CVE-2024-47062

EUVD-2024-2719 · Published Sep 20, 2024

Navidrome has Multiple SQL Injections and ORM Leak

Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Navidrome

Summary

Navidrome automatically adds parameters in the URL to SQL queries. This can be exploited to access information by adding parameters like password=... in the URL (ORM Leak).

Furthermore, the names of the parameters are not properly escaped, leading to SQL Injections.

Finally, the username is used in a LIKE statement, allowing people to log in with % instead of their username.

Details

ORM Leak

When adding parameters to the URL, they are automatically included in an SQL LIKE statement (depending on the parameter's name). This allows attackers to potentially retrieve arbitrary information.

For example, attackers can use the following request to test whether some encrypted passwords start with AAA:

GET /api/user?_end=36&_order=DESC&password=AAA%

This results in an SQL query like password LIKE 'AAA%', allowing attackers to slowly brute-force passwords. (Also, any reason for using encryption instead of hashing?)

SQL Injections

When adding parameters to the URL, they are automatically added to an SQL query. The names of the parameters are not properly escaped.

This behavior can be used to inject arbitrary SQL code (SQL Injection), for example:

GET /api/album?_end=36&_order=DESC&_sort=recently_added&_start=0&SELECT+*+FROM+USER--=123 HTTP/1.1

This is only an example, but you should see an error message in the logs.

Authentication Weakness

When retrieving the user for authentication, the following code is used:

func (r *userRepository) FindByUsername(username string) (model.User, error) {
    sel := r.newSelect().Columns("").Where(Like{"user_name": username})
    var usr model.User
    err := r.queryOne(sel, &usr)
    return &usr, err
}

This relies on a LIKE statement and allows users to log in with % instead of the legitimate username.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

See above.

Impact

These vulnerabilities can be used to leak information and dump the contents of the database.

Credit

Louis Nyffenegger from PentesterLab

Technologies

Navidrome Navidrome

Weaknesses

CWE-89

CVSS scores

v3.18.8CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

ReconImpact

Initial Access

T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.