[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-57996":30,"landing-articles":83},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":50,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":66,"epss_score":67,"epss_percentile":68,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":69,"attack_mappings":75,"exploits":82},27891,"CVE-2024-57996","EUVD-2025-5254","In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet_sched: sch_sfq: don't allow 1 packet limit\n\nThe current implementation does not work correctly with a limit of\n1. iproute2 actually checks for this and this patch adds the check in\nkernel as well.\n\nThis fixes the following syzkaller reported crash:\n\nUBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_sfq.c:210:6\nindex 65535 is out of range for type 'struct sfq_head[128]'\nCPU: 0 PID: 2569 Comm: syz-executor101 Not tainted 5.10.0-smp-DEV #1\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine\u002FGoogle Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09\u002F13\u002F2024\nCall Trace:\n  __dump_stack lib\u002Fdump_stack.c:79 [inline]\n  dump_stack+0x125\u002F0x19f lib\u002Fdump_stack.c:120\n  ubsan_epilogue lib\u002Fubsan.c:148 [inline]\n  __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xed\u002F0x120 lib\u002Fubsan.c:347\n  sfq_link net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_sfq.c:210 [inline]\n  sfq_dec+0x528\u002F0x600 net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_sfq.c:238\n  sfq_dequeue+0x39b\u002F0x9d0 net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_sfq.c:500\n  sfq_reset+0x13\u002F0x50 net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_sfq.c:525\n  qdisc_reset+0xfe\u002F0x510 net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_generic.c:1026\n  tbf_reset+0x3d\u002F0x100 net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_tbf.c:319\n  qdisc_reset+0xfe\u002F0x510 net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_generic.c:1026\n  dev_reset_queue+0x8c\u002F0x140 net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_generic.c:1296\n  netdev_for_each_tx_queue include\u002Flinux\u002Fnetdevice.h:2350 [inline]\n  dev_deactivate_many+0x6dc\u002F0xc20 net\u002Fsched\u002Fsch_generic.c:1362\n  __dev_close_many+0x214\u002F0x350 net\u002Fcore\u002Fdev.c:1468\n  dev_close_many+0x207\u002F0x510 net\u002Fcore\u002Fdev.c:1506\n  unregister_netdevice_many+0x40f\u002F0x16b0 net\u002Fcore\u002Fdev.c:10738\n  unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2be\u002F0x310 net\u002Fcore\u002Fdev.c:10695\n  unregister_netdevice include\u002Flinux\u002Fnetdevice.h:2893 [inline]\n  __tun_detach+0x6b6\u002F0x1600 drivers\u002Fnet\u002Ftun.c:689\n  tun_detach drivers\u002Fnet\u002Ftun.c:705 [inline]\n  tun_chr_close+0x104\u002F0x1b0 drivers\u002Fnet\u002Ftun.c:3640\n  __fput+0x203\u002F0x840 fs\u002Ffile_table.c:280\n  task_work_run+0x129\u002F0x1b0 kernel\u002Ftask_work.c:185\n  exit_task_work include\u002Flinux\u002Ftask_work.h:33 [inline]\n  do_exit+0x5ce\u002F0x2200 kernel\u002Fexit.c:931\n  do_group_exit+0x144\u002F0x310 kernel\u002Fexit.c:1046\n  __do_sys_exit_group kernel\u002Fexit.c:1057 [inline]\n  __se_sys_exit_group kernel\u002Fexit.c:1055 [inline]\n  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b\u002F0x40 kernel\u002Fexit.c:1055\n do_syscall_64+0x6c\u002F0xd0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61\u002F0xcb\nRIP: 0033:0x7fe5e7b52479\nCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe5e7b5244f.\nRSP: 002b:00007ffd3c800398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7\nRAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe5e7b52479\nRDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000\nRBP: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000014\nR10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0\nR13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fe5e7bcdd20 R15: 00007fe5e7b24270\n\nThe crash can be also be reproduced with the following (with a tc\nrecompiled to allow for sfq limits of 1):\n\ntc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 1: root tbf rate 1Kbit burst 100b lat 1s\n..\u002Fiproute2-6.9.0\u002Ftc\u002Ftc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 2: parent 1:10 sfq limit 1\nifconfig dummy0 up\nping -I dummy0 -f -c2 -W0.1 8.8.8.8\nsleep 1\n\nScenario that triggers the crash:\n\n* the first packet is sent and queued in TBF and SFQ; qdisc qlen is 1\n\n* TBF dequeues: it peeks from SFQ which moves the packet to the\n  gso_skb list and keeps qdisc qlen set to 1. TBF is out of tokens so\n  it schedules itself for later.\n\n* the second packet is sent and TBF tries to queues it to SFQ. qdisc\n  qlen is now 2 and because the SFQ limit is 1 the packet is dropped\n  by SFQ. At this point qlen is 1, and all of the SFQ slots are empty,\n  however q->tail is not NULL.\n\nAt this point, assuming no more packets are queued, when sch_dequeue\nruns again it will decrement the qlen for the current empty slot\ncausing an underflow and the subsequent out of bounds access.","2025-02-27T02:15:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5.5,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW","HIGH",false,[49],"CWE-129",[51],"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Linux Linux Kernel",[55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65],"https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F10685681bafce6febb39770f3387621bf5d67d0b","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F1b562b7f9231432da40d12e19786c1bd7df653a7","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F1e6d9d87626cf89eeffb4d943db12cb5b10bf961","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F35d0137305ae2f97260a9047f445bd4434bd6cc7","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F7d8947f2153ee9c5ab4cb17861a11cc45f30e8c4","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F7fefc294204f10a3405f175f4ac2be16d63f135e","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002F833e9a1c27b82024db7ff5038a51651f48f05e5e","https:\u002F\u002Fgit.kernel.org\u002Fstable\u002Fc\u002Fe12f6013d0a69660e8b99bfe381b9546ae667328","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2025\u002F03\u002Fmsg00028.html","https:\u002F\u002Flists.debian.org\u002Fdebian-lts-announce\u002F2025\u002F10\u002Fmsg00007.html","https:\u002F\u002Fcert-portal.siemens.com\u002Fproductcert\u002Fhtml\u002Fssa-082556.html",0.28,0.00273,0.19497,{"timestamp":6,"automatable":70,"tech_impact":71,"exploitation":72,"cisa_decision":73,"cisa_remediation_timeline":74},"no","partial","none",{},"FSU",[76],{"name":77,"source":78,"tactics":79,"technique_id":81},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[80],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":84,"next":85,"previous":6,"results":86},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[87,95,103],{"id":88,"title":89,"summary":90,"published_at":91,"type":92,"link":93,"image_url":94},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":96,"title":97,"summary":98,"published_at":99,"type":100,"link":101,"image_url":102},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":104,"title":105,"summary":106,"published_at":107,"type":108,"link":109,"image_url":110},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]