[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-53079":30,"landing-articles":94},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":58,"references":60,"score":64,"epss_score":65,"epss_percentile":66,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":67,"attack_mappings":77,"exploits":93},53313,"CVE-2024-53079","EUVD-2024-50495","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm\u002Fthp: fix deferred split unqueue naming and locking\n\nRecent changes are putting more pressure on THP deferred split queues:\nunder load revealing long-standing races, causing list_del corruptions,\n\"Bad page state\"s and worse (I keep BUGs in both of those, so usually\ndon't get to see how badly they end up without).  The relevant recent\nchanges being 6.8's mTHP, 6.10's mTHP swapout, and 6.12's mTHP swapin,\nimproved swap allocation, and underused THP splitting.\n\nBefore fixing locking: rename misleading folio_undo_large_rmappable(),\nwhich does not undo large_rmappable, to folio_unqueue_deferred_split(),\nwhich is what it does.  But that and its out-of-line __callee are mm\ninternals of very limited usability: add comment and WARN_ON_ONCEs to\ncheck usage; and return a bool to say if a deferred split was unqueued,\nwhich can then be used in WARN_ON_ONCEs around safety checks (sparing\ncallers the arcane conditionals in __folio_unqueue_deferred_split()).\n\nJust omit the folio_unqueue_deferred_split() from free_unref_folios(), all\nof whose callers now call it beforehand (and if any forget then bad_page()\nwill tell) - except for its caller put_pages_list(), which itself no\nlonger has any callers (and will be deleted separately).\n\nSwapout: mem_cgroup_swapout() has been resetting folio->memcg_data 0\nwithout checking and unqueueing a THP folio from deferred split list;\nwhich is unfortunate, since the split_queue_lock depends on the memcg\n(when memcg is enabled); so swapout has been unqueueing such THPs later,\nwhen freeing the folio, using the pgdat's lock instead: potentially\ncorrupting the memcg's list.  __remove_mapping() has frozen refcount to 0\nhere, so no problem with calling folio_unqueue_deferred_split() before\nresetting memcg_data.\n\nThat goes back to 5.4 commit 87eaceb3faa5 (\"mm: thp: make deferred split\nshrinker memcg aware\"): which included a check on swapcache before adding\nto deferred queue, but no check on deferred queue before adding THP to\nswapcache.  That worked fine with the usual sequence of events in reclaim\n(though there were a couple of rare ways in which a THP on deferred queue\ncould have been swapped out), but 6.12 commit dafff3f4c850 (\"mm: split\nunderused THPs\") avoids splitting underused THPs in reclaim, which makes\nswapcache THPs on deferred queue commonplace.\n\nKeep the check on swapcache before adding to deferred queue?  Yes: it is\nno longer essential, but preserves the existing behaviour, and is likely\nto be a worthwhile optimization (vmstat showed much more traffic on the\nqueue under swapping load if the check was removed); update its comment.\n\nMemcg-v1 move (deprecated): mem_cgroup_move_account() has been changing\nfolio->memcg_data without checking and unqueueing a THP folio from the\ndeferred list, sometimes corrupting \"from\" memcg's list, like swapout. \nRefcount is non-zero here, so folio_unqueue_deferred_split() can only be\nused in a WARN_ON_ONCE to validate the fix, which must be done earlier:\nmem_cgroup_move_charge_pte_range() first try to split the THP (splitting\nof course unqueues), or skip it if that fails.  Not ideal, but moving\ncharge has been requested, and khugepaged should repair the THP later:\nnobody wants new custom unqueueing code just for this deprecated case.\n\nThe 87eaceb3faa5 commit did have the code to move from one deferred list\nto another (but was not conscious of its unsafety while refcount non-0);\nbut that was removed by 5.6 commit fac0516b5534 (\"mm: thp: don't need care\ndeferred split queue in memcg charge move path\"), which argued that the\nexistence of a PMD mapping guarantees that the THP cannot be on a deferred\nlist.  As above, false in rare cases, and now commonly false.\n\nBackport to 6.11 should be straightforward.  Earlier backports must take\ncare that other _deferred_list fixes and dependencies are included.  There\nis not a strong case for backports, but they can fix cornercases.","2024-11-19T18:15:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.5,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW","HIGH",false,[49],"CWE-667",[51,52,53,54,55,56,57],"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.12:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.12:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.12:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.12:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.12:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.12:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*",[59],"Linux Linux Kernel",[61,62,63],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fafb1352d06b1b6b2cfd1f901c766a430c87078b3","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Ff8f931bba0f92052cf842b7e30917b1afcc77d5a","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Ffc4951c3e3358dd82ea508e893695b916c813f17",0.28,0.00178,0.07337,{"timestamp":68,"automatable":69,"tech_impact":70,"exploitation":71,"cisa_decision":72,"cisa_remediation_timeline":76},"2025-10-01T20:12:04.241240Z","no","partial","none",{"vector":73,"decision":74,"priority":75},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T04:45:29.843727\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[78,84],{"name":79,"source":80,"tactics":81,"technique_id":83},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[82],"privilege-escalation","T1068",{"name":85,"source":86,"cwe_ids":87,"tactics":88,"capec_ids":90,"technique_id":92},"Application or System Exploitation","capec",[49],[89],"impact",[91],"CAPEC-25","T1499.004",[],{"count":95,"next":96,"previous":6,"results":97},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[98,106,114],{"id":99,"title":100,"summary":101,"published_at":102,"type":103,"link":104,"image_url":105},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":107,"title":108,"summary":109,"published_at":110,"type":111,"link":112,"image_url":113},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":115,"title":116,"summary":117,"published_at":118,"type":119,"link":120,"image_url":121},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]