[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-45305":30,"landing-articles":107},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":62,"epss_score":63,"epss_percentile":64,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":106},54936,"CVE-2024-45305","EUVD-2024-2874","gix-path uses local config across repos when it is the highest scope\n\n### Summary\n\n`gix-path` executes `git` to find the path of a configuration file that belongs to the `git` installation itself, but mistakenly treats the local repository's configuration as system-wide if no higher scoped configuration is found. In rare cases, this causes a less trusted repository to be treated as more trusted, or leaks sensitive information from one repository to another, such as sending credentials to another repository's remote.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `gix_path::env`, the underlying implementation of the `installation_config` and `installation_config_prefix` functions calls `git config -l --show-origin` and parses the first line of the output to extract the path to the configuration file holding the configuration variable of highest [scope](https:\u002F\u002Fgit-scm.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fgit-config#SCOPES):\n\nhttps:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FByron\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8\u002Fgix-path\u002Fsrc\u002Fenv\u002Fgit\u002Fmod.rs#L91\n\nhttps:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FByron\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8\u002Fgix-path\u002Fsrc\u002Fenv\u002Fgit\u002Fmod.rs#L112\n\nWhile the configuration variable of highest scope is not usually in the local scope, there are practical situations where this occurs:\n\n- A configuration file truly associated with the installation is not present on all systems and can occasionally be empty. Likewise, there may be no variables in the global scope.\n- Configuration files associated with those higher scopes may be deliberately skipped by setting the `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM` and `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL` environment variables to `\u002Fdev\u002Fnull` (or to `NUL` on Windows). This prevents `gix-path` from finding the path of configuration files for those scopes, while not preventing downstream components such as the function in `gix-config` from reporting a local path as being associated with the installation.\n- The `GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM` environment variable can be used to disable configuration associated with the installation. (`GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM=1` is more powerful than `GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=\u002Fdev\u002Fnull` on systems where an additional \"unknown\" scope is associated with the installation, as occurs on macOS with Apple Git.) This will cause the local scope to be the highest nonempty scope under even more situations, though in practice it is less dangerous because most, though possibly not all, downstream components would disregard the value.\n\nA user may use either or both of the latter two techniques to turn off an undesired configuration or to create a more replicable environment. Such a user would expect that this results in a more controlled configuration.\n\nOften, when located inside one repository, a user performs operations on that repository or that are not specific to any repository. In such use, local configuration is typically desired or at least acceptable, and mistaking it as coming from another scope is not typically harmful.\n\nHowever, sometimes a user is in one repository and operates on another repository. A major case where this occurs is cloning one repository while located in another. This can be done in an ad-hoc fashion, including when cloning the repository outside of the one we are inside. It may also potentially be automated by an application for purposes such as submodule handling. Two kinds of problems are anticipated:\n\n- A less secure configuration may be set for a specific repository where it is judged acceptable, even though it would not be wanted for other repositories, such as to enable a protocol or set up debugging.\n- More likely, a configuration that supplies secrets for use in one repository's remote can be used to send those secrets to another repository's remote.\n\n### PoC\n\nIn this example, we send mock `Authorization: Basic ...` credentials meant for one repository's remote to another remote, by running `gix` while inside the first repository to clone the second repository.\n\nThese instructions are written for a Unix shell, but they will work in other shells, including in PowerShell on Windows if the method of setting environment variables is adapted and `\u002Fdev\u002Fnull` is replaced with `NUL`. This procedure is likely to demonstrate the problem on all systems *except* macOS. This is due to the high-scoped \"unknown\" configuration that usually accompanies Apple Git, and reflects that gix-path is in practice much less vulnerable on macOS (though still potentially vulnerable).\n\n1. Install [`dummyhttp`](https:\u002F\u002Fcrates.io\u002Fcrates\u002Fdummyhttp) to serve as a local HTTP server for the demonstration.\n\n2. Obtain a build of `gitoxide` with the `max` feature set enabled. While this vulnerability affects other builds, this example requires `max` for `http.extraHeader` support.\n\n   Running `cargo install gitoxide` will install such a build though it may build against a patched version of `gix-path`. Cloning the repository (12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8 and earlier are affected) and building with `cargo build` or `cargo install --path .` are also sufficient. In contrast, installing from published binaries with `binstall` or `quickinstall` does not provide the `max` feature, as of this writing.\n\n3. Run: `dummyhttp -i 127.0.0.1 -c 403 -v`\n\n4. In a separate terminal, create a new local repository and set up a mock remote and `http.extraHeader` configuration:\n\n   ```sh\n   git init myrepo\n   cd myrepo\n   git remote add origin http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Fmygit.git\n   git config --local http.extraHeader 'Authorization: Basic abcde'\n   ```\n\n5. Make sure the testing setup is working by running `gix fetch` in the repository and checking that it fails in the expected way. In the terminal where that is run, a message should be shown indicating an HTTP 403 error. The more interesting output is in the terminal where `dummyhttp` is running, which should look like this:\n\n   ```text\n   2024-30-30 03:30:16 127.0.0.1:55689 GET \u002Fmyrepo.git\u002Finfo\u002Frefs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP\u002F1.1\n   ┌─Incoming request\n   │ GET \u002Fmyrepo.git\u002Finfo\u002Frefs?service=git-upload-pack HTTP\u002F1.1\n   │ Accept: *\u002F*\n   │ Authorization: Basic abcde\n   │ Git-Protocol: version=2\n   │ Host: 127.0.0.1:8080\n   │ User-Agent: git\u002Foxide-0.42.2\n   ┌─Outgoing response\n   │ HTTP\u002F1.1 403 Forbidden\n   │ Content-Length: 9\n   │ Content-Type: text\u002Fplain; charset=utf-8\n   │ Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2024 03:30:16 -0400\n   ```\n\n   Some details may differ, especially dates and times. But `Authorization: Basic abcde` should be shown.\n\n6. Now, in the terminal where you ran `gix fetch`, try cloning a separate repository:\n\n   ```sh\n   gix clone http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Fother.git\n   ```\n\n   Check the output appended in the terminal where `dummyhttp` is running. This is to observe that `Authorization: Basic abcde` was rightly *not* sent.\n\n   Alternatively, if it *does* appear, then your system may be in one of the uncommon configurations that is vulnerable without further action.\n\n7. Now rerun that command, but with a modified environment, to cause `gix-path` to wrongly treat configuration from the local scope as being associated with the `git` installation:\n\n   ```sh\n   env GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM=\u002Fdev\u002Fnull GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=\u002Fdev\u002Fnull gix clone http:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8080\u002Fother.git\n   ```\n\n   Check the output appended in the terminal where `dummyhttp` is running. Observe that `Authorization: Basic abcde` was wrongly sent.\n\nWhile this procedure uses the same remote host for both repositories, this is not a required element. If the second repository had a different, untrusted host, the extra header would still be sent.\n\n### Impact\n\nIt is believed to be very difficult to exploit this vulnerability deliberately, due to the need either to anticipate a situation in which higher-scoped configuration variables would be absent, or to arrange for this to happen. Although any operating system may be affected, users running Apple Git on macOS are much less likely to be affected.\n\nIn the example shown above, more secure general practices would avoid it: using a credential manager, or even using `http.\u003Curl>.extraHeader` with as specific a `\u003Curl>` as possible, rather than the more general `http.extraHeader`. Many scenarios are analogous: if each repository's configuration is as secure as possible for how the repository is used, and secrets are stored securely and separately, then the circumstances under which an unacceptably unsecure configuration is used, or under which a leak of credentials would occur, become unlikely.","2024-09-03T20:21:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",2.5,"LOCAL","LOW","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:L\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","NONE","REQUIRED","HIGH",false,[49],"CWE-706",[51],"cpe:2.3:a:gix-path:gix-path:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Gix-Path Gix-Path",[55,56,57,58,59,60,61],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FByron\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8\u002Fgix-path\u002Fsrc\u002Fenv\u002Fgit\u002Fmod.rs#L112","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FByron\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F12251eb052df30105538fa831e641eea557f13d8\u002Fgix-path\u002Fsrc\u002Fenv\u002Fgit\u002Fmod.rs#L91","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FByron\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-v26r-4c9c-h3j6","https:\u002F\u002Fgit-scm.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fgit-config#SCOPES","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-45305","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FByron\u002Fgitoxide","https:\u002F\u002Frustsec.org\u002Fadvisories\u002FRUSTSEC-2024-0367.html",0.12,0.00244,0.15475,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2024-09-03T13:50:56.774992Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T04:45:36.394614\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[76,82,91,99],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[80],"privilege-escalation","T1068",{"name":83,"source":84,"cwe_ids":85,"tactics":86,"capec_ids":88,"technique_id":90},"Masquerading","capec",[49],[87],"stealth",[89],"CAPEC-177","T1036",{"name":92,"source":84,"cwe_ids":93,"tactics":94,"capec_ids":96,"technique_id":98},"DLL",[49],[95,87],"execution",[97],"CAPEC-641","T1574.001",{"name":100,"source":84,"cwe_ids":101,"tactics":102,"capec_ids":103,"technique_id":105},"Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking",[49],[95,87],[104],"CAPEC-159","T1574.008",[],{"count":108,"next":109,"previous":6,"results":110},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[111,119,127],{"id":112,"title":113,"summary":114,"published_at":115,"type":116,"link":117,"image_url":118},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":120,"title":121,"summary":122,"published_at":123,"type":124,"link":125,"image_url":126},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":128,"title":129,"summary":130,"published_at":131,"type":132,"link":133,"image_url":134},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]