[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-56687":30,"landing-articles":91},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":90},50082,"CVE-2024-56687","EUVD-2024-53335","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: musb: Fix hardware lockup on first Rx endpoint request\n\nThere is a possibility that a request's callback could be invoked from\nusb_ep_queue() (call trace below, supplemented with missing calls):\n\nreq->complete from usb_gadget_giveback_request\n\t(drivers\u002Fusb\u002Fgadget\u002Fudc\u002Fcore.c:999)\nusb_gadget_giveback_request from musb_g_giveback\n\t(drivers\u002Fusb\u002Fmusb\u002Fmusb_gadget.c:147)\nmusb_g_giveback from rxstate\n\t(drivers\u002Fusb\u002Fmusb\u002Fmusb_gadget.c:784)\nrxstate from musb_ep_restart\n\t(drivers\u002Fusb\u002Fmusb\u002Fmusb_gadget.c:1169)\nmusb_ep_restart from musb_ep_restart_resume_work\n\t(drivers\u002Fusb\u002Fmusb\u002Fmusb_gadget.c:1176)\nmusb_ep_restart_resume_work from musb_queue_resume_work\n\t(drivers\u002Fusb\u002Fmusb\u002Fmusb_core.c:2279)\nmusb_queue_resume_work from musb_gadget_queue\n\t(drivers\u002Fusb\u002Fmusb\u002Fmusb_gadget.c:1241)\nmusb_gadget_queue from usb_ep_queue\n\t(drivers\u002Fusb\u002Fgadget\u002Fudc\u002Fcore.c:300)\n\nAccording to the docstring of usb_ep_queue(), this should not happen:\n\n\"Note that @req's ->complete() callback must never be called from within\nusb_ep_queue() as that can create deadlock situations.\"\n\nIn fact, a hardware lockup might occur in the following sequence:\n\n1. The gadget is initialized using musb_gadget_enable().\n2. Meanwhile, a packet arrives, and the RXPKTRDY flag is set, raising an\n   interrupt.\n3. If IRQs are enabled, the interrupt is handled, but musb_g_rx() finds an\n   empty queue (next_request() returns NULL). The interrupt flag has\n   already been cleared by the glue layer handler, but the RXPKTRDY flag\n   remains set.\n4. The first request is enqueued using usb_ep_queue(), leading to the call\n   of req->complete(), as shown in the call trace above.\n5. If the callback enables IRQs and another packet is waiting, step (3)\n   repeats. The request queue is empty because usb_g_giveback() removes the\n   request before invoking the callback.\n6. The endpoint remains locked up, as the interrupt triggered by hardware\n   setting the RXPKTRDY flag has been handled, but the flag itself remains\n   set.\n\nFor this scenario to occur, it is only necessary for IRQs to be enabled at\nsome point during the complete callback. This happens with the USB Ethernet\ngadget, whose rx_complete() callback calls netif_rx(). If called in the\ntask context, netif_rx() disables the bottom halves (BHs). When the BHs are\nre-enabled, IRQs are also enabled to allow soft IRQs to be processed. The\ngadget itself is initialized at module load (or at boot if built-in), but\nthe first request is enqueued when the network interface is brought up,\ntriggering rx_complete() in the task context via ioctl(). If a packet\narrives while the interface is down, it can prevent the interface from\nreceiving any further packets from the USB host.\n\nThe situation is quite complicated with many parties involved. This\nparticular issue can be resolved in several possible ways:\n\n1. Ensure that callbacks never enable IRQs. This would be difficult to\n   enforce, as discovering how netif_rx() interacts with interrupts was\n   already quite challenging and u_ether is not the only function driver.\n   Similar \"bugs\" could be hidden in other drivers as well.\n2. Disable MUSB interrupts in musb_g_giveback() before calling the callback\n   and re-enable them afterwars (by calling musb_{dis,en}able_interrupts(),\n   for example). This would ensure that MUSB interrupts are not handled\n   during the callback, even if IRQs are enabled. In fact, it would allow\n   IRQs to be enabled when releasing the lock. However, this feels like an\n   inelegant hack.\n3. Modify the interrupt handler to clear the RXPKTRDY flag if the request\n   queue is empty. While this approach also feels like a hack, it wastes\n   CPU time by attempting to handle incoming packets when the software is\n   not ready to process them.\n4. Flush the Rx FIFO instead of calling rxstate() in musb_ep_restart().\n   This ensures that the hardware can receive packets when there is at\n   least one request in the queue. Once I\n---truncated---","2024-12-28T10:15:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.5,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW","HIGH",false,[49],"CWE-667",[51],"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Linux Linux Kernel",[55,56,57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F0c89445e6d475b78d37b64ae520831cd43af7db4","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F3fc137386c4620305bbc2a216868c53f9245670a","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F5906ee3693674d734177df13a519a21bb03f730d","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fc749500b28cae67410792096133ee7f282439c51","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Ff05ad9755bb294328c3d0f429164ac6d4d08c548","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2025\u002F03\u002Fmsg00001.html",0.28,0.00163,0.05411,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2025-10-01T19:59:19.452082Z","no","partial","none",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:09:18.133757\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[75,81],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[79],"privilege-escalation","T1068",{"name":82,"source":83,"cwe_ids":84,"tactics":85,"capec_ids":87,"technique_id":89},"Application or System Exploitation","capec",[49],[86],"impact",[88],"CAPEC-25","T1499.004",[],{"count":92,"next":93,"previous":6,"results":94},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[95,103,111],{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":112,"title":113,"summary":114,"published_at":115,"type":116,"link":117,"image_url":118},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]