[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-47061":30,"landing-articles":82},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":51,"references":53,"score":60,"epss_score":61,"epss_percentile":62,"is_kev":63,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},40804,"CVE-2024-47061","EUVD-2024-2743","Plate allows arbitrary DOM attributes in element.attributes and leaf.attributes\n\n### Impact\nOne longstanding feature of Plate is the ability to add custom DOM attributes to any element or leaf using the `attributes` property. These attributes are passed to the node component using the `nodeProps` prop.\n\nNote: The `attributes` prop that is typically rendered alongside `nodeProps` is unrelated.\n\n```ts\n[{\n  type: 'p',\n  attributes: { 'data-my-attribute': 'This will be rendered on the paragraph element' },\n  children: [{\n    bold: true,\n    attributes: { 'data-my-attribute': 'This will be rendered on the bold leaf element' },\n    text: 'Bold text',\n  }],\n}]\n```\n\n```tsx\nconst ParagraphElement = ({ attributes, nodeProps, children }) => (\n  \u003Cp\n    {...attributes}\n    {...nodeProps} \u002F\u002F Arbitrary DOM attributes are injected here\n  >\n    {children}\n  \u003C\u002Fp>\n);\n\nconst BoldLeaf = ({ attributes, nodeProps, children }) => (\n  \u003Cstrong\n    {...attributes}\n    {...nodeProps} \u002F\u002F Arbitrary DOM attributes are injected here\n  >\n    {children}\n  \u003C\u002Fstrong>\n);\n```\n\nIt has come to our attention that this feature can be used for malicious purposes, including cross-site scripting (XSS) and information exposure (specifically, users' IP addresses and whether or not they have opened a malicious document).\n\nNote that the risk of information exposure via `attributes` is only relevant to applications in which web requests to arbitrary URLs are not ordinarily allowed. Plate editors that allow users to embed images from arbitrary URLs, for example, already carry the risk of leaking users' IP addresses to third parties.\n\nAll Plate editors using an affected version of `@udecode\u002Fplate-core` are vulnerable to these information exposure attacks via the `style` attribute and other attributes that can cause web requests to be sent. \n\nIn addition, whether or not a Plate editor is vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks using `attributes` depends on a number of factors. The most likely DOM attributes to be vulnerable are `href` and `src` on links and iframes respectively. Any component that spreads `{...nodeProps}` onto an `\u003Ca>` or `\u003Ciframe>` element and does not later override `href` or `src` will be vulnerable to XSS.\n\n```tsx\n\u003Ca\n  href={sanitizedHref}\n  {...attributes}\n  {...nodeProps} \u002F\u002F Definitely vulnerable to XSS since `href` can be overridden\n>\n```\n\n```tsx\n\u003Ca\n  {...attributes}\n  {...nodeProps} \u002F\u002F Probably not vulnerable to XSS via `href`\n  href={sanitizedHref}\n>\n```\n\n```tsx\n\u003Ca\n  {...attributes}\n  {...nodeProps} \u002F\u002F May be vulnerable to XSS via `href` if `href` is sometimes omitted from `sanitizedLinkProps`\n  {...sanitizedLinkProps}\n>\n```\n\nReact does not allow passing a string to event handler props like `onClick`, so these are unlikely (but not impossible) to be vulnerable.\n\nThe attack surface is larger for users running older browsers, which may be vulnerable to XSS in DOM attributes that are less dangerous (although still vulnerable to information exposure) in modern browsers such as `style` or `background`.\n\nPotential attack vectors for delivering malicious Slate content to users include:\n\n- Opening a malicious document stored on the server\n- Pasting a malicious Slate fragment into a document\n- Receiving malicious Slate operations on a collaborative document\n\n### Patches\nIn patched versions of Plate, we have disabled `element.attributes` and `leaf.attributes` for most attribute names by default, with some exceptions including  `target`, `alt`, `width`, `height`, `colspan` and `rowspan` on the link, image, video, table cell and table header cell plugins.\n\nIf this is a breaking change for you, you can selectively re-enable `attributes` for certain plugins as follows. Please carefully research and assess the security implications of any attribute you allow, as even seemingly innocuous attributes such as `style` can be used maliciously.\n\n#### Plate >= 37\n\nFor custom plugins, specify the list of allowed attribute names in the `node.dangerouslyAllowAttributes` plugin configuration option.\n\n```ts\nconst ImagePlugin = createPlatePlugin({\n  key: 'image',\n  node: {\n    isElement: true,\n    isVoid: true,\n    dangerouslyAllowAttributes: ['alt'],\n  },\n});\n```\n\nTo modify an existing plugin, use the `extend` method.\n\n```ts\nconst MyImagePlugin = ImagePlugin.extend({\n  node: {\n    dangerouslyAllowAttributes: ['alt'],\n  },\n});\n```\n\n#### Plate \u003C 37\n\nNote that the patch has been backported to versions `@udecode\u002Fplate-core@21.5.1` and `@udecode\u002Fplate-core@36.5.9` only.\n\nFor custom plugins, specify the list of allowed attribute names in the `dangerouslyAllowAttributes` plugin configuration option.\n\n```ts\nconst createImagePlugin = createPluginFactory({\n  key: 'image',\n  isElement: true,\n  isVoid: true,\n  dangerouslyAllowAttributes: ['alt'],\n});\n```\n\nTo modify an existing plugin, pass `dangerouslyAllowAttributes` to the plugin factory.\n\n```ts\ncreateImagePlugin({\n  dangerouslyAllowAttributes: ['alt'],\n});\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you are unable to upgrade to any of the patched versions, you should use a tool like [`patch-package`](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002Fpatch-package) or [`yarn patch`](https:\u002F\u002Fyarnpkg.com\u002Fcli\u002Fpatch) to remove the logic from `@udecode\u002Fplate-core` that adds `attributes` to `nodeProps`.\n\nThis logic can be found in the `getRenderNodeProps` function and looks something like this. The entire `if` statment can safely be removed.\n\n```ts\n  if (!newProps.nodeProps && attributes) {\n    newProps.nodeProps = attributes;\n  }\n```\n\nAfter applying the patch, be sure to test its effectiveness by rendering a Slate value containing an `attributes` property on some element.\n\n```ts\n[{\n  type: 'p',\n  attributes: { 'data-vulnerable': true },\n  children: [{ text: 'My paragraph' }],\n}]\n```\n\nIf the patch was successful, the `data-vulnerable=\"true\"` attribute should not be present on any DOM element when the Plate editor is rendered in the browser.","2024-09-20T14:41:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":42,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":42},"UNCHANGED","3.1",8.3,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:L","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-79",[50],"cpe:2.3:a:udecode:plate-core:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52],"Udecode Plate-Core",[54,55,56,57,58,59],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fudecode\u002Fplate\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-73rg-f94j-xvhx","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002Fpatch-package","https:\u002F\u002Fyarnpkg.com\u002Fcli\u002Fpatch","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-47061","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fudecode\u002Fplate\u002Fcommit\u002F16df6074edac22d56c60e0283eae0740230401c9","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fudecode\u002Fplate",0.61,0.00515,0.43586,false,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2024-09-20T19:15:49.437196Z","no","partial","none",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T11:36:37.971418\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[79],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":83,"next":84,"previous":6,"results":85},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[86,94,102],{"id":87,"title":88,"summary":89,"published_at":90,"type":91,"link":92,"image_url":93},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":95,"title":96,"summary":97,"published_at":98,"type":99,"link":100,"image_url":101},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]