[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-43858":30,"landing-articles":82},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":47,"cwes":48,"cpes":51,"technologies":53,"references":55,"score":61,"epss_score":62,"epss_percentile":63,"is_kev":47,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":64,"attack_mappings":74,"exploits":81},64285,"CVE-2025-43858","EUVD-2025-11986","YoutubeDLSharp allows command injection on windows system due to non sanitized arguments\n\n## Summary\nThis vulnerability only apply when running on a Windows OS.\nAn unsafe conversion of arguments allows the injection of a malicous commands when starting `yt-dlp` from a commands prompt.\n\n> [!CAUTION]\n> **NOTE THAT DEPENDING ON THE CONTEXT AND WHERE THE LIBRARY IS USED, THIS MAY HAVE MORE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES. FOR EXAMPLE, A USER USING THE LIBRARY LOCALLY IS A LOT LESS VULNERABLE THAN AN ASP.NET APPLICATION ACCEPTING INPUTS FROM A NETWORK\u002FINTERNET.**\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability have been implemented in a commit (https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fcommit\u002Ffdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50) 3 year ago to fix a issue with unicode characters on Windows.  ( In the latest version at the time of writing this, the code seems to have moved here : https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fblob\u002Fb2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002FYoutubeDLProcess.cs#L87 )\nIn this commit, a new way of starting yt-dlp was implemented, method that was defined as the default behaviour.  \n\nWhen the internal method [`ConvertToArgs`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fcommit\u002Ffdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R64) get called, the application will test multiples conditions to decide on how the yt-dlp application should be started. The condition we are interesed in, as well a the default one on Windows, is at [line 99](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fcommit\u002Ffdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R99) . Inside the `if` statement, we can see that insead of directly calling the `yt-dlp` binary, a command prompt is opened to run `yt-dlp`.  \n\n**The problem arises when you realize that both arguments in the `ConvertToArgs` method may be provided by an untrusted client.** Since the documentation of YoutubeDLSharp does not warn developers about this behavior, they might assume that the library handles this safely by ensuring that the arguments are secure to run inside a command prompt. Instead, the two potentially malicious arguments are directly appended to the command string without any sanitization (see line [104](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fcommit\u002Ffdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R104) and [107](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fcommit\u002Ffdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R107)).\n\n\n\n## PoC\nFor this example, I'm going to use the version `1.1.1` and a method inside [YoutubeDL.cs](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fblob\u002Fb2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002FYoutubeDL.cs). Assuming you are running on a Windows OS, this method will by default use a CMD to open yt-dlp.\n\n```c#\nusing YoutubeDLSharp;\n\npublic async Task\u003CRunResult\u003CVideoData>> GetMediaInformation()\n{\n        YoutubeDL youtubeDl = new YoutubeDL();\n\t\u002F\u002F Fetch media information using a badly crafted \"url\" (escaped)\n\treturn await youtubeDl.RunVideoDataFetch(\"https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\\\" & start calc.exe\");\n}\n```\nAt the call of `GetMediaInformation`, the method `RunVideoDataFetch` will be called, internally this method will call the vulnerable method [`ConvertToArgs`] resulting in the following string: \n```\n\u002FC chcp 65001 >nul 2>&1 && \"yt-dlp.exe\"  --external-downloader \"m3u8:native\" --external-downloader-args \"ffmpeg:-nostats -loglevel 0\" -o \"C:\\Users\\\u003Chidden>\\Documents\\GitHub\\\u003Chidden>\\\u003Chidden>\\bin\\Release\\net8.0\\%(title)s [%(id)s]_%(epoch)s.%(ext)s\" --force-overwrites --no-part -i --ignore-config --ffmpeg-location \"ffmpeg.exe\" --exec \"echo outfile: {}\" -- \"https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\" & start calc.exe\"\n```\n>[!NOTE]\n> Some text have been replaced by `\u003Chidden>` inside the command.\n\nThe important part here is at the end of the command, we can see `\"https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\" & start calc.exe\"`, if we compare it with our  \nmalicious URL `https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\" & start calc.exe`, we can see that the method added quotes at the start and the end of the string. However, our additional quote in the URL followed by the `&` character made it so the CMD interprets what follows the `&` as a new command, thus executing `yt-dlp` **AND** the *very* dangerous `start calc.exe` 😊.\n\nHere is a screenshot of the processes using another malicious url `https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F\" & start msinfo32`\n![showcase](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fuser-attachments\u002Fassets\u002Fd6f5513c-a69b-4cdd-9820-3f4d71b5c457)\n\n## Impact\nEvery users running a effected version on a Windows OS with the [`UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround`](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fcommit\u002Ffdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50#diff-8ec44b4ade6ce6ed38ebf7e765dc86c426984a18304cd1cd320bf92500133c88R44) value defined to true (default behaviour). If you are using build-in methods form the [YoutubeDL.cs](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fblob\u002Fb2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002FYoutubeDL.cs) file, the value is `true` by default and **you cannot disable it from theses methods**.\n\n## Patch\n\nUpgrade to **v.1.1.2 or higher** of YoutubeDLSharp. The `UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround` property has been removed entirely in v.1.1.2.\n\n## Workaround\n(only for v1.1.1 or lower, please upgrade to the latest version)\n\n### Using `YoutubeDLProcess`\nIf you are using a `YoutubeDLProcess` object directly to communicate with yt-dlp, you can disable `UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround` to mitigate the vulnerability. Doing so will execute the yt-dlp binary directly. However, you will lose support for Unicode characters.\n**Example:**\n```c#\nYoutubeDLProcess youtubeDLProc = new YoutubeDLProcess()\n{\n       UseWindowsEncodingWorkaround = false\n};\n```\n\n### Sanitizing url\nIf you want to keep support for Unicode characters or are using methods from the [YoutubeDL.cs](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fblob\u002Fb2f7968a2ef06a9c7b2c212785cfeac0b187b6d8\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002FYoutubeDL.cs) file, you would need to manually sanitize your inputs until a version with a fix is released. For URL sanitization, I managed to prevent the exploitation of the PoC by creating this method. However, I can't guarantee it would work in every case.\n```c#\n\t\tpublic static string? SanitizeUrl(string url)\n\t\t{\n\t\t\t\u002F\u002F Parse the URL using Uri\n\t\t\tif (Uri.TryCreate(url, UriKind.Absolute, out Uri? urlUri))\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\t\u002F\u002F According to the microsoft docs getting the absolute url append\n\t\t\t\t\u002F\u002F all of the others fields, theses fields get URI escaped when you GET them\n\t\t\t\t\u002F\u002F (https:\u002F\u002Flearn.microsoft.com\u002Fen-us\u002Fdotnet\u002Fapi\u002Fsystem.uri.query?view=net-8.0#remarks) \n\t\t\t\treturn urlUri.AbsoluteUri;\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\t\u002F\u002F Invalid url format\n\t\t\treturn null;\n\t\t}\n```\nThis works because Uri properties have special characters like spaces and `\"` escaped into percent numbers like `%20`, thus turning our malicous url into `https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F%22%20&%20start%20calc.exe`.\n**Note, however, that if you modify the options with which yt-dlp is run, you need to ensure every option is also sanitized (assuming they are taken from a untrusted user input). This method won't work as these options are not URLs.**","2025-04-23T22:25:00Z",{"cvss_v3.1":37},{"scope":38,"version":39,"baseScore":40,"attackVector":41,"baseSeverity":42,"vectorString":43,"integrityImpact":44,"userInteraction":45,"attackComplexity":46,"availabilityImpact":46,"privilegesRequired":45,"confidentialityImpact":44},"CHANGED","3.1",9.2,"LOCAL","CRITICAL","CVSS:3.1\u002FAV:L\u002FAC:L\u002FPR:N\u002FUI:N\u002FS:C\u002FC:H\u002FI:H\u002FA:L","HIGH","NONE","LOW",false,[49,50],"CWE-77","CWE-78",[52],"cpe:2.3:a:youtubedlsharp:youtubedlsharp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[54],"Youtubedlsharp Youtubedlsharp",[56,57,58,59,60],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fcommit\u002Fb6051372bd5af30f95f73de47d9bc71c3a07de0f","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fcommit\u002Ffdf3256da18d0e2da4a2f33ad4a1b72ff8273a50","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-2jh5-g5ch-43q5","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-43858","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FBluegrams\u002FYoutubeDLSharp",0.46,0.00264,0.18146,{"timestamp":65,"automatable":66,"tech_impact":67,"exploitation":68,"cisa_decision":69,"cisa_remediation_timeline":73},"2025-04-24T19:03:58.754946Z","no","total","poc",{"vector":70,"decision":71,"priority":72},"CISAv1\u002FE:P\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T09:11:26.617875\u002F","attend","medium","14D",[75],{"name":76,"source":77,"tactics":78,"technique_id":80},"Exploitation for Privilege Escalation","attack_vector",[79],"privilege-escalation","T1068",[],{"count":83,"next":84,"previous":6,"results":85},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[86,94,102],{"id":87,"title":88,"summary":89,"published_at":90,"type":91,"link":92,"image_url":93},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":95,"title":96,"summary":97,"published_at":98,"type":99,"link":100,"image_url":101},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":103,"title":104,"summary":105,"published_at":106,"type":107,"link":108,"image_url":109},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]