[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-27154":30,"landing-articles":87},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":40,"technologies":43,"references":46,"score":53,"epss_score":54,"epss_percentile":55,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":56,"attack_mappings":66,"exploits":85},69573,"CVE-2025-27154","EUVD-2025-5469","Spotipy's cache file, containing spotify auth token, is created with overly broad permissions\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `CacheHandler` class creates a cache file to store the auth token here: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspotipy-dev\u002Fspotipy\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fspotipy\u002Fcache_handler.py#L93-L98\n\nThe file created has `rw-r--r--` (644) permissions by default, when it could be locked down to `rw-------` (600) permissions. I think `600` is a sensible default.\n\n![image](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002F0b7ebbc1-a27a-4528-ab6a-135c7886766a)\n\n### Details\n\nThis leads to overly broad exposure of the spotify auth token. If this token can be read by an attacker (another user on the machine, or a process running as another user), it can be used to perform administrative actions on the Spotify account, depending on the scope granted to the token.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun an application that uses spotipy with client creation like this:\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport spotipy\nfrom os import getenv\n\ndef create_spotify_client(client_id: str, client_secret: str) -> spotipy.Spotify:\n    \"\"\"Create and return an authenticated Spotify client.\n\n    Args:\n        client_id: Spotify API client ID\n        client_secret: Spotify API client secret\n\n    Returns:\n        An authenticated Spotify client instance\n    \"\"\"\n    cache_path = Path.home() \u002F \".cache\" \u002F \"spotify-backup\u002F.auth_cache\"\n    cache_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n    cache_handler = spotipy.cache_handler.CacheFileHandler(cache_path=str(cache_path))\n\n    client = spotipy.Spotify(\n        auth_manager=spotipy.oauth2.SpotifyOAuth(\n            client_id=client_id,\n            client_secret=client_secret,\n            redirect_uri=\"http:\u002F\u002Flocalhost:8000\u002Fcallback\",\n            cache_handler=cache_handler,\n            scope=[\n                \"user-library-read\",\n                \"playlist-read-private\",\n                \"playlist-read-collaborative\",\n            ],\n        )\n    )\n\n    return client\n\ncreate_spotify_client()\n```\n\nAnd then check the file permissions on the cache file that was created with:\n\n```bash\n$ ls -la ~\u002F.cache\u002Fspotify-backup\u002F.auth_cache`\n.rw-r--r--. alichtman alichtman 562 B Thu Feb 20 02:12:33 2025  \u002Fhome\u002Falichtman\u002F.cache\u002Fspotify-backup\u002F.auth_cache\n```\n\nIf this issue is combined with another misconfiguration, like having `o+r` permissions set on your home directory, an attacker will be able to read this file and steal this auth token.\n\nGood defense in depth would be to restrict read permissions on this cache file that contains an auth token\n\n### Impact\n\nPotential exposure of Spotify auth token to other users with access to the machine. A worst case scenario is if the token is granted all permissions, and can be used to do any of:\n\n- exfiltrate spotify likes \u002F saved playlists\n- delete your content\n- modify your content w\u002Fo your permission\n\nIf someone were to discover an RCE in Spotify that you could trigger on a machine by having a song played (or song metadata parsed or something), this auth token could maybe be used to add a song to a playlist, or control playback (allowing further exploitation).","2025-02-28T02:34:00Z",{},false,[39],"CWE-276",[41,42],"cpe:2.3:a:spotipy_project:spotipy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","cpe:2.3:a:spotipy:spotipy:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[44,45],"Spotipy_Project Spotipy","Spotipy Spotipy",[47,48,49,50,51,52],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspotipy-dev\u002Fspotipy\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fspotipy\u002Fcache_handler.py#L93-L98","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspotipy-dev\u002Fspotipy\u002Fcommit\u002F1ca453f6ef87a2a9e9876f52b6cb38d13532ccf2","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspotipy-dev\u002Fspotipy\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F2.25.1","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspotipy-dev\u002Fspotipy\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-pwhh-q4h6-w599","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-27154","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fspotipy-dev\u002Fspotipy",0,0.00611,0.48932,{"timestamp":57,"automatable":58,"tech_impact":59,"exploitation":60,"cisa_decision":61,"cisa_remediation_timeline":65},"2025-02-27T14:29:34.168048Z","no","total","none",{"vector":62,"decision":63,"priority":64},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T08:12:53.295635\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[67,76],{"name":68,"source":69,"cwe_ids":70,"tactics":71,"capec_ids":73,"technique_id":75},"File and Directory Discovery","capec",[39],[72],"discovery",[74],"CAPEC-127","T1083",{"name":77,"source":69,"cwe_ids":78,"tactics":79,"capec_ids":82,"technique_id":84},"Services File Permissions Weakness",[39],[80,81],"execution","stealth",[83],"CAPEC-1","T1574.010",[86],{"link":50},{"count":88,"next":89,"previous":6,"results":90},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[91,99,107],{"id":92,"title":93,"summary":94,"published_at":95,"type":96,"link":97,"image_url":98},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":100,"title":101,"summary":102,"published_at":103,"type":104,"link":105,"image_url":106},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":108,"title":109,"summary":110,"published_at":111,"type":112,"link":113,"image_url":114},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]