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CVE-2025-47948

NVDCIRCLENISA

EUVD-2025-28138 · Published May 19, 2025

Cocotais Bot has builtin .echo command injection

Summary


A command echoing feature in the framework allows users to indirectly trigger privileged behavior by injecting special platform tags. Specifically, an unauthorized user can use the /echo <qqbot-at-everyone /> command to cause the bot to send a message that mentions all members in the chat, bypassing any permission controls. This can lead to spam, disruption, or abuse of notification systems.


Details


The framework provides a command /echo that causes the bot to repeat any user-provided message verbatim in the group chat. However, the bot fails to sanitize or filter platform-specific control elements such as <qqbot-at-everyone />, which, when included in a message, mentions everyone (i.e., @全体成员). While normal users are forbidden from using this tag in normal chats, the bot, which has higher privileges, is allowed to do so.

Since the /echo command blindly echoes any content, a user can exploit this by sending:


/echo <qqbot-at-everyone />


The bot will then send a message containing <qqbot-at-everyone />, causing the platform to interpret it as an @全体成员 command, effectively allowing an unauthorized user to @everyone via the bot.


PoC



  1. Set up a chatbot using the affected framework.
  2. Join the chat that includes the bot as a regular user with no permission to use @全体成员.
  3. Send the following message in the chat:
    
/echo <qqbot-at-everyone />
  1. The bot will respond by repeating the message, and the platform will interpret <qqbot-at-everyone /> as an @全体成员 mention.
  2. All the chat members receive a notification, despite the user lacking that permission.
    
    

Technologies

Cocotais-Bot Cocotais-Bot

Weaknesses

CWE-74

CVSS scores

  • v3.16.5CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

MITRE ATT&CK

Inferred

Where this vulnerability fits in an attack

Initial Access Execution Stealth Defense Impairment

References

Potentially impacted assets

See if this affects your attack surface

Latest trending attack

Criticalyesterday

Google Brotli decoder - Remote Code Execution via compressed requests (Exploitation Check)

This control is the second step of the Patrowl response to CVE-2026-111497 (Node2Shell). It complements the first control of 22 October 2026, which focused on the Node.js runtime, and does not replace it. Why a second control CVE-2026-111497 is an out-of-bounds write in the Google Brotli decoder, the library that decompresses Brotli ("br") data. It was first published as a Node.js vulnerability, because Node.js bundles this decoder. Later publications showed that the flaw is in the library itself. Every product that embeds an affected version of the decoder is concerned, whatever its language or vendor. A public proof of concept demonstrates code execution. Any server that decompresses request bodies sent with "Content-Encoding: br" exposes the decoder to unauthenticated attackers. Known cases include Express 5 and NestJS 11 on Node.js, Koa and Fastify setups, Bun, Envoy and Istio with request decompression enabled, and any application or reverse proxy that decodes Brotli request bodies with an affected library. The flaw also works in the other direction. A malicious server can compromise an unpatched client that decodes a Brotli response, for example Node.js fetch(), Python clients (requests, httpx, aiohttp, Scrapy) with the Brotli or brotlicffi package, or libcurl builds with Brotli support. What this control checks Patrowl sends small, valid Brotli-compressed requests to each asset and observes whether the server decodes them. The check does not depend on the technology: it detects the behaviour, whatever the stack behind it. These requests are what any legitimate client could send. They never reach the vulnerable code path and cannot affect the availability of the service. How to read the result Potentially impacted means the asset decodes Brotli request bodies: the attack surface is exposed. It does not confirm that the asset is vulnerable. The version of the Brotli decoder in use is not visible from the outside. This check covers applications that parse request bodies on their root path. A Not impacted result does not rule out exposure on other routes, nor on the client side. Checking the versions on the servers remains the only exhaustive verification. Affected and fixed versions Google Brotli 1.0.3 to 1.2.0 are affected, fixed in 1.0.10, 1.1.1 and 1.2.1. Fixed releases of the main products embedding it: Node.js 22.23.4, 24.22.1 and 26.12.1 (end-of-life lines 20.x and older and 25.x receive no fix), Bun 1.4.4, Envoy 1.37.8, 1.38.6, 1.39.3 and 1.40.0, Istio 1.29.9, 1.30.6 and 1.31.2, Python Brotli 1.2.1 and brotlicffi 1.2.1.0. Products that link against the system library depend on the Brotli package of the Linux distribution. Recommendations Update every component that embeds the Brotli decoder (only real fix). Start with the assets flagged by this control. Restart the processes after the update. Rebuild containers, single-executable applications and appliances that bundle an affected runtime or library. Reduce the exposure until the update is deployed. Reject requests with "Content-Encoding: br" at the reverse proxy, load balancer or WAF, case-insensitively and including lists such as "gzip, br". On Envoy and Istio, disable request decompression for Brotli. Review outbound calls. List the features that fetch content from servers you do not control, and patch the services that host them first.

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