[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"landing-trending":3,"cve-CVE-2025-46569":30,"landing-articles":134},{"count":4,"next":5,"previous":6,"results":7},266,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Ftrending_attacks\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",null,[8,17,20],{"id":9,"title":10,"summary":11,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":15},265,"Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)","This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.","2026-10-24T10:37:22.192753Z",4,"google",[16],"brotli",{"id":4,"title":10,"summary":18,"published_at":12,"severity":13,"vendor":14,"products":19},"This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it.\r\n\r\nWhy a second control\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli (\"br\") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution.\r\n\r\nAny server that decompresses request bodies sent with \"Content-Encoding: br\" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library.\r\n\r\nThe flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support.\r\n\r\nWhat this control checks\r\n\r\nPatrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service.\r\n\r\nHow to read the result\r\n\r\nPotentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside.\r\n\r\nThis check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification.\r\n\r\nTwo situations are possible. When the decoding is done by your own application or reverse proxy, identify the component and update it. If an update is not possible right away, reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy or WAF.\r\n\r\nWhen the asset is hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN (for example Platform.sh, Upsun or Fastly), the decoding may be done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application. You cannot patch it yourself, but this router handles all the traffic of your site. Ask your provider to confirm that its edge components are patched against CVE-2026-111497. Assets hosted on a managed platform or behind a CDN carry the tag \"paas: platform.sh\" or \"cdn: fastly\" in the asset view: for these assets, the Brotli decoding is done by the provider's edge router, in front of your application, and only the provider can patch it.\r\n\r\nAffected and fixed versions\r\n\r\nGoogle Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution.\r\n\r\nRecommendations\r\n\r\nUpdate every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library.\r\n\r\nReduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with \"Content-Encoding: br\" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as \"gzip, br\". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli.\r\n\r\nContact your edge provider about the status of the pathing (Fastly \u002F Plateform.sh)\r\n\r\nReview outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.",[16],{"id":21,"title":22,"summary":23,"published_at":24,"severity":13,"vendor":25,"products":26},263,"Oracle Java SE JSSE - Improper Access Control & Unauthorized Data Access & Unauthorized Data Modification","Oracle Java SE is the Java runtime and development platform. Its JSSE (Java Secure Socket Extension) component provides TLS\u002FSSL for secure network communication. Oracle GraalVM is a JDK distribution based on the same platform.\r\n\r\nCVE-2026-91403\r\n\r\nA vulnerability in the JSSE component of Oracle Java SE, Oracle GraalVM for JDK and Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition can be exploited by an unauthenticated attacker with network access over multiple protocols. A successful attack can give unauthorized access to critical data and allow unauthorized creation, deletion or modification of data. It can also affect sandboxed Java Web Start applications and applets that run untrusted code. The record lists the weakness as CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) in the CISA ADP entry, while another database lists CWE-295. The record lists these affected versions:\r\n- Oracle Java SE: 8u511, 8u511-perf, 11.0.33, 17.0.21, 21.0.13, 25.0.5, 27.0.1.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM for JDK: 17.0.21, 21.0.13.\r\n- Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition: 21.3.20.\r\n\r\nOracle published an out-of-cycle Security Alert on October 21, 2026. One secondary source says the fix makes Java distrust eight compromised intermediate CA certificates shipped with the JDK. The Oracle-focused sources do not confirm this root cause, so check it against the Oracle advisory. CISA ADP SSVC data shows Exploitation: none, Automatable: yes, Technical Impact: total. The CVE is not in the CISA KEV catalog as of October 22, 2026, and its EPSS score is below 1%.","2026-10-23T14:12:32.871954Z","Oracle",[27,28,29],"Oracle Java SE","Oracle GraalVM Enterprise Edition","Oracle GraalVM for JDK",{"id":31,"cve_id":32,"euvd_id":33,"summary":34,"published":35,"cvss_data":36,"is_remote":37,"cwes":38,"cpes":43,"technologies":45,"references":47,"score":53,"epss_score":54,"epss_percentile":55,"is_kev":37,"cisa_kev_date_added":6,"cisa_kev_due_date":6,"cisa_ssvc":56,"attack_mappings":66,"exploits":133},101804,"CVE-2025-46569","EUVD-2025-12838","OPA server Data API HTTP path injection of Rego\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen run as a server, OPA exposes an HTTP[ Data API](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openpolicyagent.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Frest-api\u002F#data-api) for reading and writing documents. Requesting a virtual document through the Data API entails policy evaluation, where a Rego query containing a single data document [reference](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openpolicyagent.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Fpolicy-language\u002F#references) is constructed from the requested path. This query is then used for policy evaluation.\n\nA HTTP request path can be crafted in a way that injects Rego code into the constructed query. The evaluation result cannot be made to return any other data than what is generated by the requested path, but this path can be misdirected, and the injected Rego code can be crafted to make the query succeed or fail; opening up for oracle attacks or, given the right circumstances, erroneous policy decision results. Furthermore, the injected code can be crafted to be computationally expensive, resulting in a Denial Of Service (DoS) attack.\n\n**Users are only impacted if all of the following apply:**\n\n* OPA is deployed as a standalone server (rather than being used as a Go library)\n* The OPA server is exposed outside of the local host in an untrusted environment.\n* The configured [authorization policy](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openpolicyagent.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Fsecurity\u002F#authentication-and-authorization) does not do exact matching of the `input.path` attribute when deciding if the request should be allowed.\n\n**or, if all of the following apply:**\n\n* OPA is deployed as a standalone server.\n* The service connecting to OPA allows 3rd parties to insert unsanitised text into the path of the HTTP request to OPA’s Data API.\n\n**Note:** With **no** Authorization Policy configured for restricting API access (the default configuration), the RESTful Data API provides access for managing Rego policies; and the RESTful Query API facilitates advanced queries. Full access to these APIs provides both simpler, and broader access than what the security issue describes here can facilitate. As such, OPA servers exposed to a network are **not** considered affected by the attack described here if they are knowingly not restricting access through an Authorization Policy.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in OPA v1.4.0.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n#### Don’t publicly expose OPA’s RESTful APIs ####\n\nUnless necessary for production reasons, network access to OPA’s RESTful APIs should be limited to `localhost` and\u002For trusted networks. \nSince OPA v1.0, unless otherwise configured, the server listener defaults to `localhost`.\n\n#### Enable Authentication to Only Allow Access to Trusted Clients ####\n\nA configured [authentication](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openpolicyagent.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Fsecurity\u002F#authentication-and-authorization) scheme is a requirement when OPA is exposed in an untrusted environment. While requiring authentication alone doesn’t mitigate this attack, it effectively reduces the scope from untrusted clients to trusted clients.\n\n#### Perform Path Validation Using OPA’s Authorization Policy Functionality ####\n\nOPA can be configured to use an [Authorization Policy](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openpolicyagent.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Fsecurity\u002F#authentication-and-authorization) to validate all incoming requests.\nBy authoring the Authorization Policy to only accept paths corresponding to expected Rego package references, this attack can be fully mitigated.\n\nThe HTTP path in a Data API request is of the format `\u002Fv1\u002Fdata\u002F{path:.+}` (`\u002Fv0\u002Fdata\u002F{path:.+}`, for the v0 Data API), where `data\u002F{path:.+}` directly corresponds to a reference to a virtual document, and a prefix of `{path:.+}` corresponds to a Rego `package` declaration. \nE.g. the HTTP path `v1\u002Fdata\u002Fdo\u002Fre\u002Fmi` corresponds to the data reference `data.do.re.mi`, where `do.re` is the package and `mi` is the rule in the following Rego module:\n\n```rego\npackage do.re\n\nmi if {\n\t...\n}\n```\n\nUnless otherwise [configured](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openpolicyagent.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Fconfiguration\u002F#miscellaneous), OPA will use the rule at `data.system.authz.allow` as Authorization Policy. Authorization is enabled by starting OPA with the `--authorization=basic` flag, and the Authorization policy must be made available to the OPA runtime either through a bundle (via the `--bundle` flag or through [discovery](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.openpolicyagent.org\u002Fdocs\u002Flatest\u002Fmanagement-discovery\u002F)) or as an individual module via the command-line.\n\nA trivial Authorization Policy example:\n\n```rego\npackage system.authz\n\nallowed_paths := [\n\t[\"v1\", \"data\", \"policy1\", \"allow\"],\n\t[\"v1\", \"data\", \"policy2\", \"allow\"],\n\t...\n]\n\nallow if {\n\tinput.path in allowed_paths\n}\n```\n\n**Note:** configuring an Authorization Policy in OPA isn't the only way to protect against malicious request paths. Path validation and sanitisation can also be performed by connecting clients and 3rd party intermediaries, such as API gateways, reverse proxies, etc.","2025-05-01T17:02:00Z",{},false,[39,40,41,42],"CWE-94","CWE-863","CWE-770","CWE-78",[44],"cpe:2.3:a:open-policy-agent:opa:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",[46],"Open-Policy-Agent Opa",[48,49,50,51,52],"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-policy-agent\u002Fopa\u002Fcommit\u002Fad2063247a14711882f18c387a511fc8094aa79c","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-policy-agent\u002Fopa\u002Fsecurity\u002Fadvisories\u002FGHSA-6m8w-jc87-6cr7","https:\u002F\u002Fnvd.nist.gov\u002Fvuln\u002Fdetail\u002FCVE-2025-46569","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fopen-policy-agent\u002Fopa","https:\u002F\u002Fpkg.go.dev\u002Fvuln\u002FGO-2025-3660",0,0.00532,0.44647,{"timestamp":57,"automatable":58,"tech_impact":59,"exploitation":60,"cisa_decision":61,"cisa_remediation_timeline":65},"2025-05-02T18:08:05.851856Z","no","total","none",{"vector":62,"decision":63,"priority":64},"CISAv1\u002FE:N\u002FA:N\u002FT:T\u002FM:H\u002F2026-10-26T04:50:53.678050\u002F","track_star","medium","14D",[67,76,82,92,99,105,111,120,127],{"name":68,"source":69,"cwe_ids":70,"tactics":71,"capec_ids":73,"technique_id":75},"HTML Smuggling","capec",[39],[72],"stealth",[74],"CAPEC-35","T1027.006",{"name":77,"source":69,"cwe_ids":78,"tactics":79,"capec_ids":80,"technique_id":81},"Embedded Payloads",[39],[72],[74],"T1027.009",{"name":83,"source":69,"cwe_ids":84,"tactics":85,"capec_ids":87,"technique_id":91},"Direct Network Flood",[41],[86],"impact",[88,89,90],"CAPEC-125","CAPEC-482","CAPEC-528","T1498.001",{"name":93,"source":69,"cwe_ids":94,"tactics":95,"capec_ids":96,"technique_id":98},"Reflection Amplification",[41],[86],[97],"CAPEC-490","T1498.002",{"name":100,"source":69,"cwe_ids":101,"tactics":102,"capec_ids":103,"technique_id":104},"Endpoint Denial of Service",[41],[86],[88],"T1499",{"name":106,"source":69,"cwe_ids":107,"tactics":108,"capec_ids":109,"technique_id":110},"OS Exhaustion Flood",[41],[86],[89],"T1499.001",{"name":112,"source":69,"cwe_ids":113,"tactics":114,"capec_ids":115,"technique_id":119},"Service Exhaustion Flood",[41],[86],[116,89,117,118,90],"CAPEC-469","CAPEC-488","CAPEC-489","T1499.002",{"name":121,"source":69,"cwe_ids":122,"tactics":123,"capec_ids":124,"technique_id":126},"Application Exhaustion Flood",[41],[86],[125],"CAPEC-130","T1499.003",{"name":128,"source":69,"cwe_ids":129,"tactics":130,"capec_ids":131,"technique_id":132},"Resource Forking",[39],[72],[74],"T1564.009",[],{"count":135,"next":136,"previous":6,"results":137},26,"http:\u002F\u002Fweb:8606\u002Fapi\u002Farticles\u002F?page=2&page_size=3&sorted_by=-published_at",[138,146,154],{"id":139,"title":140,"summary":141,"published_at":142,"type":143,"link":144,"image_url":145},30,"PHP2Shell: Two Critical RCE Flaws in PHP (CVSS 9.2)","Unauthenticated code execution demonstrated on WordPress, Drupal and Joomla, and reproduced in our lab. Patched versions and steps to take today.","2026-10-22T00:00:00Z","cve","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002Fc0615c4ee6-1792684469\u002Fphp2shell-2-critical-rce-flaws-php-cvss-9-2.png",{"id":147,"title":148,"summary":149,"published_at":150,"type":151,"link":152,"image_url":153},29,"Manage External Security Across All Your Entities","Centralize the management of entities, users and external security resources while maintaining strict data isolation with Patrowl.","2026-09-15T00:00:00Z","security tips","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fmulti-entity-external-security-how-structure-governance-group-level","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F8b2c0cc5eb-1789551467\u002Fvisu_1_multi_tenancy_dark_1x.webp",{"id":155,"title":156,"summary":157,"published_at":158,"type":159,"link":160,"image_url":161},28,"Will AI Become the Next Hacker? Bruce Schneier Answers at DEF CON 34","Tax law, finance, legislation: Bruce Schneier shows how AI could hack human rule systems just as easily as it hacks software.","2026-09-14T00:00:00Z","hacks","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fen\u002Fblog\u002Fbruce-schneier-def-con-34","https:\u002F\u002Fpatrowl.io\u002Fmedia\u002Fsite\u002F5c616d9db4-1789462598\u002Fai-hacker.en.png"]