[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-25194":30,"landing-articles":80},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":52,"references":54,"score":58,"epss_score":59,"epss_percentile":60,"is_kev":61,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":62,"attack_mappings":72,"exploits":79},84133,"CVE-2025-25194","EUVD-2025-4082","Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in activitypub_federation\n\n### Summary\nThis vulnerability allows a user to bypass any predefined hardcoded URL path or security anti-Localhost mechanism and perform an arbitrary GET request to any Host, Port and URL using a Webfinger Request.\n\n### Details\nThe Webfinger endpoint takes a remote domain for checking accounts as a feature, however, as per the ActivityPub spec (https:\u002F\u002Fwww.w3.org\u002FTR\u002Factivitypub\u002F#security-considerations), on the security considerations section at B.3, access to Localhost services should be prevented while running in production.\nThe library attempts to prevent Localhost access using the following mechanism (\u002Fsrc\u002Fconfig.rs):\n```rust\npub(crate) async fn verify_url_valid(&self, url: &Url) -> Result\u003C(), Error> {\n        match url.scheme() {\n            \"https\" => {}\n            \"http\" => {\n                if !self.allow_http_urls {\n                    return Err(Error::UrlVerificationError(\n                        \"Http urls are only allowed in debug mode\",\n                    ));\n                }\n            }\n            _ => return Err(Error::UrlVerificationError(\"Invalid url scheme\")),\n        };\n\n        \u002F\u002F Urls which use our local domain are not a security risk, no further verification needed\n        if self.is_local_url(url) {\n            return Ok(());\n        }\n\n        if url.domain().is_none() {\n            return Err(Error::UrlVerificationError(\"Url must have a domain\"));\n        }\n\n        if url.domain() == Some(\"localhost\") && !self.debug {\n            return Err(Error::UrlVerificationError(\n                \"Localhost is only allowed in debug mode\",\n            ));\n        }\n\n        self.url_verifier.verify(url).await?;\n\n        Ok(())\n    }\n```\nThere are multiple issues with the current anti-Localhost implementation: \n\n1. It does not resolve the domain address supplied by the user.\n2. The Localhost check is using only a simple comparison method while ignoring more complex malicious tampering attempts.\n3. It filters only localhost domains, without any regard for alternative local IP domains or other sensitive domains, such internal network or cloud metadata domains.\n\nWe can reach the verify_url_valid function while sending a Webfinger request to lookup a user’s account (\u002Fsrc\u002Ffetch\u002Fwebfinger.rs):\n\n```rust\npub async fn webfinger_resolve_actor\u003CT: Clone, Kind>(\n    identifier: &str,\n    data: &Data\u003CT>,\n) -> Result\u003CKind, \u003CKind as Object>::Error>\nwhere\n    Kind: Object + Actor + Send + 'static + Object\u003CDataType = T>,\n    for\u003C'de2> \u003CKind as Object>::Kind: serde::Deserialize\u003C'de2>,\n    \u003CKind as Object>::Error: From\u003Ccrate::error::Error> + Send + Sync + Display,\n{\n    let (_, domain) = identifier\n        .splitn(2, '@')\n        .collect_tuple()\n        .ok_or(WebFingerError::WrongFormat.into_crate_error())?;\n    let protocol = if data.config.debug { \"http\" } else { \"https\" };\n    let fetch_url =\n        format!(\"{protocol}:\u002F\u002F{domain}\u002F.well-known\u002Fwebfinger?resource=acct:{identifier}\");\n    debug!(\"Fetching webfinger url: {}\", &fetch_url);\n\n    let res: Webfinger = fetch_object_http_with_accept(\n        &Url::parse(&fetch_url).map_err(Error::UrlParse)?,\n        data,\n        &WEBFINGER_CONTENT_TYPE,\n    )\n    .await?\n    .object;\n\n    debug_assert_eq!(res.subject, format!(\"acct:{identifier}\"));\n    let links: Vec\u003CUrl> = res\n        .links\n        .iter()\n        .filter(|link| {\n            if let Some(type_) = &link.kind {\n                type_.starts_with(\"application\u002F\")\n            } else {\n                false\n            }\n        })\n        .filter_map(|l| l.href.clone())\n        .collect();\n\n    for l in links {\n        let object = ObjectId::\u003CKind>::from(l).dereference(data).await;\n        match object {\n            Ok(obj) => return Ok(obj),\n            Err(error) => debug!(%error, \"Failed to dereference link\"),\n        }\n    }\n    Err(WebFingerError::NoValidLink.into_crate_error().into())\n}\n```\n\nThe Webfinger logic takes the user account from the GET parameter “resource” and sinks the domain directly into the hardcoded Webfinger URL (“{protocol}:\u002F\u002F{domain}\u002F.well-known\u002Fwebfinger?resource=acct:{identifier}”) without any additional checks.\nAfterwards the user domain input will pass into the “fetch_object_http_with_accept” function and finally into the security check on “verify_url_valid” function, again, without any form of sanitizing or input validation.\nAn adversary can cause unwanted behaviours using multiple techniques:\n\n1. **_Gaining control over the query’s path:_**\nAn adversary can manipulate the Webfinger hard-coded URL, gaining full control over the GET request domain, path and port by submitting malicious input like: hacker@hacker_host:1337\u002Fhacker_path?hacker_param#, which in turn will result in the following string:\nhttp[s]:\u002F\u002Fhacker_host:1337\u002Fhacker_path?hacker_param#\u002F.well-known\u002Fwebfinger?resource=acct:{identifier}, directing the URL into another domain and path without any issues as the hash character renders the rest of the URL path unrecognized by the webserver.\n\n2. **_Bypassing the domain’s restriction using DNS resolving mechanism:_**\nAn adversary can manipulate the security check and force it to look for internal services regardless the Localhost check by using a domain name that resolves into a local IP (such as: localh.st, for example), as the security check does not verify the resolved IP at all - any service under the Localhost domain can be reached.\n\n3. _**Bypassing the domain’s restriction using official Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs):**_\nIn the official DNS specifications, a fully qualified domain name actually should end with a dot.\nWhile most of the time a domain name is presented without any trailing dot, the resolver will assume it exists, however - it is still possible to use a domain name with a trailing dot which will resolve correctly.\nAs the Localhost check is mainly a simple comparison check - if we register a “hacker@localhost.” domain it will pass the test as “localhost” is not equal to “localhost.”, however the domain will be valid (Using this mechanism it is also possible to bypass any domain blocklist mechanism).\n\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Activate a local HTTP server listening to port 1234 with a “secret.txt” file:\n`python3 -m http.server 1234`\n2. Open the “main.rs” file inside the “example” folder on the activitypub-federated-rust project, and modify the “beta@localhost” string into “hacker@localh.st:1234\u002Fsecret.txt?something=1#”.\n3. Run the example using the following command:\n`cargo run --example local_federation axum`\n4. View the console of the Python’s HTTP server and see that a request for a “secret.txt” file was performed.\n\nThis proves that we can redirect the URL to any domain and path we choose.\nNow on the next steps we will prove that the security checks of Localhost and blocked domains can be easily bypassed (both checks use the same comparison mechanism).\n\n1. Now open the “instance.rs” file inside the “example” folder and view that the domain “malicious.com” is blocked (you can switch it to any desired domain address).\n2. Change the same “beta@localhost” string into “hacker@malicious.com” and run the example command to see that the malicious domain blocking mechanism is working as expected.\n3. Now change the “hacker@malicious.com” string into  “hacker@malicious.com.” string and re-initiate the example, view now that the check passed successfully.\n4. You can combine both methods on “localhost.” domain (or any other domain) to verify that the FQDNs resolving is indeed successful.\n\n\n### Impact\nDue to this issue, any user can cause the server to send GET requests with controlled path and port in an attempt to query services running on the instance’s host, and attempt to execute a Blind-SSRF gadget in hope of targeting a known vulnerable local service running on the victim’s machine.\n\n### Fix Suggestion\nModify the domain validation mechanism and implement the following checks:\n\n1. Resolve the domain and validate it is not using any invalid IP address (internal, or cloud metadata IPs) using regexes of both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.\nFor Implementation example of a good SSRF prevention practice you can review a similiar project such as “Fedify” (https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fdahlia\u002Ffedify\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fsrc\u002Fruntime\u002Furl.ts) which handles external URL resource correctly.\nNote that it is still needed to remove unwanted characters from the URL. \n2. Filter the user’s input for any unwanted characters that should not be present on a domain name, such as #,?,\u002F, etc.\n3. Perform checks that make sure the desired request path is the executed path with the same port.\n4. Disable automatic HTTP redirect follows on the implemented client, as redirects can be used for security mechanisms circumvention.","2025-02-10T20:25:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":13,"attackVector":40,"baseSeverity":41,"vectorString":42,"integrityImpact":43,"userInteraction":43,"attackComplexity":44,"availabilityImpact":43,"privilegesRequired":43,"confidentialityImpact":45},"CHANGED","3.1","NETWORK","MEDIUM","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:H\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:L\u002FI:N\u002FA:N","NONE","HIGH","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-918",[50,51],"cpe:2.3:a:activitypub_federation:activitypub_federation:0.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:activitypub_federation:activitypub_federation:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[53],"Activitypub_Federation Activitypub Federation",[55,56,57],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FLemmyNet\u002Flemmy\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-7723-35v7-qcxw","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-25194","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FLemmyNet\u002Factivitypub-federation-rust",0.4,0.00418,0.35794,false,{"timestamp":63,"automatable":64,"tech_impact":65,"exploitation":66,"cisa_decision":67,"cisa_remediation_timeline":71},"2025-02-11T15:19:28.876838Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":68,"decision":69,"priority":70},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T05:14:43.108829\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[73],{"name":74,"source":75,"tactics":76,"technique_id":78},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[77],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":81,"next":82,"previous":6,"results":83},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[84,92,100],{"id":85,"title":86,"summary":87,"published_at":88,"type":89,"link":90,"image_url":91},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":93,"title":94,"summary":95,"published_at":96,"type":97,"link":98,"image_url":99},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":101,"title":102,"summary":103,"published_at":104,"type":105,"link":106,"image_url":107},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]