[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"cve-CVE-2025-22620":3,"landing-trending":56,"landing-articles":82},{"id":4,"cve_id":5,"euvd_id":6,"summary":7,"published":8,"cvss_data":9,"is_remote":21,"cwes":22,"cpes":25,"technologies":27,"references":29,"score":34,"epss_score":35,"epss_percentile":36,"is_kev":21,"cisa_kev_date_added":37,"cisa_kev_due_date":37,"cisa_ssvc":38,"attack_mappings":48,"exploits":55},70710,"CVE-2025-22620","EUVD-2025-0160","gix-worktree-state nonexclusive checkout sets executable files world-writable\n\n### Summary\n\n`gix-worktree-state` specifies 0777 permissions when checking out executable files, intending that the umask will restrict them appropriately. But one of the strategies it uses to set permissions is not subject to the umask. This causes files in a repository to be world-writable in some situations.\n\n### Details\n\nGit repositories track executable bits for regular files. In tree objects and the index, regular file modes are stored as 0644 if not executable, or 0755 if executable. But this is independent of how the permissions are set in the filesystem (where supported).\n\n[`gix_worktree_state::checkout`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Ffunction.rs#L8-L35) has two strategies for checking out a file and marking it executable on a Unix-like operating system, one of which is vulnerable:\n\n- If the file is created by assuming it does not already exist, correct permissions are applied, because permissions specified when opening a file are subject to the umask.\n- If the file is considered possibly already to exist—even in a clean checkout if the application does not specify the option to treat the destination directory as empty—then permissions conferring unrestricted access to any user account on the system are wrongly applied, because permissions specified when calling chmod on an existing file are not subject to the umask. \n\nSpecifically, [`checkout::entry::checkout`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fentry.rs#L56-L191) chooses the strategy for each file. The same strategy is usually chosen for each executable file, if no [process](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fgit\u002Fgit\u002Fblob\u002Fa60673e9252b08d4eca90543b3729f4798b9aafd\u002FDocumentation\u002FRelNotes\u002F2.11.0.txt#L149-L154) (i.e. [long running](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fdiscussions\u002F996)) smudge filter is in use. The strategy depends on the [`checkout::Options::destination_is_initially_empty`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fmod.rs#L50-L53) value, which is passed along to [`checkout::entry::open_file`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fentry.rs#L253-L277), whose return value includes a flag indicating whether permissions still need to be set:\n\n- With `destination_is_initially_empty: true`, executable permissions are specified when opening the file, via [`OpenOptionsEx::mode`](https:\u002F\u002Fdoc.rust-lang.org\u002Fstd\u002Fos\u002Funix\u002Ffs\u002Ftrait.OpenOptionsExt.html#tymethod.mode), by its effect on the behavior of [`OpenOptions::open`](https:\u002F\u002Fdoc.rust-lang.org\u002Fstd\u002Ffs\u002Fstruct.OpenOptions.html#method.open). A mode of 0777 is safe here, for the same reason the default mode of 0666 is safe. When creating a file, the applied mode is the specified mode with any bits unset from it that are set in the umask.\n\n   https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fentry.rs#L265-L268\n\n  The `set_executable_after_creation` flag in the `open_file` return value is then `false`.\n\n- With `destination_is_initially_empty: false`, executable permissions are set in a separate step, via [`PermissionsExt::set_mode`](https:\u002F\u002Fdoc.rust-lang.org\u002Fbeta\u002Fstd\u002Fos\u002Funix\u002Ffs\u002Ftrait.PermissionsExt.html#tymethod.set_mode) and [`set_permissions`](https:\u002F\u002Fdoc.rust-lang.org\u002Fbeta\u002Fstd\u002Ffs\u002Ffn.set_permissions.html). A mode of 0777 is not safe here, because the umask is not applied. The vulnerable code appears in [`checkout::entry::finalize_entry`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fentry.rs#L279-L299), which receives the `set_executable_after_creation` flag originally from `open_file`:\n\n  https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fentry.rs#L288-L293\n\n  The file has unrestricted permissions.\n\n`finalize_entry` is [likewise called](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fchunk.rs#L229-L236) from [`checkout::chunk::process_delayed_filter_results`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fchunk.rs#L157-L259).\n\n### PoC\n\n1. On a Unix-like system such as GNU\u002FLinux or macOS, create a new project and define its dependencies. While the vulnerability is in `gix-worktree-state`, this example will use vulnerable code through the `gix` crate, which exposes it. Run:\n\n   ```sh\n   cargo new checkout-index\n   cd checkout-index\n   cargo add gix gix-object\n   ```\n\n2. In the `checkout-index` directory, edit `src\u002Fmain.rs` so that its entire contents are:\n\n   ```rust\n   fn main() -> Result\u003C(), Box\u003Cdyn std::error::Error>> {\n       let repo = gix::discover(\"has-executable\")?;\n       let mut index = repo.open_index()?;\n       gix::worktree::state::checkout(\n           &mut index,\n           repo.work_dir().ok_or(\"need non-bare repo\")?,\n           gix_object::find::Never, \u002F\u002F Can also use: repo.objects.clone()\n           &gix::progress::Discard,\n           &gix::progress::Discard,\n           &Default::default(),\n           Default::default(),\n       )?;\n       Ok(())\n   }\n   ```\n\n3. Create the test repository that the vulnerable program will operate on. Still in the `checkout-index` directory, run:\n\n   ```sh\n   git init has-executable\n   touch has-executable\u002Fa has-executable\u002Fb\n   chmod +x has-executable\u002Fb\n   git -C has-executable add .\n   ```\n\n   It is not necessary to commit the changes, only to stage them, since the test program will check  out the index.\n\n4. *Optionally*, run `rm has-executable\u002F[ab]` to remove the staged files from disk.\n\n5. Run the program by issuing `cargo run`. The program uses `gix-worktree-state` to check out the index. It should terminate successfully and not issue any errors.\n\n6. Run `ls -l has-executable` to inspect the permissions of the checked out files. Observe that owner, group, and other all have read, write, and execute permissions on `b`.\n\n   ```text\n   -rw-r--r-- 1 ek ek 0 Jan  9 03:38 a\n   -rwxrwxrwx 1 ek ek 0 Jan  9 03:38 b\n   ```\n\n   With affected versions of `gix-worktree-state`, the output shows `-rwxrwxrwx` for `b`, whether the files were removed in step 4 or not.\n\n7. It was not necessary to set `destination_is_initially_empty` to `false` explicitly to trigger the bug, because that is its default value. If desired, modify the program to pass `true` and rerun the experiment to verify that `b` is no longer created with excessive permissions. The modified program would change the last `checkout` argument from `Default::default(),` to:\n\n   ```rust\n           gix::worktree::state::checkout::Options {\n               destination_is_initially_empty: true,\n               ..Default::default()\n           },\n   ```\n\n### Impact\n\nSetting unlimited file permissions is a problem on systems where a user account exists on the system that should not have the ability to access and modify the files. That applies to multi-user systems, or when an account is used to run software with reduced abilities. (Some programs may also treat broad write permissions to mean less validation is required.)\n\nThis bug affects Unix-like systems but not Windows. The `gix clone` command is not believed to be affected, due to [`checkout_exclusive`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002Faf704f57bb9480c47cdd393465264d586f1d4562\u002Fgitoxide-core\u002Fsrc\u002Findex\u002Fcheckout.rs#L14-L172)'s [use](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002Faf704f57bb9480c47cdd393465264d586f1d4562\u002Fgitoxide-core\u002Fsrc\u002Findex\u002Fcheckout.rs#L61) of `destination_is_initially_empty: true`. Specialized uses in which repositories are known never to have any files marked executable are unaffected. Repositories that no untrusted users can access, due to not having the ability to traverse the directories to them or due to sufficiently restrictive ACLs, are likewise unaffected.\n\nThe default value of `destination_is_initially_empty` is `false`, so some applications may be affected even if they don't attempt checkouts in nonempty directories. The 0777 permissions are applied to files that are created earlier in the same checkout, as well as those that already existed, regardless of their prior permissions. On preexisting files, 0777 is set *even if [`overwrite_existing`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fblob\u002F8d84818240d44e1f5fe78a231b5d9bffd0283918\u002Fgix-worktree-state\u002Fsrc\u002Fcheckout\u002Fmod.rs#L54-L58) is `false`*, as that prevents the checkout from changing file contents but not permissions.\n\nFiles not tracked\u002Fstaged as executable are not checked out with insecure permissions. Such a file that previously existed keeps its old permissions. However, this may include executable permissions that no longer match repository metadata, as well as undesired write permissions acquired from a previous vulnerable checkout. `set_mode(0o777)` clears other bits, so the bug is not exacerbated by the presence of setuid\u002Fsetgid bits. In some applications, the vulnerable strategy may be used only for files rewritten by a [long running](https:\u002F\u002Fgit-scm.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fgitattributes\u002F2.40.0#_long_running_filter_process) smudge filter or only in the presence of [delays](https:\u002F\u002Fgit-scm.com\u002Fdocs\u002Fgitattributes\u002F2.40.0#_delay).","2025-01-21T21:13:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":10},{"scope":11,"version":12,"baseScore":13,"attackVector":14,"baseSeverity":15,"vectorString":16,"integrityImpact":17,"userInteraction":18,"attackComplexity":19,"availabilityImpact":20,"privilegesRequired":19,"confidentialityImpact":20},"UNCHANGED","3.1",5,"LOCAL","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:L\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","HIGH","REQUIRED","LOW","NONE",false,[23,24],"CWE-281","CWE-687",[26],"cpe:2.3:a:gix-worktree-state:gix-worktree-state:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[28],"Gix-Worktree-State Gix-Worktree-State",[30,31,32,33],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-fqmf-w4xh-33rh","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-22620","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FGitoxideLabs\u002Fgitoxide","https:\u002F\u002Frustsec.org\u002Fadvisories\u002FRUSTSEC-2025-0001.html",0.25,0.00371,0.30807,null,{"timestamp":39,"automatable":40,"tech_impact":41,"exploitation":42,"cisa_decision":43,"cisa_remediation_timeline":47},"2025-01-21T14:54:20.971258Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":44,"decision":45,"priority":46},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T08:44:00.686558\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[49],{"name":50,"source":51,"tactics":52,"technique_id":54},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[53],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":57,"next":58,"previous":37,"results":59},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[60,69,72],{"id":61,"title":62,"summary":63,"published_at":64,"severity":65,"vendor":66,"products":67},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[68],"brotli",{"id":57,"title":62,"summary":70,"published_at":64,"severity":65,"vendor":66,"products":71},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[68],{"id":73,"title":74,"summary":75,"published_at":76,"severity":65,"vendor":77,"products":78},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[79,80,81],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"count":83,"next":84,"previous":37,"results":85},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[86,94,102],{"id":87,"title":88,"summary":89,"published_at":90,"type":91,"link":92,"image_url":93},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":95,"title":96,"summary":97,"published_at":98,"type":99,"link":100,"image_url":101},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]