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CVE-2025-21839

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-7590 · Published Mar 7, 2025

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Load DR6 with guest value only before entering .vcpu_run() loop Move the conditional loading of hardware DR6 with the guest's DR6 value out of the core .vcpu_run() loop to fix a bug where KVM can load hardware with a stale vcpu->arch.dr6. When the guest accesses a DR and host userspace isn't debugging the guest, KVM disables DR interception and loads the guest's values into hardware on VM-Enter and saves them on VM-Exit. This allows the guest to access DRs at will, e.g. so that a sequence of DR accesses to configure a breakpoint only generates one VM-Exit. For DR0-DR3, the logic/behavior is identical between VMX and SVM, and also identical between KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED (userspace debugging the guest) and KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT (guest using DRs), and so KVM handles loading DR0-DR3 in common code, _outside_ of the core kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run() loop. But for DR6, the guest's value doesn't need to be loaded into hardware for KVM_DEBUGREG_BP_ENABLED, and SVM provides a dedicated VMCB field whereas VMX requires software to manually load the guest value, and so loading the guest's value into DR6 is handled by {svm,vmx}_vcpu_run(), i.e. is done _inside_ the core run loop. Unfortunately, saving the guest values on VM-Exit is initiated by common x86, again outside of the core run loop. If the guest modifies DR6 (in hardware, when DR interception is disabled), and then the next VM-Exit is a fastpath VM-Exit, KVM will reload hardware DR6 with vcpu->arch.dr6 and clobber the guest's actual value. The bug shows up primarily with nested VMX because KVM handles the VMX preemption timer in the fastpath, and the window between hardware DR6 being modified (in guest context) and DR6 being read by guest software is orders of magnitude larger in a nested setup. E.g. in non-nested, the VMX preemption timer would need to fire precisely between #DB injection and the #DB handler's read of DR6, whereas with a KVM-on-KVM setup, the window where hardware DR6 is "dirty" extends all the way from L1 writing DR6 to VMRESUME (in L1). L1's view: ========== <L1 disables DR interception> CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640961: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 A: L1 Writes DR6 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640963: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff1 B: CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640967: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT intr_info 0x800000ec D: L1 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640969: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640976: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 L2 reads DR6, L1 disables DR interception CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640980: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: kvm_entry: vcpu 0 CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640983: <hack>: Set DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L2 detects failure CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640987: kvm_exit: vcpu 0 reason HLT L1 reads DR6 (confirms failure) CPU 0/KVM-7289 [023] d.... 2925.640990: <hack>: Sync DRs, DR6 = 0xffff0ff0 L0's view: ========== L2 reads DR6, arch.dr6 = 0 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit: vcpu 23 reason DR_ACCESS info1 0x0000000000000216 L2 => L1 nested VM-Exit CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] ..... 3410.005610: kvm_nested_vmexit_inject: reason: DR_ACCESS ext_inf1: 0x0000000000000216 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005610: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_exit: vcpu 23 reason VMREAD CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410.005611: kvm_entry: vcpu 23 CPU 23/KVM-5046 [001] d.... 3410. ---truncated---

Technologies

Linux Linux Kernel

CVSS scores

  • v3.15.5CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

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Privilege Escalation

References

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Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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