[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-24895":30,"landing-articles":82},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":51,"technologies":54,"references":56,"score":60,"epss_score":61,"epss_percentile":62,"is_kev":63,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},68148,"CVE-2025-24895","EUVD-2025-4791","AspNetCore Remote Authenticator for CIE3.0 Allows SAML Response Signature Verification Bypass\n\n### Description\n\nAuthentication using Spid and CIE is based on the SAML2 standard which provides for two entities:\n\nIdentity Provider (IdP): the system that authenticates users and provides identity information ( SAML assertions ) to the Service Provider, essentially, it is responsible for managing user credentials and identity;\nService Provider (SP): The system that provides a service to the user and relies on the Identity Provider to authenticate the user, receives SAML assertions from the IdP to grant access to resources.\nThe library `cie-aspnetcorerefers` to the second entity, i.e. the SP, and implements the validation logic of the SAML assertions present within the SAML response . The following is a summary diagram of an authentication flow via SAML:\n\n![](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F5b10c8f8-5121-446f-95f8-c0355daa5959)\n\nAs shown in the diagram, the IdP, after verifying the user's credentials, generates a signed SAML response, this is propagated to the SP by the user's browser and the SP, after verifying the signature, can extract the data needed to build the user's session.\n\nThe signature validation logic is central as it ensures that you cannot craft a SAML response with arbitrary assertions and thus impersonate other users.\n\nThe following is the validation code implemented in `cie-aspnetcore`.\n\n```csharp\ninternal static bool VerifySignature(XmlDocument signedDocument, IdentityProvider? identityProvider = null){\n    \u002F\u002F...SNIP...\n    SignedXml signedXml = new SignedXml(signedDocument);\n    if (identityProvider is not null)\n    {\n        bool validated = false;\n        foreach (var certificate in identityProvider.X509SigningCertificates){\n            var publicMetadataCert = new X509Certificate2(Convert.FromBase64String(certificate));\n            XmlNodeList nodeList = (signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName(\"ds:Signature\")?.Count > 1) ?\n                                    signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName(\"ds:Signature\") :\n                                   (signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName(\"ns2:Signature\")?.Count > 1) ?\n                                    signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName(\"ns2:Signature\") :\n                                    signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName(\"Signature\");\n            signedXml.LoadXml((XmlElement)nodeList[0]);\n            validated |= signedXml.CheckSignature(publicMetadataCert, true);\n        }\n        return validated;\n    }\n    else{\n        XmlNodeList nodeList = (signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName(\"ds:Signature\")?.Count > 0) ?\n                               signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName(\"ds:Signature\") :\n                               signedDocument.GetElementsByTagName(\"Signature\");\n        signedXml.LoadXml((XmlElement)nodeList[0]);\n        return signedXml.CheckSignature();\n    }\n    \u002F\u002F...SNIP...\n}\n```\n\nThe parameter `signedDocument` contains the SAML response in XML format, while the parameter `identityProvider` can contain the IdP info. If the parameter `identityProvider` has been specified, the public certificates of that IdP are extracted, so as to force their use during the signature verification, otherwise the certificates configured within the application are used.\n\nNext, a response envelope is generated nodeList within which all XML elements containing an XML signature of part or all of the SAML response envelope are saved.\n\nFinally, the first element of this list, i.e. the first signature found, is extracted and verified.\n\nIn a normal authentication flow, the SAML response looks like this (note that some fields and attributes have been omitted for ease of reading):\n\n```xml\n\u003Csamlp:Response ID=\"response_id\" IssueInstant=\"2025-01-07T13:37:00Z\" Version=\"2.0\" xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" xmlns:samlp=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol\">\n    \u003Csaml:Issuer Format=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity\">\n        https:\u002F\u002Fdemo.spid.gov.it\u002Fvalidator\n    \u003C\u002Fsaml:Issuer>\n    \u003Cds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2000\u002F09\u002Fxmldsig#\">\n        \u003Cds:SignedInfo>\n            \u003Cds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002F10\u002Fxml-exc-c14n#\"\u002F>\n            \u003Cds:SignatureMethod Algorithm=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002F04\u002Fxmldsig-more#rsa-sha256\"\u002F>\n            \u003Cds:Reference URI=\"#response_id\">\n                \u003Cds:Transforms>\n                    \u003Cds:Transform Algorithm=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2000\u002F09\u002Fxmldsig#enveloped-signature\"\u002F>\n                \u003C\u002Fds:Transforms>\n                \u003Cds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002F04\u002Fxmlenc#sha256\"\u002F>\n                \u003Cds:DigestValue>\n                    \u003C!-- DIGEST -->\n                \u003C\u002Fds:DigestValue>\n            \u003C\u002Fds:Reference>\n        \u003C\u002Fds:SignedInfo>\n        \u003Cds:SignatureValue>\n           \u003C!-- SIGNATURE -->\n        \u003C\u002Fds:SignatureValue>\n        \u003Cds:KeyInfo>\n            \u003Cds:X509Data>\n                \u003Cds:X509Certificate>\n                    \u003C!-- CERTIFICATE -->\n                \u003C\u002Fds:X509Certificate>\n            \u003C\u002Fds:X509Data>\n        \u003C\u002Fds:KeyInfo>\n    \u003C\u002Fds:Signature>\n    \u003Csamlp:Status>\n        \u003Csamlp:StatusCode Value=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success\"\u002F>\n    \u003C\u002Fsamlp:Status>\n    \u003Csaml:Assertion ID=\"assertion_id\" IssueInstant=\"2025-01-07T13:37:00Z\" Version=\"2.0\" xmlns:xs=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002FXMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002FXMLSchema-instance\">\n        \u003Csaml:Issuer Format=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:entity\">\n            https:\u002F\u002Fdemo.spid.gov.it\u002Fvalidator\n        \u003C\u002Fsaml:Issuer>\n        \u003Cds:Signature xmlns:ds=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2000\u002F09\u002Fxmldsig#\">\n            \u003Cds:SignedInfo>\n                \u003Cds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002F10\u002Fxml-exc-c14n#\"\u002F>\n                \u003Cds:SignatureMethod Algorithm=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002F04\u002Fxmldsig-more#rsa-sha256\"\u002F>\n                \u003Cds:Reference URI=\"#assertion_id\">\n                    \u003Cds:Transforms>\n                        \u003Cds:Transform Algorithm=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2000\u002F09\u002Fxmldsig#enveloped-signature\"\u002F>\n                    \u003C\u002Fds:Transforms>\n                    \u003Cds:DigestMethod Algorithm=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002F04\u002Fxmlenc#sha256\"\u002F>\n                    \u003Cds:DigestValue>\n                        \u003C!-- DIGEST -->\n                    \u003C\u002Fds:DigestValue>\n                \u003C\u002Fds:Reference>\n            \u003C\u002Fds:SignedInfo>\n            \u003Cds:SignatureValue>\n                \u003C!-- SIGNATURE -->\n            \u003C\u002Fds:SignatureValue>\n            \u003Cds:KeyInfo>\n                \u003Cds:X509Data>\n                    \u003Cds:X509Certificate>\n                        \u003C!-- CERTIFICATE -->\n                    \u003C\u002Fds:X509Certificate>\n                \u003C\u002Fds:X509Data>\n            \u003C\u002Fds:KeyInfo>\n        \u003C\u002Fds:Signature>\n        \u003Csaml:AttributeStatement>\n            \u003Csaml:Attribute Name=\"spidCode\" NameFormat=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic\">\n                \u003Csaml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002FXMLSchema\" xmlns:xsi=\"http:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002F2001\u002FXMLSchema-instance\" xsi:type=\"xs:string\">\n                    AGID-001\n                \u003C\u002Fsaml:AttributeValue>\n            \u003C\u002Fsaml:Attribute>\n            \u003C!-- ... SNIP ... -->\n        \u003C\u002Fsaml:AttributeStatement>\n    \u003C\u002Fsaml:Assertion>\n\u003C\u002Fsamlp:Response>\n```\n\nThe SDK code would get as the first element of the `nodeList`, that is `nodeList[0]`, the signature referring to the entire SAML response, in fact the reference of the first signature `\u003Cds:Reference URI=\"#response_id\">` points to the root object `\u003Csamlp:Response ID=\"response_id\" ...>`. Therefore, verifying this signature will ensure that the entire content of the SAML response is intact and authentic.\n\nHowever, there is no guarantee that the first signature refers to the root object, so if an attacker injects a signed element as the first element, all other signatures will not be verified. The only requirement is to have a legitimately signed XML element from the IdP, which is easily accomplished using the public metadata of the IdP.\n\nThe SAML response would be structured like this:\n\n![](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F42b8c97a-96ae-45c9-afed-aab7066201a1)\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker could craft an arbitrary SAML response that would be accepted by SPs using the vulnerable SDKs, allowing him to impersonate any Spid and\u002For CIE user.\n\n### Complexity of the attack\nThe attacker needs an XML block containing a valid signature from one of the IdPs accepted by the SP. As described above, this requirement is satisfied by reading the public metadata of the IdP which is represented by a signed XML block of the IdP.\n\n### Related issues\nN\u002FA\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Clone the repository https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fitalia\u002Fspid-aspnetcore.git\n2. From the root of the project, enter the folder relating to the example webapp: `samples\u002F1_SimpleSPWebApp\u002FSPID.AspNetCore.WebApp\u002F`\n3. Change the value of the `AssertionConsumerServiceURL` key in the file `appsettings.json` to a custom domain: `https:\u002F\u002F$CUSTOM_DOMAIN:$CUSTOM_PORT\u002Fsignin-spid`\n4. Compile and run the sample webapp using the following command, taking care to replace the placeholders with the same values ​​used in step 3: `dotnet build \"SPID.AspNetCore.WebApp.csproj\" -o .\u002Fapp\u002Fbuild && dotnet publish \"SPID.AspNetCore.WebApp.csproj\" -o .\u002Fapp\u002Fpublish && dotnet .\u002Fapp\u002Fpublish\u002FSPID.AspNetCore.WebApp.dll -urls=https:\u002F\u002F$CUSTOM_DOMAIN:$CUSTOM_PORT`\n5. Visit URL: `https:\u002F\u002F$CUSTOM_DOMAIN:$CUSTOM_PORT\u002F`\n6. Click \"Enter with SPID\" > \"DemoSpid\" (second IdP in the list)\n7. Visit the \"Response\" > \"Check Response\" section\n8. Insert the following string into the \"Audience\" field (right column): `https:\u002F\u002Fspid.aspnetcore.it\u002F`\n9. Click \"Send response to Service Provider\", note the redirect to  `\u002Fhome\u002Floggedin` and consequently the correct execution of the login on the example portal\n\n![](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Faf3775a1-5f01-4ffa-9b28-730fef487869)\n\n10. Repeat steps 5 to 8 inclusive\n11. Intercept the HTTP request generated in step 8 via an HTTP Proxy, such as PortSwigger's BurpSuite\n12. Perform URL-decoding and Base64-decoding of the POST `SAMLResponse` parameter\n13. Insert the content present at the following URL in the second line of the XML: https:\u002F\u002Fdemo.spid.gov.it\u002Fmetadata.xml\n14. Change the contents of the tag `\u003Csaml:Assertion>`, for example change the `email` attribute to an arbitrary value: `spid.tech@shielder.it`\n15. Run Base64-encoding and then URL-encoding the `SAMLResponse` parameter\n16. Send the request and note the redirect to `\u002Fhome\u002Floggedin` which demonstrates the correct identification and therefore also the verification of the arbitrary signature inserted in `SAMLResponse` despite the modification of the assertion\n\n![](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fa725401f-7884-4910-b4e5-b6c55c1cde83)\n\n### Recommended Solution\n\nVerify all signatures within the SAML response and do not accept unsigned XML elements.\n\n### References\n\n- https:\u002F\u002Fcheatsheetseries.owasp.org\u002Fcheatsheets\u002FSAML_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html\n\n### Credits\n- [Abdel Adim `smaury` Oisfi](https:\u002F\u002Fx.com\u002Fsmaury92) di [Shielder](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.shielder.com)\n- [Paolo`paupu` Cavaglià](https:\u002F\u002Fx.com\u002Fpaupu_95) di [Shielder](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.shielder.com)\n- [Nicola `fromveeko` Davico](https:\u002F\u002Fx.com\u002Ffromveeko) di [Shielder](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.shielder.com)","2025-02-18T19:25:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":45,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",9.1,"NETWORK","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:N","HIGH","NONE","LOW",true,[49,50],"CWE-287","CWE-290",[52,53],"cpe:2.3:a:cie.aspnetcore.authentication:cie.aspnetcore.authentication:2.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:cie.aspnetcore.authentication:cie.aspnetcore.authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[55],"Cie.Aspnetcore.Authentication Cie.Aspnetcore.Authentication",[57,58,59],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fitalia\u002Fcie-aspnetcore\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-vq63-8f72-f486","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fitalia\u002Fcie-aspnetcore\u002Fcommit\u002Fe66b7f336ff5d4c69f95f197f27f3145f2484994","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fitalia\u002Fcie-aspnetcore",0.66,0.00607,0.48726,false,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2025-02-18T19:39:11.324365Z","yes","partial","poc",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:Y\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T09:11:46.037411\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[79],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":83,"next":84,"previous":6,"results":85},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[86,94,102],{"id":87,"title":88,"summary":89,"published_at":90,"type":91,"link":92,"image_url":93},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":95,"title":96,"summary":97,"published_at":98,"type":99,"link":100,"image_url":101},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]