" by Alexandre Belling, Azam Soleimanian, and Olivier Begassat. In that paper, it seems that commitments are applied to what were originally public inputs, which are moved to private witnesses for efficiency reasons. In any case, that paper does not discuss any hiding\u002Fprivacy\u002Fzero-knowledge properties of their protocols.\n\nSo for the use-cases envisioned by that paper, having the commitment not be hiding and losing zero-knowledge of Groth16 might be adequate. However, the documentation by gnark does not make clear that committing to private witnesses loses the zero-knowledge property. The documentation for `frontend.Committer` does not mention this, and the following snippet from `std\u002Fmulticommit\u002Fdoc_test.go`, where private witness variables are named `Secrets` and are committed, seems to actively suggest that committed witnesses are still private.\n```go\n\u002F\u002F MultipleCommitmentCircuit is an example circuit showing usage of multiple\n\u002F\u002F independent commitments in-circuit.\ntype MultipleCommitmentsCircuit struct {\n    Secrets [4]frontend.Variable\n}\n\nfunc (c *MultipleCommitmentsCircuit) Define(api frontend.API) error {\n    \u002F\u002F first callback receives first unique commitment derived from the root commitment\n    multicommit.WithCommitment(api, func(api frontend.API, commitment frontend.Variable) error {\n        \u002F\u002F compute (X-s[0]) * (X-s[1]) for a random X\n        res := api.Mul(api.Sub(commitment, c.Secrets[0]), api.Sub(commitment, c.Secrets[1]))\n        api.AssertIsDifferent(res, 0)\n        return nil\n    }, c.Secrets[:2]...)\n   \u002F\u002F ...\n```\n\nThus it seems to me that the intention likely was (and users will be expecting) that gnark's implementation of Groth16 with these commitments should still have zero-knowledge and that the commitments should be hiding.\n\nThe way to fix this is likely to adjust the commitment to be hiding the way that is done in the LegoSNARK paper (https:\u002F\u002Feprint.iacr.org\u002F2019\u002F142.pdf). To expand:\n\nFirst, let me fix some notation.\n\nCurrently, the verifying key has two points on G2 used for checking the proof of knowledge for the commitment: `g` and `g'=-1\u002Fσ * g` (in the code: `VerifyingKey.CommitmentKey.G` and `VerifyingKey.CommitmentKey.GRootSigmaNeg`).\nThe commitment itself is then `c = sum_i w_i * b_i`, where `b_i` are on G1, and the proof of knowledge associated to `c` is calculated as `pok = sum_i w_i * b'_i`, where `b'_i = σ*b_i` (in the code `b_i` and `b'_i` are `ProvingKey.CommitmentKeys.Basis[0][i]` and `ProvingKey.CommitmentKeys.BasisExpSigma[0][i]`). The proof of knowledge is then verified by checking `e(c, g) + e(pok, g') = 0` (I am using additive notation throughout here).\n\nThe Groth16 proof is verified by checking\n```\ne(Krs, -[δ]₂) + e(c, -[γ]₂) + e(term involving public inputs, -[γ]₂) + other terms = 0\n```\n\nThe construction ccGro16 from the LegoSNARK paper (page 73 in https:\u002F\u002Feprint.iacr.org\u002F2019\u002F142.pdf) is a similar construction. They do not have a proof of knowledge accompanying the commitment because they are considering the case where there are no public inputs. However, they claim that their scheme is zero-knowledge, and the crucial difference for this is that their commitment has an extra blinding term as is usual for Pedersen commitments. Concretely, it is of the form:\n```\nc_new = sum_i w_i * b_i + v*[η\u002Fγ]₁\n```\nwhere `[η\u002Fγ]₁` is a new element of G1 that is part of the proving key, with `η` a new toxic waste field element. The value of `v` is randomly chosen by the prover.\n\nWhen adding this additional term to `c`, then to make the proof verification still succeeds, the proof point `Krs` is changed accordingly:\n```\nKrs_new = Krs_old -  v*[η\u002Fδ]₁\n```\nwhere `[η\u002Fδ]₁` is another new element of G1 that is part of the proving key. As `e([η\u002Fγ]₁, -[γ]₂) = e([η\u002Fδ]₁, -[δ]₂)`, the contributions from the new terms cancel each other in the proof verification pairing check.\n\nThis modification should ensure that the commitment is hiding.\n\nThe proof of knowledge would also need to be adapted accordingly, with\n```\npok = sum_i w_i * b'_i + v*[σ*η\u002Fγ]₁\n```\nwhere `[σ*η\u002Fγ]₁` is another point of G1 to add to the proving key.\n\n\n### Impact\n\nThe vulnerability affects only Groth16 proofs with commitments. Notably, PLONK proofs are not affected.\n\nThe vulnerability affects the zero-knowledge property of the proofs - in case the witness (secret or internal) values are small, then the attacker may be able to enumerate all possible choices to deduce the actual value. If the possible choices for the variables to be committed is large or there are many values committed, then it would be computationally infeasible to enumerate all valid choices.\n\nIt doesn't affect the completeness\u002Fsoundness of the proofs.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability has been fixed in https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark\u002Fpull\u002F1245. Corresponding commit on the master branch https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark\u002Fcommit\u002Fafda68a38acca37becb8ba6d8982d03fee9559a0.\n\nThe patch to fix the issue is to add additional randomized value to the list of committed value at proving time to mask the rest of the values which were committed.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThe user can manually commit to a randomized value.\n","2024-09-06T19:40:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":45},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.9,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","NONE","HIGH",true,[48],"CWE-200",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:a:consensys:gnark-crypto:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:consensys:gnark:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53,54],"Consensys Gnark-Crypto","Consensys Gnark",[56,57,58,59,60,61],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark\u002Fcommit\u002Fafda68a38acca37becb8ba6d8982d03fee9559a0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark\u002Fpull\u002F1245","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-9xcg-3q8v-7fq6","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-45040","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FConsensys\u002Fgnark","https:\u002F\u002Fpkg.go.dev\u002Fvuln\u002FGO-2024-3123",0.5,0.00427,0.36685,false,{"timestamp":67,"automatable":68,"tech_impact":69,"exploitation":70,"cisa_decision":71,"cisa_remediation_timeline":75},"2024-09-06T13:57:02.916086Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":72,"decision":73,"priority":74},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T02:42:56.841447\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[77],{"name":78,"source":79,"tactics":80,"technique_id":82},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[81],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":85,"next":86,"previous":6,"results":87},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[88,96,104],{"id":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"published_at":92,"type":93,"link":94,"image_url":95},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":97,"title":98,"summary":99,"published_at":100,"type":101,"link":102,"image_url":103},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":105,"title":106,"summary":107,"published_at":108,"type":109,"link":110,"image_url":111},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]